Malicious Prosecution

Factual disputes precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity: “we hold that, if a police officer finds an individual’s statements regarding his lack of intent to commit a crime to be credible in light of the totality of the circumstances, or if (at the very least) such exculpatory statements could materially impact the probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate judge, that officer cannot then use the incriminating portions of those statements as the foundation for probable cause in an arrest warrant affidavit for that individual, while either knowingly or recklessly concealin

Plaintiff was arrested on a warrant based on tip from a CI and photographic identification by co-perpetrator who had already confessed; when co-perpetrator saw plaintiff in person he said she was not the perpetrator; failure to release plaintiff promptly or to return to magistrate to inform him of non-identification did not violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights; probable cause persisted throughout detention, officer was entitled to rely on facially valid and lawfully obtained warrant, and officer did not take affirmative action to continue the prosecution; in revisionist opinion by Ju

Court lacks jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity where officer’s argument consisted of disagreements with plaintiff’s facts and district court’s determinations that disputes of facts existed; court notes it is clearly established that individuals have a right to be free from malicious prosecution by a defendant who has made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff by, for example, knowingly or recklessly making false statements that are material to the prosecution either in reports or in affidavits filed to secure warrants.

Dismissal of narcotics charge on speedy trial grounds generally satisfies favorable termination element for malicious prosecution claim under the Second Circuit’s “indicative of innocence” standard; court reasons that failure to timely prosecute compels an inference of a lack of reasonable grounds for the prosecution, unless the civil defendant produces evidence of a non-merits based explanation for the failure to prosecute; dismissal on speedy trial grounds also constitutes a favorable termination for a fabrication of evidence claim, that claim does not impugn an ongoing prosecution nor wo

Court finds probable cause for prosecution without relying on presumption of probable cause based on grand jury indictment; in dictum, however, court notes plaintiff’s claim that presumption should have been overcome by evidence that prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to grand jury; court, in dictum, distinguishes between failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and presenting false evidence, suggesting that only the latter would overcome presumption, stating that Constitution does not require prosecutors to present any exculpatory evidence to grand jury.

Standard for malicious prosecution has two elements: “the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizures pursuant to legal process and (2) that the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor”; first element requires “proof that the legal process justifying his seizure was constitutionally infirm and that his seizure would not otherwise be justified without legal process”; affidavit merely alleging it was based on detective’s investigation and eyewitness statements, without any details, failed to establish probable cause

Dismissal of a prosecution as untimely satisfies the favorable termination element of malicious prosecution claim under Fourth Amendment: “After considering both the common law and Fourth Amendment, we hold that the favorable-termination element of malicious prosecution is not limited to terminations that affirmatively support the plaintiff’s innocence. Instead, the favorable-termination element requires only that the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff formally end in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence on at least one charge that authorized his confinement.

Trial judge did not err in admitting certificate of innocence at trial on ground it was relevant to element of favorable termination in malicious prosecution claim.

Dismissal following suppression of evidence because search did not fall within exception to warrant requirement was not a favorable termination based on innocence.

Element of malice may be inferred if defendant caused prosecution without arguable probable cause.