False Arrest

Court finds investigation establishing probable cause for arrest warrant adequate, although not perfect; court upholds district court’s rejection of plaintiff’s expert testimony on the matter.

Officers lacked probable cause for warrant-supported arrest for failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements, where they were purportedly aware that arrestee had been attempting to comply with requirements and communicated with Sheriff's Office regarding permissible methods of compliance, thus precluding satisfaction of willful mens rea for offences; alleged conduct of officers, if proven, precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Facts omitted from arrest warrant affidavit were critical to probable cause and it was reckless under Franks not to include them; exoneree’s due process right not to have false evidence manufactured was clearly established; exoneree’s right of access to courts was clearly established; exoneree’s claimed right under First and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from governmental interference with familial and marital relationships was not clearly established.

Arresting plaintiff for moving a barricade to exit a private parking lot violated her rights—no probable cause because law did not prohibit her from removing barricade and no signs prohibited its removal; court folds excessive forest claim into illegal seizure of the person claim, because if an officer does not have the right to make an arrest, he does not have the right to use any degree of force in making that arrest.

Clarifying standards in 11th Circuit following District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577 (2018), and
Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4 th 891 (11 th Cir. 2022); “probable cause exists where a
reasonable officer could conclude—considering all of the surrounding circumstances,
including the plausibility of the explanation itself—that there was a substantial chance of
criminal activity,” and “arguable probable cause exists where a reasonable officer,
looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted

Officer could be held liable
where probable cause that existed from telephone call had dissipated by time of arrest.

No probable cause for arrest for interrupting policeman in performance of duty based on verbal criticism protected by First Amendment, no qualified immunity.

Where officer had no reason to believe subject was armed, subject was critically injured and likely could not move, handcuffing subject was an arrest without probable cause under clearly established law.

Use of firearms to detain subject of Terry stop was reasonable and did not escalate detention into arrest where officers reasonably suspected they were confronting a fugitive triple-murderer.

Under Iowa law, arrestee’s passive refusal to comply with detectives’ request to enter home for welfare check on arrestee’s daughter did not constitute resistance or obstruction as crime to interfere with official acts and thus there was no probable cause for arrest; no arguable probable cause and no qualified immunity.