City was not liable under Monell for off-duty shooting by officer despite claims that city policies caused shooting; under DeShaney city had no duty to protect plaintiff from private violence.
District court erred in failing to appoint counsel for pro se plaintiff; with counsel it would be reasonably likely that medically ill plaintiff could hold prison doctor liable on claim that he left him in significant and prolonged pain to “teach him a lesson about the consequences of self-destructive behavior,” namely plaintiff’s head-banging in response to hearing voices.
Plaintiff claimed fabrication of evidence, suggestive identification procedures, and withholding exculpatory evidence; in first trial plaintiff prevailed only against one individual defendant and lost against City, damages awarded were $80,000; in subsequent retrial, plaintiff prevailed against two individual defendants and City, obtained $22 million in compensatory damages and a total of $40,000 in punitive damages against two individual defendants; retrial held proper based on defense misrepresentations that a defense witness would be imprisoned for years, when in fact he was released mon
Investigating driver for impersonating police officer justified pat down for weapons because nature of the crime implies possibility of presence of weapon; handcuffing suspect does not always transform Terry stop into arrest, but it is a “rare case” where it would not, facts of this case did not justify handcuffing; officer at time of handcuffing did not have probable cause or even arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff (who was in business of roadside assistance to motorists) for impersonating a police officer; formal arrest of plaintiff was based on probable cause information learned
Claim of excessive force causing plaintiff’s death, court concludes force was not excessive and subject died of cardiac arrhythmia, in course of discussion court acknowledges that officer may not have followed best practices, but concludes, “police training policies and best practices, while relevant, do not define what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment … ‘The excessive-force inquiry is governed by constitutional principles, not police-department regulations … Put another way, a police officer’s compliance with the rules of his department is neither sufficient nor necessary to satisf
Affirming trial judge’s refusal to dismiss case as a sanction for plaintiff’s perjury in pretrial deposition, where he falsely claimed he had never lied in an affidavit and had never spoken to a certain party, on ground that lies did not concern core issues in the litigation and were fully exposed at trial as part of rigorous attack on his credibility; trial judge did not err in admitting certificate of innocence at trial on ground it was relevant to element of favorable termination in malicious prosecution claim.
Trial judge did not err in admitting certificate of innocence at trial on ground it was relevant to element of favorable termination in malicious prosecution claim.
Rejecting claim that officers created situation that ultimately led to subject’s death by failing to make a plan for the encounter, failing to secure knife block in kitchen, and questioning subject aggressively, provoking his violent resistance; such actions did not violate Fourth Amendment and did not render officers’ subsequent use of force unreasonable; court distinguishes earlier cases where officer’s unreasonable actions created situation where deadly force became essentially inevitable.
Even though officer shot suspect after suspect threw knife at him, shooting was justified because suspect was bent on harming officer and might have had other weapons or physically assaulted officer with his body.
Sheriff violated Fourth Amendment when in place of court-ordered release on specific terms, he substituted prolonged detentions and significant restraints on pretrial release of his own devising, causing jailing of group of plaintiffs from three to fourteen days.