Whether officers singled protestor out due to retaliatory animus or were simply acting according to understanding of their responsibilities when they allegedly pepper sprayed him and shot him with rubber bullet could not be resolved on motion to dismiss protestor’s First Amendment retaliation claims against officers on basis of qualified immunity.
Evangelist arrested when he refused to move as ordered by officers when others abused and physically assaulted him; court reverses denial of preliminary injunction, finding content-based heckler’s veto: defined as “government silences particular speech or a particular speaker due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the audience.”
Plaintiff had posted a “joke” on Facebook claiming that deputies would shoot “the infected” with Covid on sight; was arrested for terrorism; language was protected by First Amendment, deputies not entitled to qualified immunity) (Note: this case was previously reported in the 11/21/23 Actionable Conduct report. The earlier decision was withdrawn and superseded by this opinion.
Where county jail employees opened and scanned legal mail into computer that contained memory chip, they could access mail outside of detainee’s presence in the future in violation of his First Amendment rights.
Plaintiff had posted a “joke” on Facebook claiming that deputies would shoot “the infected” with Covid on sight; was arrested for terrorism; language was protected by First Amendment, deputies not entitled to qualified immunity.
No clearly established First Amendment right to remain silent during police questioning, Wooley v. Maynards, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) recognition of “right to refrain from speaking at all” in connection with right not to display “Live Free or Die” on license plates is at too high a level of generality; no clearly established right to be free from investigation in retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights.
Officer’s telephone call
criticizing plaintiff for talking to reporter did not violate First Amendment where plaintiff
was merely “scared,” an insufficient injury.
Intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions of expression, rather than strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions of expression, was applicable to temporary nighttime curfew imposed by mayor to quell violence and destruction accompanying mass protests; curfew upheld.
Placing inmate in disciplinary/segregated confinement constitutes “adverse action” for First Amendment retaliation claim; if inmate is found guilty of disciplinary infraction after being afforded due process and there is evidence to support the disciplinary panel’s finding, he cannot assert a retaliation claim.