Reversing summary judgment for officer, holding that jury could find that officer who restrained diabetic face down in prone position for several minutes had applied deadly force to a non-suspect civilian who was not resisting arrest and did not pose an imminent threat to any person or himself; depending upon facts to be found by jury, plaintiff’s rights could be held clearly established.
Cause of action for illegal pretrial detention based on fabricated evidence accrued when plaintiff was released on bond; court characterizes claim as one under Fourth Amendment rather than Fourteenth Amendment and thus distinguishes McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149 (2019); bond conditions that he appear in court and requirement that he request permission before leaving state did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Cause of action for illegal pretrial detention based on fabricated evidence accrued when plaintiff was released on bond; court characterizes claim as one under Fourth Amendment rather than Fourteenth Amendment and thus distinguishes McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149 (2019); bond conditions that he appear in court and requirement that he request permission before leaving state did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force after he fired gun was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey because his guilty plea to aggravated discharge of firearm was not undermined by claim that officer used excessive force after the fact; officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting at plaintiff after he fired two rounds and was walking toward officer, and for failure to give a warning, and for using plaintiff as a shield when another party picked up plaintiff’s gun and began firing at officer.
Federal court in Illinois could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Indiana officer who procured warrant against plaintiff and put it on nationwide database, leading to plaintiff’s arrest in Illinois.
Court does not insist upon intent-to-harm standard of Co. of Sacramento v. Lewis, applies standard of “criminal recklessness,” which it equates to “deliberate indifference” to high-speed driving by officer that caused accident; holds that this standard is appropriate in non-emergency situation where officer had actual knowledge of unjustifiable risk to human life and consciously disregarded risk; concluding that officer’s reckless conduct, unjustified by emergency, allowed the inference that he subjectively knew of the risk he created and consciously disregarded it.
Determination of facts and their significance was for the jury, affirming denial of directed verdict for officers on probable cause issue; affirming verdict for $4 million in compensatory damages for nearly three years in jail awaiting trial for murder at which plaintiff was acquitted.
City was not liable under Monell for off-duty shooting by officer despite claims that city policies caused shooting; under DeShaney city had no duty to protect plaintiff from private violence.
District court erred in failing to appoint counsel for pro se plaintiff; with counsel it would be reasonably likely that medically ill plaintiff could hold prison doctor liable on claim that he left him in significant and prolonged pain to “teach him a lesson about the consequences of self-destructive behavior,” namely plaintiff’s head-banging in response to hearing voices.
Plaintiff claimed fabrication of evidence, suggestive identification procedures, and withholding exculpatory evidence; in first trial plaintiff prevailed only against one individual defendant and lost against City, damages awarded were $80,000; in subsequent retrial, plaintiff prevailed against two individual defendants and City, obtained $22 million in compensatory damages and a total of $40,000 in punitive damages against two individual defendants; retrial held proper based on defense misrepresentations that a defense witness would be imprisoned for years, when in fact he was released mon