Where reasonable officer would have known driver was unarmed, driver never reached out of officer’s sight, officer had taser he failed to use, officer never warned driver he would shoot, shooting driver would be excessive force and officer not entitled to qualified immunity.
Holding as “conclusory” allegations that defendants suppressed exculpatory police reports and “knowingly and deliberately failed to provide these reports to [defendant], his defense attorneys, or prosecutors” and that defendant would have used reports to impeach witnesses; faulting plaintiff for failing to identify each witness who would have been impeached, which testimony would have been discredited, and which defendant was responsible for suppressing each report; rejecting claim of fabricated evidence based on similar arguments about conclusory allegations; rejecting claims a
Holding that Thompson v Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332 (2022) overruled Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003) with respect to the viability of a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, and thus reinstated the elements found necessary by the Fifth Circuit in Gordy v. Burns, 294 F.3d 722 (5th Cir.
Convicted prisoner had twice before been placed on suicide watch, then released from it; over three week period got into fight with another prisoner, acted distant, had abrasions on wrist, was unkempt, not eating, lost weight, slept poorly, stated he “needed help,” falsely accused cell mate of raping him; then committed suicide ten days later after asking for his cellmate to be removed; court holds even if prisoner should have been moved to suicide watch due to incidents during the three week period, there were no signs of suicidal behavior ten days later when he committed suici
Arrestee charged with solicitation of minor was released from custody and committed suicide two days later; Wellpath owed arrestee no duty of care after he was released.
Officer who punched plaintiff, knocking him to ground and hovering over him menacingly, seized plaintiff, although he did not intend to arrest him, because reasonable person would not believe he was free to leave, even if only for a brief period of time.
Officers did not violate First Amendment rights of arrestees by searching their religious headgear incident to their arrest.
Officers had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Moorish Americans for refusing to leave courthouse when ordered to do so after declining to submit to security screening; 1836 U.S.-Morocco Treaty of Peace and Friendship did not clearly establish a right for Moorish Americans to enter courthouse without security screening.
During welfare check, deputy made explicit sexual remarks and demands, commanded plaintiff to expose her breasts, vagina, and clitoris and then masturbated to ejaculation in front of her; remarkably, the court finds that the plaintiff was not “seized” and thus had no claim under the Fourth Amendment; the court does find that plaintiff’s right to bodily integrity was violated in violation of substantive due process and finds, contrary to the district court (Judge Michael Joseph Truncale’s conscience was not shocked), that the defendant’s conduct shocked the conscience even though
Clearly established that police may not use force against high school student not committing crime, no threat to others, and not resisting or attempting to flee.