7th Circuit

Failure to explain meaning of column of data in cell phone records furnished to criminal defendant did not amount to failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.

Officer did not violate 4th Amendment by relying on John Doe informant to get search warrant; officer did violate 4th Amendment and commit Franks violation by misrepresenting to judge who issued warrant that he knew apartment number of premises to be searched when in fact he had guessed at the number and got it wrong; officer violated 4th Amendment by seeking warrant to search for drugs when informant had said nothing about drugs; warrant that was obtained through Franks violation did not protect from suit officer who committed Franks violation for conducting search based on the warrant; of

Factual disputes precluded appeal of qualified immunity issue; question was whether suspect continued to pose threat of serious harm when he was shot; “shooting an unarmed and surrendering suspect who was not actively resisting in the moments before shooting and who posed a diminishing threat would violate clearly established law. Deadly force is warranted only when an immediate threat of serious harm to the officers is present.

Reversing summary judgment for officer, holding that jury could find that officer who restrained diabetic face down in prone position for several minutes had applied deadly force to a non-suspect civilian who was not resisting arrest and did not pose an imminent threat to any person or himself; depending upon facts to be found by jury, plaintiff’s rights could be held clearly established.

Cause of action for illegal pretrial detention based on fabricated evidence accrued when plaintiff was released on bond; court characterizes claim as one under Fourth Amendment rather than Fourteenth Amendment and thus distinguishes McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149 (2019); bond conditions that he appear in court and requirement that he request permission before leaving state did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Cause of action for illegal pretrial detention based on fabricated evidence accrued when plaintiff was released on bond; court characterizes claim as one under Fourth Amendment rather than Fourteenth Amendment and thus distinguishes McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149 (2019); bond conditions that he appear in court and requirement that he request permission before leaving state did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force after he fired gun was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey because his guilty plea to aggravated discharge of firearm was not undermined by claim that officer used excessive force after the fact; officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting at plaintiff after he fired two rounds and was walking toward officer, and for failure to give a warning, and for using plaintiff as a shield when another party picked up plaintiff’s gun and began firing at officer.

Federal court in Illinois could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Indiana officer who procured warrant against plaintiff and put it on nationwide database, leading to plaintiff’s arrest in Illinois.

Court does not insist upon intent-to-harm standard of Co. of Sacramento v. Lewis, applies standard of “criminal recklessness,” which it equates to “deliberate indifference” to high-speed driving by officer that caused accident; holds that this standard is appropriate in non-emergency situation where officer had actual knowledge of unjustifiable risk to human life and consciously disregarded risk; concluding that officer’s reckless conduct, unjustified by emergency, allowed the inference that he subjectively knew of the risk he created and consciously disregarded it.

Determination of facts and their significance was for the jury, affirming denial of directed verdict for officers on probable cause issue; affirming verdict for $4 million in compensatory damages for nearly three years in jail awaiting trial for murder at which plaintiff was acquitted.