6th Circuit

Court applies racial bias exception to FRE 606 (b) no-impeachment rule for jury verdicts of Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct.

Issue of fact precluded summary judgment on claim that officer ignored plaintiff’s complaint that handcuffs were too tight; fact that a different officer later loosened cuffs did not absolve first officer of liability.

Court awards qualified immunity to officers for shooting woman who called 911 and stated she had a gun and would shoot anyone who came to her residence; when police arrived woman came out of her house with BB handgun that resembled a .45 caliber pistol in her right hand, began to raise her hand, walked to her car, leaned on its hood and turned back toward her house; officers began firing when she first began to raise gun and continued until she collapsed after turning toward her house; she had placed gun on hood of car but that was not visible to officers; video was recorded by dashcam; dis

If officer placed overly tight handcuffs on plaintiff’s wrists, ignored her complaints of pain, and yanked her arm with enough force to tear her rotator cuff, he would not be entitled to qualified immunity.

Prison counselor not liable for failure to protect plaintiff from assault by cellmate where counselor was neither objectively aware of nor deliberately indifferent to risk of harm.

Court finds probable cause for prosecution without relying on presumption of probable cause based on grand jury indictment; in dictum, however, court notes plaintiff’s claim that presumption should have been overcome by evidence that prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to grand jury; court, in dictum, distinguishes between failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and presenting false evidence, suggesting that only the latter would overcome presumption, stating that Constitution does not require prosecutors to present any exculpatory evidence to grand jury.

Prosecutor not entitled to absolute immunity where actions occurred before probable cause hearing or arrest warrant was sought and were completely divorced from judicial phase of criminal process; prosecutor could be held liable for threatening to charge suspect with murders although prosecutor had reason to believe suspect was not involved, promising suspect immunity for testifying against plaintiff at trial, notwithstanding fact suspect said that plaintiff was not involved, assisting in interrogation of suspect, and conspiring with detective to intimidate and coerce suspect into falsely i

Plaintiff was held without reasonable suspicion for some minutes until a drug dog arrived and allegedly alerted, whereupon plaintiff’s vehicle was searched and police found pills; plaintiff was prosecuted and convicted, then the conviction was reversed by an appellate court that found the initial detention was unlawful; Sixth Circuit holds that plaintiff’s claim for unreasonable seizure of his person, which it analogizes to false arrest and false imprisonment, accrued when he was initially released on bond and therefore this action, which he filed when he was released from his conviction, w

When officer fired eight shots through closed door of plaintiff’s home, plaintiff was seized within meaning of Fourth Amendment although he was not struck by the shots; this was a show of authority with acquisition of control, a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave with the officer firing at his house; mere fact that plaintiff said he had a gun and then opened door would not justify using deadly force, but court cannot resolve on summary judgment what officer perceived when plaintiff opened door; under plaintiff’s version of facts, that plaintiff was unarmed when he open

Reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant, finding issue of fact whether classification officer was deliberately indifferent where decedent with several risk factors had previously attempted suicide at jail, was medically cleared to general population, got into altercation with other inmates, then was placed in solitary where he hung himself; court concludes medical clearance to place someone in general population is not the same as medical clearance to place him in solitary with access to bedsheets and barred windows.