First Amendment

Plaintiff had posted a “joke” on Facebook claiming that deputies would shoot “the infected” with Covid on sight; was arrested for terrorism; language was protected by First Amendment, deputies not entitled to qualified immunity.

No clearly established First Amendment right to remain silent during police questioning, Wooley v. Maynards, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) recognition of “right to refrain from speaking at all” in connection with right not to display “Live Free or Die” on license plates is at too high a level of generality; no clearly established right to be free from investigation in retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights.

Officer’s telephone call
criticizing plaintiff for talking to reporter did not violate First Amendment where plaintiff
was merely “scared,” an insufficient injury.

Intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions of expression, rather than strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions of expression, was applicable to temporary nighttime curfew imposed by mayor to quell violence and destruction accompanying mass protests; curfew upheld.

Placing inmate in disciplinary/segregated confinement constitutes “adverse action” for First Amendment retaliation claim; if inmate is found guilty of disciplinary infraction after being afforded due process and there is evidence to support the disciplinary panel’s finding, he cannot assert a retaliation claim.

In outrageous qualified immunity decision, court denies absolute immunity but affords qualified immunity to prosecutor who redacted exculpatory information from exoneree’s file, thus interfering with his access to courts claim, because it was not clearly established that redacting exculpatory evidence in response to a public records request violated constitutional or statutory law.

Placing inmate in disciplinary/segregated confinement constitutes “adverse action” for First Amendment retaliation claim.

Police power to declare that an assembly is unlawful and to order individuals to disperse is not limited to situations in which protestors are violating criminal laws; for example, police have authority to insure the free and orderly flow of traffic or to control entry by protestors onto state property not traditionally used as a public forum.

In case by NLG legal observers, court holds that observing and recording police-citizen interactions was not a clearly established First Amendment right in 2015, but there is a strong dissent by Judge Benton who finds right was clearly established; court rejects other theories that police who tear gassed NLG legal observers and others on private property did so in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights; court finds that wearing green hats that said “National Lawyers Guild Legal Observer” did not clearly convey a pro-protest message; third plaintiff who followed polic

Officer lacked probable cause for arresting plaintiff for interfering with an officer by posting sign “Cops Ahead” to warn motorists of distracted-driving operation; well-settled that only physical conduct and fighting words give rise to viable charge of interfering with an officer; plaintiff was speaking on a matter of public concern and speech was not “integral to criminal conduct” and was protected by First Amendment; restricting plaintiff’s speech did not satisfy strict scrutiny and was not narrowly tailored.