Buckley v. Hennepin Co.
Sedating intoxicated, suicidal, semi-conscious subject of emergency-services welfare check with ketamine without consent during transport to hospital was not objectively unreasonable.
Sedating intoxicated, suicidal, semi-conscious subject of emergency-services welfare check with ketamine without consent during transport to hospital was not objectively unreasonable.
Court grant cert and remands case for reconsideration of facts and circumstances that may have rendered force excessive; pretrial detainee who had apparently attempted suicide and then struggled with officers was placed in handcuffs and leg irons and placed in prone position, held face down on floor of cell with at least one officer applying pressure to his back for fifteen minutes until he stopped moving and lost a pulse; Supreme Court says unclear if Eighth Circuit would say prone restraint is not objectively unreasonable and per se constitutional when subject actively resists; Eighth Cir
Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force after he fired gun was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey because his guilty plea to aggravated discharge of firearm was not undermined by claim that officer used excessive force after the fact; officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting at plaintiff after he fired two rounds and was walking toward officer, and for failure to give a warning, and for using plaintiff as a shield when another party picked up plaintiff’s gun and began firing at officer.
Court unjustifiably overrules district court, which found that issues of fact precluded summary judgment, and affords qualified immunity to officers for (1) take down of unarmed plaintiff who had been pulled over for non-violent traffic offense, based on “slight movement” and “tension” in plaintiff’s arm, which would have been insufficient but for so-called aggravating factors that plaintiff continued driving for a couple of minutes after officer engaged lights and siren, incident occurred in “high-crime area,” plaintiff was taller than officers, plaintiff expressed anger and frustration, s
Plaintiff was unarmed, injured, covered in his own blood, hanging from second-story window by his hands with feet dangling when officer punched him repeated in head with closed fist; “right of an injured, visibly unarmed suspect to be free from temporarily paralyzing force while positioned at a height that carries with it a risk of serious injury or death” was clearly established by “robust consensus of cases”; second officer who tased plaintiff after he fell to ground and was unconscious violated his clearly established right to be free from excessive force in the form of being tased while
Throwing plaintiff against a wall, applying overtight restraints despite protestations, and pushing plaintiff’s head into car door, where plaintiff was not resisting but making only verbal objections, constituted excessive force.
Excessive force claim was barred by Heck where plaintiff had been convicted of resisting, delaying, or obstructing peace officer and jury in criminal trial was told that it could convict defendant only if officer was lawfully performing his duties.
If officer placed overly tight handcuffs on plaintiff’s wrists, ignored her complaints of pain, and yanked her arm with enough force to tear her rotator cuff, he would not be entitled to qualified immunity.
Officers entitled to summary judgment against officers for pushing disturbed plaintiff onto a sofa, which toppled over; court reverses directed verdict in favor of officers on question of whether officer who then kneeled on plaintiff’s back caused additional injury, ruling that was a jury question; court concludes it was legitimate to segment the two uses of force.
If motorist was at most passively resisting officers by refusing to produce driver’s license, tripping him while holding his arms behind his back constituted excessive force.