2nd Circuit

Adherents of Falun Gong maintained tables on sidewalk to pass out flyers and display posters protesting Chinese government’s treatment of Falun Gong and sued defendants who allegedly harassed, intimidated, and interfered with their activities at the tables; court holds that under the FACEA a “place of worship” is “anywhere that religious adherents collectively recognize or religious leadership designates as a space primarily to gather for or hold religious worship activities,” and the sidewalk tables did not qualify as such, thus there was no claim under the FACEA).

It was clearly established by 1999 that police forensic examiner was required to turn over exculpatory information to prosecutor under Brady, thus examiner who failed to turn over ballistics reports could be held liable under § 1983.

Dismissal of narcotics charge on speedy trial grounds generally satisfies favorable termination element for malicious prosecution claim under the Second Circuit’s “indicative of innocence” standard; court reasons that failure to timely prosecute compels an inference of a lack of reasonable grounds for the prosecution, unless the civil defendant produces evidence of a non-merits based explanation for the failure to prosecute; dismissal on speedy trial grounds also constitutes a favorable termination for a fabrication of evidence claim, that claim does not impugn an ongoing prosecution nor wo

2d Cir.

Under McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct.

Court does not reach issue of whether favorable termination requirement is more capacious for fabrication of evidence claim than for malicious prosecution because finds favorable termination under latter standard; although termination for facial insufficiency generally do not qualify as favorable, that determination is context-specific; here disposition was noted as facial insufficiency but circumstances showed that case was dismissed because officers found marijuana in an apartment where others were present, photos showed plaintiff arrived at apartment only after police, and it was dispute

Jury charge on fabricated evidence claim was “severely misleading” error requiring new trial, fabrication requires only that defendant knowingly make a false statement or omission; erroneous charge was: “Paperwork errors, or a mere mistake, or mistakes, by a police officer in making a written record is not a basis for finding a constitutional violation but can be considered on the question of veracity.

Throwing plaintiff against a wall, applying overtight restraints despite protestations, and pushing plaintiff’s head into car door, where plaintiff was not resisting but making only verbal objections, constituted excessive force.

Officers who detained and frisked plaintiff based solely on knowledge he had been arrested before and notion that there “might be” an outstanding warrant on him, although they had no articulable facts to support that suspicion, violated Fourth Amendment and were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Eleventh Amendment did not bar relief against individual corrections officer for failing to protect plaintiff from attack from another prisoner; State voluntarily undertook to satisfy judgment on behalf of officer, then recouped more than half of it based on cost-of-incarceration lien and public defender costs; State’s actions were preempted by § 1983 because they conflicted with the statute’s purpose of deterring constitutional violations; held that judgment against defendant Marinelli remained unsatisfied and noted that State remained free to recover its payments to plaintiff in state cou