



**National Police
Accountability Project**

*A Project of the National
Lawyers Guild*

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August 9, 2023

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)

**RE: Michael Brown and Lezley McSpadden v.
United States of America, Report No. 367/22,
Petition 909-15**

The National Lawyers Guild National Police Accountability Project (“NPAP”) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to holding law enforcement and corrections officers to constitutional and professional standards in the United States.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides individuals with a cause of action against government officials and government entities who use their authority to violate constitutional or statutory rights. The legislation, commonly referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act, can be invoked by anyone whose rights have been violated but it was originally designed to ensure that Black people could hold government officials accountable for perpetrating or sanctioning racial violence. Section 1983 perfected the U.S. Constitution by ensuring people had a remedy when the government violated their civil rights.

However, the judge-created doctrine of qualified immunity has undermined the purpose and promise of Section 1983 and created a nearly insurmountable barrier for communities to hold police officers civilly liable for civil rights violations. Qualified immunity requires a victim of police misconduct to not only show that their constitutional rights were violated but prove that the violation was of “clearly established” law.¹ The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the “clearly established” law requirement to mean a plaintiff must be able to identify existing precedent that “squarely governs” the specific facts in their case in order to recover.²

There are many cases where an officer’s patently unconstitutional conduct was shielded by qualified immunity because no prior defendant had been sued for similar

¹ *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

² *Kisela v. Hughes*, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018).

behavior. For instance, in *Corbitt v. Vickers*,³ a deputy sheriff in the State of Georgia accidentally shot a ten-year-old child lying on the ground while repeatedly attempting to shoot a pet dog that posed no threat. The circuit court held that the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity because there was no prior case with the same unique set of facts. There are dozens of other equally ludicrous and unjust outcomes that have resulted from the doctrine of qualified immunity.⁴

In this case, the Petitioners are requesting that the IACHR instruct the United States to amend Section 1983. One such amendment could be to end qualified immunity and prevent law enforcement officers who engage in excessive force from using qualified immunity as a shield against liability. Eliminating qualified immunity will result in more just outcomes for victims of police misconduct, help develop new law and clearer guidance for law enforcement, and improve court efficiencies in civil rights litigation.

In the United States, officers ordered to pay monetary awards to plaintiffs are almost always indemnified by their employers, meaning that law enforcement agencies and municipalities are on the hook for paying out settlements and judgments, even when the officers have been disciplined, terminated, or criminally prosecuted for their misconduct.⁵ Without the shield of qualified immunity, municipalities and law enforcement agencies seeking to avoid these large payouts will have more incentive to properly screen, discipline, and remove problematic officers.

There are a number of misconceptions and myths about ending qualified immunity that have been proven untrue.⁶ For instance, eliminating qualified immunity will not cost the government more money. In fact, eliminating qualified immunity will enable victims to be compensated for their injuries and incentivize agencies to prevent misconduct in the future. Currently, plaintiffs with meritorious cases that get thrown out on qualified immunity end up carrying the financial burden for police misconduct. Victims of police brutality, in particular, experience tangible consequences, including medical costs, lost wages, and emotional trauma. Municipalities that indemnify their officers will be more likely to discipline or terminate officers who refuse to comply

³ 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019).

⁴ See Exhibit A, National Police Accountability Project, *Expanding Pathways to Accountability: State Legislative Options to Remove the Barrier of Qualified Immunity*; Exhibit B, National Police Accountability Project, *Expanding Pathways to Accountability: Municipal-Level Ordinances to Remove the Barrier of Qualified Immunity*.

⁵ See Joanna C. Schwartz, *Police Indemnification*, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885 (2014) (“[P]olice officers are virtually always indemnified: During the study period, governments paid approximately 99.98% of the dollars that plaintiffs recovered in lawsuits alleging civil rights violations by law enforcement.”).

⁶ See Exhibit C, National Police Accountability Project, *End Qualified Immunity One-Pager*.

with constitutional and statutory standards than risk liability for their misconduct, avoiding payouts from verdicts and settlements and saving money in the long run.

Similarly, eliminating qualified immunity will not make officers more afraid to do their jobs or lead to an increase in crime. Officers who are making reasonable, good faith decisions when carrying out their duties and following their training and department policies do not need qualified immunity to continue doing their jobs—they are already protected by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Eliminating qualified immunity has also had no impact on officers' ability to address crime. For instance, an examination of data from cities in the State of Colorado, Denver and Colorado Springs, shows that violent crime rates have remained the same since qualified immunity reform was passed.⁷ Crime rates in Denver also remained consistent with cities with similar populations and demographics.⁸

Lastly, eliminating qualified immunity will not burden the court system. Litigating the issue of qualified immunity is not only costly for the parties in the litigation but prolongs cases in front of the court.⁹ Defendant officers are able to appeal a court's denial of qualified immunity to a higher court before a final order is issued in the case, delaying the trial date and burdening litigants with additional expenses related to the appeal, stale evidence, and fewer witnesses. These interlocutory appeals also disrupt the efficient administration of trial and appellate courts.¹⁰ Following the elimination of qualified immunity in the State of New Mexico, civil rights attorneys reported a decrease in litigation delays.¹¹ Eliminating qualified immunity as a defense would streamline cases and enable victims to be compensated in a more timely manner.

Petitioners are also seeking an adjustment to the current standards federal courts use to assess civil claims for civil rights violations. Under Section 1983, courts analyze excessive force claims arising out of arrests, stops, and other seizures of individuals at liberty under the Fourth Amendment. To overcome qualified immunity on an excessive force claim, plaintiffs must identify prior cases with

⁷ See Exhibit D, Andrew Qin and National Police Accountability Project, *Statistical Report on Colorado's Qualified Immunity Reform and Crime Rates*.

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ See Exhibit E, *Harris v. City of Newark*, Docket No. A-59-20, Brief of Amicus Curiae National Police Accountability Project at pp. 3 - 15; see also Joanna C. Schwartz, *Qualified Immunity's Selection Effects*, 114 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1101, 1119 (2020) (“[Q]ualified immunity doctrine increases the cost, time, and complexity of litigating police misconduct cases.”).

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ See Exhibit F, National Police Accountability Project, *Impact of the New Mexico Civil Rights Act One Year Later*.

nearly identical facts concerning the nature of the interaction before force was used, the magnitude of force used, and the degree of danger or resistance posed by the individual who was the target of the force used.

Even with qualified immunity eliminated as a defense, plaintiffs must still show that an officer did not act with objective reasonableness. The analysis considers only what a reasonable officer on the scene would have done under the circumstances, regardless of the defendant officer's actual intentions and motivations. The "reasonableness" of an officer's conduct is determined by a balancing test weighing the "facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [they are] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."¹²

Lawsuits brought under Section 1983 with clear facts and meritorious claims are often dismissed due to qualified immunity or the burdensome objective reasonableness standard. There is no justification for the doctrine of qualified immunity in common law, historical precedent, or public interest, and the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard creates a heavy burden for plaintiffs to carry to prove excessive force.¹³ Instead, qualified immunity and difficult evidentiary standards allow law enforcement agencies and municipalities to continue "promulgating a system of impunity," as Petitioners state.

NPAP supports the Petitioners' request that the IACHR instruct the United States to amend Section 1983.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Respectfully,

National Police Accountability Project

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
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¹² *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

¹³ *See Exhibit E, supra* note 9, at pp. 17 - 23 (qualified immunity is not incorporated into the text of Section 1983, immunities for police officers were not available at common law, and the application of qualified immunity undermines principles of fairness, contributing to a culture of police impunity).



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
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EXPANDING PATHWAYS *to* ACCOUNTABILITY: STATE LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS *to* REMOVE *the* BARRIER *of* QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

A growing number of Americans have come to the realization that there is a systemic problem with policing in our country. It has become clear that too often, a police officer can violate a person's rights, and even end their life, without facing any meaningful consequences. While there are many police accountability mechanisms in need of change, ensuring officers at least face civil liability for misconduct is critical to any reform effort. Lawsuits alone cannot end problematic policing tactics, eliminate racial bias in law enforcement agencies, or bring peace to the grieving families who lost a loved one to police violence. However, they can deter future officer misconduct, empower Black and Brown communities by giving them recourse to vindicate their rights, and ensure victims of police abuse are not forced to bear the cost of their mistreatment.

Individuals whose rights have been violated by the police face exceptionally difficult barriers to relief in federal court and often lack alternative paths to recovery under state law. In federal litigation, the judge-made doctrine of qualified immunity shields officers from liability in lawsuits alleging constitutional violations because courts often require a plaintiff to point to a factually identical prior case. While many states provide their residents with constitutional protections similar to those guaranteed by the federal bill of rights, there is often no corresponding private right of action. Shut out of both federal and state court, individuals who have been harmed by the police have no avenue to pursue justice and the responsible law enforcement officers are able to escape liability for their misconduct.

States do not need to wait for Congress or the United States Supreme Court to allow their residents to hold police officers accountable. State lawmakers can pass legislation that: (1) creates a private right of action for individuals whose state constitutional rights are violated by the police and; (2) eliminates immunity defenses, including qualified immunity. Montana and Colorado already provide their residents with state constitutional causes of action without the barrier of qualified immunity. Increasing access to justice can be accomplished without the doomsday scenarios forecasted by opponents of qualified immunity reform. This paper outlines the shortcomings in existing civil rights enforcement regimes, proposes recommendations for state-level reform legislation, and responds to common objections raised by opponents of immunity reform efforts.



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The DOCTRINE of QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IMPEDES JUSTICE *in* FEDERAL COURT

Congress enacted Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to provide a cause of action against government officials who used their authority to violate a person’s constitutional rights. The legislation, commonly referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act, can be invoked by anyone whose rights are violated but was designed to ensure African Americans could hold government officials accountable for perpetrating or sanctioning racial violence.

Nothing in the text of the statute provides for immunities. Instead, qualified immunity is a judge-created doctrine that has questionable common law precedent as applied to many claims.¹ The Supreme Court first articulated the current standard for qualified immunity in *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*.² This standard requires an individual to not only show that her constitutional rights were violated, but prove that the violation was of “clearly established” law.³ A law is “clearly established” where “existing precedent places the legal question ‘beyond debate’ to ‘every reasonable officer.’”⁴

Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has urged lower courts to apply qualified immunity more and more strictly, resulting in harsh and unjust decisions. Many courts have held that qualified immunity requires civil rights plaintiffs to identify a prior case with facts that are nearly identical to those giving rise to their case. Consequently, Section 1983 police brutality cases are often not decided on whether the plaintiff’s rights were violated, but rather their ability to locate an identical constitutional violation in a prior case. This requirement severely undermines civil rights guarantees by providing protection to inventive, grossly incompetent, and uniquely egregious officers. There are many cases where an officer’s patently unconstitutional conduct was shielded by qualified immunity because no prior defendant had been sued for similar behavior. The following recent cases highlight how this protection operates in practice:

- *Jessop v. City of Fresno*⁵—a Fresno police officer stole more than \$225,000 in cash and rare coins while executing a search warrant. The Ninth Circuit held that while “the theft [of]


¹ See Eg. *Ziglar v. Abbasi*, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017)(Thomas, J., concurring)(explaining “We have not attempted to locate that standard in the common law as it existed in 1871, however, and some evidence supports the conclusion that common-law immunity as it existed in 1871 looked quite different from our current doctrine.”); Joanna Schwartz, *The Case Against Qualified Immunity*, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1797, 1801 (2018); William Baude, *Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful*, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 45, 55-57 (2018).

² 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)

³ *Id.*

⁴ *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd*, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); *Kisela v. Hughes*, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018)

⁵ 936 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2019)



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personal property by police officers sworn to uphold the law” may be “morally wrong,” the officer could not be sued for the theft because the Ninth Circuit had never specifically decided “whether the theft of property covered by the terms of a search warrant, and seized pursuant to that warrant, violates the Fourth Amendment.”

- *Corbitt v. Vickers*⁶—a Georgia deputy sheriff accidentally shot a ten-year-old child lying on the ground – while repeatedly attempting to shoot a pet dog that posed no threat. The Eleventh Circuit held that the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity because there was no prior case with this particular set of facts.
- *Dukes v. Deaton*⁷—Clayton County narcotics officers began a military-style assault on a sleeping couple’s bedroom without providing a warning or visually inspecting the room. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that throwing an explosive device into an occupied bedroom was not a clearly established constitutional violation because there was no decisional case law on point.

Additionally, courts often seize on minor factual distinctions in finding that “clearly established law” does not exist. The following cases illustrate how qualified immunity denies victims of police brutality access to justice even in situations where the abuse they have experienced is not novel:

- *Baxter v. Bracey*⁸ —an officer deployed a police dog against a man suspected of a crime who had already surrendered and was sitting on the ground with his hands up. The Sixth Circuit granted the officer qualified immunity even though the plaintiff had successfully identified a prior case with nearly identical facts, in which the court had held that it was unconstitutional for police to deploy a dog against a suspect who had surrendered by lying on the ground.⁹ However, the Sixth Circuit distinguished the circumstances because the plaintiff was sitting in clear surrender rather than lying down.
- *Kisela v. Hughes*¹⁰—an officer shot a woman holding a knife who was reportedly calm and standing 5-6 feet away from the nearest person. The Supreme Court held that officer was entitled to qualified immunity, in part because the most similar prior case involved an officer who shot someone from the top of a hill, not from behind a fence.


⁶ 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019)

⁷ 852 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2017)

⁸ 751 F. App’x 869 (6th Cir. 2018)

⁹ *Campbell v City of Springsboro*, 700 F.3d 779, 789 (6th Cir. 2012)

¹⁰ 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2018)



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- *De Boise v. Taser Int'l, Inc.*¹¹ — St. Louis police officers rejected safer alternatives to gain compliance and tased an unarmed man to death while he was in the throes of a mental health episode. The Eighth Circuit dismissed the family’s lawsuit on the basis of qualified immunity, finding prior cases prohibiting repeated tasing were not sufficiently similar.

In addition to producing unjust results, qualified immunity stalls the development of new law and fosters inefficiency in civil rights litigation. First, courts rarely make new “clearly established law” as cases are often dismissed on qualified immunity grounds without ever deciding whether a constitutional violation occurred.¹² This means that courts can avoid providing warnings about what the Constitution requires by simply holding that a violation was not previously established.

Moreover, the qualified immunity doctrine allows government defendants to make civil rights actions slower and more expensive. Federal civil procedure typically bars a party from appealing a district court decision until a final judgment has been entered in the case.¹³ However, orders denying qualified immunity can be appealed on an interlocutory basis—pausing the case from moving forward, often for years, while the appeal is pending, and increasing litigation costs. Defendants can even file multiple interlocutory appeals in the same case. That means victims of police misconduct who ultimately prevail have to wait much longer to obtain justice.

The bad decisions and unfair results attributable to the qualified immunity doctrine have mobilized a diverse collection of critics. Jurists and legal advocacy organizations across the ideological spectrum have spoken out in favor of eliminating the defense of qualified immunity. For instance, Justice Thomas recently filed a dissent from a denial of certiorari stating “I continue to have strong doubts about our § 1983 qualified immunity doctrine.”¹⁴ Justice Sotomayor expressed a similar disapproval of the doctrine in her dissenting opinion in *Kisela v. Hughes*, “the majority today exacerbates [qualified immunity’s] troubling asymmetry . . . It tells officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.”¹⁵ In the NGO sector,


¹¹ 760 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2014)

¹² *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)(authorizing courts to resolve question of whether challenged conduct violated clearly established law without first determining whether a constitutional violation occurred)

¹³ 28 U.S.C. 1291

¹⁴ *Baxter v. Bracey*, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (Mem.) (2020) (Thomas)

¹⁵ *Kisela v. Hughes*, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (2018)



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the Cato Institute,¹⁶ American Civil Liberties Union,¹⁷ Law Enforcement Action Partnership,¹⁸ and the Movement for Black Lives¹⁹ have all called for the end of the qualified immunity in its current form.

Given the growing consensus that qualified immunity is in need of abolition, there is hope that federal level reform could be on the horizon. However, judicial reconsideration and federal legislative action are far from guaranteed. Additionally, states that provide their residents with more expansive protections than the federal constitution have an interest in ensuring there is a vehicle to vindicate those rights regardless of federal reform. State legislators must take action to ensure their citizens have an avenue to obtain justice in state court and hold police officers accountable for misconduct.

There are CURRENTLY INSUFFICIENT STATE COURT ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE to hold POLICE ACCOUNTABLE

State courts provide remedies for certain types of police abuse through common law torts like false arrest, trespass, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, and wrongful death. However, the relief available to plaintiffs under tort law is generally not coextensive with federal constitutional protections. Many existing tort law regimes deprive plaintiffs of relief for common injuries that flow from police misconduct like interference with speech and protest rights. Additionally, state tort laws also contain broad immunities that operate to help police officers avoid accountability.²⁰ And tort remedies frequently do not include attorney's fees, so victims of police misconduct who are unlikely to recover large awards often cannot find a lawyer to take their tort case on a contingent fee basis.


¹⁶ Lawrence Hurley and Andrew Chung, *Before the court: A united front takes aim at qualified immunity*, REUTERS, (May 8, 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-opposition/>

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ *Recommendations to Reform Policing*, Law Enforcement Action Partnership, (June 3, 2020), <https://lawenforcementactionpartnership.org/national-policing-recommendations/>

¹⁹ *End of the War on Black Communities*, Movement for Black Lives, <https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/end-the-war-on-black-communities/> (last visited Feb. 12, 2021, 12:45 PM).

²⁰ See *Eg., Ridley v. Johns*, 274 Ga. 241, 242, 552 S.E. 2d 853 (2001); See OCGA § 50-21-25(a)(the Georgia Tort Claims Act "exempts state officers and employees from liability for any torts committed while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment."); *McKenna v. Julian*, 763 N.W.2d 384, 389–90 (Neb. 2009) (Nebraska's Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act immunizes any officer, agent, or employee of a political subdivision for claims "arising out of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights."); *Pauley v. Reinoehl*, No. 679, 2002, 848 A.2d 561 (Del. 2004)(the state statutes waived sovereign immunity only to the extent that any loss was covered by insurance); *Dall v. Caron*, 628 A.2d 117, 119 (Me. 1993) (Maine Tort Claims Act "confers immunity on the police officers for their decision to prosecute the criminal charges on which the malicious prosecution claims are based").



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Even though many state constitutions recognize their residents possess fundamental rights analogous to or greater than those enshrined in the federal bill of rights, they do not always have a recognized private right of action. Currently only 22 states provide a statutory or common law private right of action that allows people to recover for violations of their state constitutional rights.²¹ Even the states that have recognized their residents have a constitutional private right of action have limited the situations in which a plaintiff can recover. Some states only permit recovery for specific types of injuries²² or only in the event of flagrant violations.²³ Moreover, several states have adopted the federal “clearly established law” qualified immunity standard for state constitutional challenges—effectively foreclosing meaningful recovery.²⁴

STATE LEGISLATION *can* EXPAND ACCOUNTABILITY *for* POLICE

State legislatures have the authority to provide the people in their state with a clear civil court remedy when police violate their civil rights. While the optimal legislative strategy will vary depending on the state’s existing laws and political landscape, enacting a state analogue to Section 1983 that eliminates the shield of qualified immunity would provide a remedy for constitutional violations. To ensure meaningful recovery for police misconduct, the reform bill should include the following features:


- Provide a cause of action allowing people to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed by the state constitution;
- Specify that qualified immunity is not a defense to claims brought under the Act;
- Provide for monetary damages and injunctive relief;
- Allow for plaintiffs who prevail in cases brought under the Act to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs;
- Ensure that state and local governments indemnify their employees where failure to do so would leave the plaintiff without a method of recovery.

²¹Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. §§16-123-101 to -108), California (CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131) Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11I), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §20-148), New Jersey (N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:6-2), Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, , Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin *See*, Sharon N. Humble, *Implied Cause of Action for Damages for Violation of Provisions of State Constitutions*, 75 A.L.R. 5th 619, 624-28 (2000)

²² *See Old Tuckaway Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. City of Greenfield*, 509 N.W.2d 323, 328–29 & n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)(recognizing constitutional claims only for due process violations)

²³ *See Eg. Hertz v. Beach*, 211 P.3d 668, 677 (Alaska 2009)(limiting damages for private causes of action enforcing Alaska’s constitution except in cases of flagrant violations)

²⁴ *See e.g.*, Gary S. Gildin, *Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured by State Constitutions Outside the Shadow of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Remedies Jurisprudence*, 115 Penn St. L. Rev. 877, 903–04 (2011).



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The first two sections of this paper detail the importance of creating a state cause of action and eliminating the defense of qualified immunity. Damages, attorney's fees, and indemnification are also necessary to ensure plaintiffs have a meaningful opportunity to pursue relief under the statute. Section 1983 authorizes both compensatory and punitive damages for civil rights violations. Compensatory damages are grounded in the plaintiff's actual losses and designed to make the plaintiff whole as well as deter the defendant from engaging in future constitutional violations.²⁵ They are indispensable to most civil remedial statutes and must be included in a state reform bill to provide comparable relief to Section 1983. While many important policy rationales support the provision of punitive damages,²⁶ proponents of state reform bills may determine it is not strategic to include them. As discussed further below, a common concern about qualified immunity reform is cost and permitting plaintiffs to seek punitive damages may exacerbate that concern since it would potentially expose the government to much higher liability. Excluding punitive damages from state legislation may allay fears that the bill will produce a wave of multi-million dollar verdicts and make law enforcement agencies uninsurable.

It is also critical that a state reform bill entitles prevailing plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney's fees. Civil rights cases often do not involve large damage awards for plaintiffs, particularly where the challenged conduct did not result in injury or death. Accordingly, contingent fee arrangements are insufficient to compensate lawyers in many constitutional rights cases. Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act²⁷ to address this problem in federal civil rights litigation.²⁸ Including a fee shifting provision will promote enforcement of the statute and help victims of police misconduct obtain counsel irrespective of the damage value of their case. Without an attorney's fee provision, many meritorious cases will never be filed.


Indemnification of law enforcement officers provides a guarantee that individuals who sue under the state reform bill will actually recover for the harm they suffered. Civil rights plaintiffs would be left empty handed if an officer cannot afford to satisfy the judgment and their government employer refuses to contribute to the award. Colorado recently struck a balance that provided for both individual officer accountability and plaintiff recovery by requiring the officer to pay for 5% or \$25,000 of the judgment if they failed to act in good faith unless the amount is not collectible, in

²⁵ *Memphis Community School District v. Stachura*, 477 U.S. 299 (1986);

²⁶ *Smith v. Wade*, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (explaining punitive damages punish the defendant for outrageous conduct and serve as a deterrent from similar conduct in the future)

²⁷ 42 U.S.C. 1988

²⁸ *City of Riverside v. Rivera*, 477 U.S. 561, 578 (1986) ("the function of an award of attorney's fees to encourage the bringing of meritorious claims that would otherwise be abandoned because of financial imperatives")



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which case the employer is required to pay the outstanding costs.²⁹ NPAP does not have a specific recommendation on the ideal indemnification model so long as the state reform bill provides plaintiffs with some method to recover the full judgment of their successful case.

ADDRESSING MISCONCEPTIONS *about* STATE LEGISLATIVE REFORM *to* QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

In addition to Colorado's successful passage of SB 217 last summer, several state legislatures have already started considering laws to eliminate qualified immunity. These initial reform efforts have been met with opposition stemming from three general objections:

- (1) eliminating the defense of qualified immunity will be prohibitively costly;
- (2) eliminating the defense of qualified immunity will expose law enforcement officers to liability for reasonable, good faith performance of their duties; and
- (3) law enforcement officers will be apathetic or afraid to effectively do their jobs for fear of being sued.


These concerns are largely premised on a misunderstanding about how qualified immunity functions in practice.

Any Increased Costs Associated with Eliminating Qualified Immunity Would Be Reasonable and Manageable

Opponents of ending qualified immunity have warned that removing the defense will increase the cost of litigation and lead to an explosion of expensive verdicts. While qualified immunity reform will make it possible for additional victims of police misconduct to recover compensation, that does not mean there will be a significant net rise in costs.

It should first be acknowledged that forcing communities to contend with qualified immunity will not save costs but shift them to the people injured by police misconduct. Victims of police brutality

²⁹ COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131 ("A peace officer's employer shall indemnify its peace officers for any liability incurred by the peace officer and for any judgment or settlement entered against the peace officer for claims arising pursuant to this section; except that if the peace officer's employer determines that the officer did not act upon a good faith and reasonable belief that the action was lawful, then the peace officer is personally liable and shall not be indemnified by the peace officer's employer for five percent of the judgment or settlement or twenty-five thousand dollars, whichever is less...if the peace officer's portion of the judgment is uncollectible from the peace officer, the peace officer's employer or insurance shall satisfy the full amount of the judgment or settlement.")



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experience tangible consequences. For instance, they may have medical costs, be forced to miss work, or be injured so severely that their earning potential is permanently reduced. Barring suits through the doctrine of qualified immunity forces victims to bear the cost of police misconduct rather than the officers and law enforcement agencies responsible for their suffering.

Should we choose to evaluate cost from a litigation defense standpoint, qualified immunity still does not save government defendants money. First, asserting qualified immunity does not automatically dispose of a lawsuit. While a government actor can move to dismiss a case on qualified immunity grounds in the initial stages of litigation, many cases proceed to discovery and even trial before the defense is granted.³⁰ Additionally, qualified immunity has the effect of *increasing* costs in some cases due to the multiple interlocutory appeals a defendant can pursue challenging the district court's denial of the defense.

Fears that state and local governments will face insurmountable expenses related to an influx of new claims currently precluded by qualified immunity have no concrete basis. Indeed, other states have already eliminated qualified immunity for state civil rights claims. Montana also eliminated qualified immunity defenses for state constitutional actions against law enforcement officers over a decade ago in *Dorwat v. Caraway*.³¹ In the years following the *Dorwat* decision, the number of reported cases against employees in their individual capacity only marginally increased.


An analysis of reported decisions involving constitutional claims against public employees the three years prior to and following the court's 2002 decision reveals a difference of only nine cases. The number of cases reported against local governments remained steady. Only one additional individual liability case against local government was reported in the three-year period following the 2002 decision. While reported decisions are not a perfect proxy for cases filed, they do provide insight into filing trends. Colorado also recently created a state cause of action to challenge police misconduct while eliminating qualified immunity.³² The changes recommended in this paper are not unprecedented and have been managed by other states for years.

Some cost concerns are based on the speculative assertion that eliminating qualified immunity will significantly increase insurance premiums. While it is difficult to project the precise impact on

³⁰ See Eg. Joanna C. Schwartz, *How Qualified Immunity Fails*, 127 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2, 9 (2017) (UCLA Law Professor Joanna Schwartz studied civil rights cases in five federal district courts over a two-year period and found that qualified immunity was only raised as a defense prior to discovery in 13.9% of cases where the defense was available).

³¹ 58 P.3d 128, 131, 137 (Mont. 2002)

³² COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131



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insurance, a recent study by the Insurance Law Center at University of Connecticut determined that removing qualified immunity would not compromise the insurability of municipal law enforcement agencies in the state because the cost of police liability represented a fairly small portion of municipal policies.³³

Finally, it is important to note that an increased risk of liability will ultimately help save government entities money in the long run through deterrence. One of the core policy functions of permitting private enforcement of civil rights statutes is to deter future violations.³⁴ By enhancing opportunities to hold government officials accountable for misconduct, the proposed state bill will deter future constitutional violations, obviating the cost of defending against lawsuits and settlement payouts.

Constitutional Jurisprudence Affords Officers Protection for Reasonable, Good Faith Conduct, Particularly in the Police Misconduct Context


Qualified immunity is often misrepresented as the only protection police officers have against liability for making reasonable, good faith decisions in high pressure situations. However, law enforcement officers are already accorded a great deal of deference under the Fourth Amendment and analogous state constitutional provisions.³⁵ In use of force cases, courts evaluate the reasonableness of an officer's conduct to determine whether a constitutional violation occurred. The Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard "allows for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving" and acknowledges that decisions cannot be judged with "the 20/20 vision of hindsight."³⁶ An officer can mistakenly determine that force is necessary without facing constitutional liability so long as his mistake is

³³ Peter Kochenburger & Peter Siegelman, *Preliminary report on insurance related issues*, UConn Insurance Law Center (Jan. 5, 2021) available at https://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/upload/2021/01/UCONN_Law_and_Logistics_Subcommittee_Section_41_Assessment_1.pdf

³⁴ See *Eg.* William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, *The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law*, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 852-57 (1980-1981); *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents*, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)(Burger, dissenting)(explaining that deterrence of police misbehavior could be achieved better through private lawsuits and an administrative structure in which aggrieved citizens would make monetary claims against officers)

³⁵ Many state constitutional provisions regarding use of force are coextensive with the Fourth Amendment and have adopted a similar reasonableness analysis. See *Eg.* *Norcross v. Town of Hammonton*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEIS 9067 (D. N.J. 2008); *Jones v. City of Philadelphia*, 890 A.2d 1188 (Pa..2006); *State v. Gallup*, 512 S.E. 2D 66, 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). While a full survey of state constitutional claims is beyond the scope of this paper, a selection of states that have recognized broader state protections also have robust safeguards. See *Eg.* *State v. Bayard*, 71 P.3d 498, 502 (Nev. 2003)(analyzing reasonableness of arrest).

³⁶ *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)



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reasonable. For example, the Eleventh Circuit held that an officer had not violated the Constitution when he ordered a police dog to attack an unarmed man because he incorrectly, but reasonably, believed the man had a weapon.³⁷

The Fourth Amendment and its state analogues are not unique in creating a demanding burden to prevail on a constitutional claim. Many government officials are protected by analytical frameworks that defer to their decision-making. For instance, a prison official's conduct is protected by the Eighth Amendment's deliberate indifference standard which permits incorrect and even negligent decisions regarding an inmate's health and safety so long as the official does not disregard a known risk.³⁸ A correctional officer in a pretrial detention center whose conduct is evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment is generally protected unless he uses force in an objectively unreasonable manner.³⁹ Civil rights plaintiffs have a high threshold to meet in virtually every constitutional claim they pursue.⁴⁰

Qualified immunity is not necessary to ensure that police and other government officials do not face legal consequences for split-second decisions, because that protection is typically already an integral part of the underlying constitutional analysis.

There is No Evidence That Officers Will Stop Performing Lawful, Public Safety Functions Out of Fear They Will Be Sued


Qualified immunity is currently not protecting police officers who are making reasonable, good faith decisions in carrying out their duties. Officers who follow their training and department policies, and who are doing their job "by the book," do not need qualified immunity. As discussed in the prior section, Fourth Amendment law provides that safeguard. Only a police officer who profoundly misunderstood their Fourth Amendment training would pull back from reasonably carrying out their duties because qualified immunity was eliminated.

³⁷ *Crenshaw v. Lister*, 556 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009)

³⁸ *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 836-837 (1994)

³⁹ *Kingsley v. Hendrickson*, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015)

⁴⁰ A comprehensive list of constitutional standards is beyond the scope of this paper but the following precedential cases illustrate the high burdens placed on plaintiffs pursuing common civil rights claims: *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)(holding a plaintiff must prove the government intended to discriminate on the basis of race in order to prevail in an Equal Protection challenge even if a policy or law has demonstrable discriminatory impacts); *Turner v. Safley*, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)(establishing standard for prisoner First Amendment claims which permits the prison to impose restrictions so long as they are reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest and not an exaggerated response); *Nieves v. Bartlett*, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019)(requiring a plaintiff to prove an officer lacked probable cause or present evidence that other similarly situated individuals not engaged in protected activity were not arrested in order to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim).



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Moreover, there is no evidence that police officers are apathetic or afraid to perform their jobs in states that have already eliminated qualified immunity defenses. That argument denigrates dedicated, law-abiding, law enforcement officers. It is also important to note that many people employed in high stakes professions are able to effectively do their jobs even though they face financial liability for misconduct and mistakes. There is no reason to assume that a police officer would respond to an increased risk of liability differently than a doctor.

CONCLUSION

Meaningful police reform cannot happen where officers are insulated from civil liability when they violate the Constitution. The doctrine of qualified immunity has inhibited progress by permitting officers who engage in misconduct to escape accountability. State lawmakers do not have to accept the judge-created system of impunity that exists in federal civil rights litigation. They can and should provide their constituents with a state court cause of action to sue police officers who violate civil rights and eliminate the defense of qualified immunity.

We urge every state legislator that acknowledged the need to improve police accountability in the wake of George Floyd's murder to take action and eliminate qualified immunity defenses for state constitutional claims. NPAP is eager to assist with these efforts. Please do not hesitate to contact us at legal.npap@nlg.org if you are interested in pursuing legislative reform in your state.



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Expanding Pathways to Accountability: Municipal-Level Ordinances to Remove the Barrier of Qualified Immunity

In many cases, law enforcement officers who violate an individual's constitutional rights—in some cases, even taking their life—do not face civil liability. One of the reasons officers avoid civil liability for violating the constitution is because of qualified immunity. When plaintiffs bring cases in federal court under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Section 1983), officers are often shielded from liability for constitutional violations because, under the judge-made doctrine of qualified immunity, plaintiffs are required to point to a prior case that has nearly identical facts to their own case. Although many states provide residents with state constitutional protections similar to those guaranteed by the constitution, there is often no corresponding private right of action, meaning plaintiffs are unable to bring the same claims in state court that they would bring in federal court under Section 1983.

Although lawsuits alone cannot end problematic policing tactics, eliminate racial bias in policing, or bring peace to grieving families who have lost a loved one to police violence, they can deter future officer misconduct, empower Black and brown communities by giving them recourse to vindicate their rights, and ensure victims of police abuse are not forced to bear the cost of their mistreatment. However, if individuals who have been harmed by the police are shut out of both federal and state court, they may not have any avenue to pursue justice, allowing the responsible officers to escape liability for their misconduct.

Municipalities do not need to wait for Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, state legislatures, or courts to act. Municipalities can pass ordinances and local laws that: (1) create a local right of action for individuals whose state constitutional rights are violated by the police and remove qualified immunity as a defense; (2) condition legal representation provided by the municipality on officers foregoing qualified immunity as a defense; (3) deny or limit municipal indemnification when officers invoke qualified immunity as a legal defense; or (4) eliminate or limit municipal funding for private counsel for officers who do not agree to forego the qualified immunity defense.

Increasing access to justice can be accomplished without the doomsday scenarios forecasted by opponents of qualified immunity reform. This paper provides background on qualified immunity, proposes recommendations for municipal-level qualified immunity reform, responds to common objections raised by opponents of qualified immunity reform efforts, and outlines special considerations for qualified immunity ordinances and local laws.



The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine created by judges that requires plaintiffs to not only show that their constitutional rights have been violated but to prove that the violation was of “clearly established” law.¹ A law is “clearly established” where there is existing legal precedent for the scenario at issue such that every reasonable officer would know that their conduct constituted a constitutional violation.² Many courts have held that plaintiffs must identify a prior case with facts nearly identical to their own. As such, cases often turn on whether a plaintiff can locate a case with identical facts, rather than on whether their constitutional rights were violated.

Over time, courts have applied qualified immunity more strictly, resulting in unjust decisions and unfair results for plaintiffs. For example, in *Corbitt v. Vickers*,³ in an attempt to shoot a pet dog (that was not posing any threat), a Georgia deputy sheriff accidentally shot a ten-year-old child laying on the ground. The Eleventh Circuit held that the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity because there was no prior case with this particular set of facts.⁴ In *Keller v. Fleming*, a court found that a Mississippi deputy sheriff who dropped off a man with a mental disability at the county border, where he was later hit by a car and killed, was not entitled to qualified immunity.⁵ The Fifth Circuit initially affirmed the finding, but later withdrew its opinion, ruling in the new opinion that although the deputy violated the man’s constitutional right to be free of unlawful seizure, the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity because there was no precedent for driving someone several miles to the county line and leaving them there.

Even in cases where the plaintiff finds precedent for an officer’s conduct, courts may pick out minor factual distinctions in finding that no clearly established law exists. For instance, in *Baxter v. Bracey*,⁶ an officer deployed a police dog against a man suspected of a crime who had already surrendered with his hands up. The plaintiff successfully identified a case with nearly identical facts where the court held it was unconstitutional for police to deploy a dog against someone who had already surrendered.⁷ Yet, the Sixth Circuit held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because although in both cases the plaintiff was in the “surrender position” when the dog was released, in the prior case, the dog was inadequately trained whereas the dog that attacked plaintiff did not have a history of bad

¹ *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

² *Kisela v. Hughes*, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018); *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd*, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).

³ *Corbitt v. Vickers*, 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019).

⁴ *Id.* at 1318.

⁵ *Keller v. Fleming*, 952 F.3d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 2020).

⁶ *Baxter v. Bracey*, 751 F. App’x 869 (6th Cir. 2018).

⁷ *Id.* at 872.



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behavior.⁸ In *McManemy v. Tierney*,⁹ a court found an Iowa deputy sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity after he kned a man 20 to 30 times in the eye after he had already been restrained and had four officers on top of him. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the finding, claiming that there was no case that “squarely govern[ed] the specific facts at issue”¹⁰ despite case law finding the use of gratuitous and unnecessary violence unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.¹¹

Additionally, qualified immunity hinders the development of new law since courts often dismiss cases without ever deciding whether a constitutional violation occurred, depriving the public of guidance on what is and is not a violation. Further, qualified immunity allows government defendants to make civil rights case more expensive and less efficient by dragging out litigation. For instance, defendants are permitted to appeal orders denying qualified immunity on an interlocutory basis, meaning that instead of waiting for a trial court’s final order, cases are paused while an appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision on qualified immunity.¹² As a result, plaintiffs are often forced to wait even longer to obtain justice.

The unjust decisions and unfair results created by qualified immunity have created a movement to eliminate it that is supported by a wide variety of jurists and legal advocacy organizations across the political and ideological spectrum. For instance, Justice Thomas filed a dissent from a denial of certiorari in *Baxter v. Bracey*, stating, “I continue to have strong doubts about our § 1983 qualified immunity doctrine.”¹³ Justice Sotomayor expressed similar disapproval of the doctrine in her dissenting opinion in *Kisela v. Hughes*, stating, “[T]he majority today exacerbates [qualified immunity’s] troubling asymmetry...It tells officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.”¹⁴ Numerous legal advocacy organizations, including the Cato Institute,¹⁵ American Civil Liberties Union,¹⁶ Law Enforcement Action

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *McManemy v. Tierney*, 970 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2020).

¹⁰ *Id.* at 1040.

¹¹ *Id.* at 1041 (Grasz, J., dissenting).

¹² Alex Reinert, *Does Qualified Immunity Matter?*, 8 U. St. Thomas L. J., 477, 493-94 (2011).

¹³ *Supra* n. 6, *Baxter* at 1865 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

¹⁴ *Supra* n. 2, *Kisela* at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

¹⁵ Lawrence Hurley and Andrew Chung, *Before the court: A united front takes aim at qualified immunity*, Reuters (May 8, 2020), <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-opposition/>.

¹⁶ *Id.*



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Partnership,¹⁷ and the Movement for Black Lives,¹⁸ have called for the end of qualified immunity in its current form. Although this support signals hope for federal legislative action, it is far from a guarantee that qualified immunity will soon end.

At the state level, plaintiffs can bring cases against officers under common law torts like arrest, trespass, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, and wrongful death. However, the relief available in state court under tort law is not as extensive as the constitutional protections available in federal court. For instance, plaintiffs in state court cannot get relief for common injuries that flow from police misconduct, such as interference with free speech and protest rights. Further, most states do not have a private right of action that allows plaintiffs to recover for violations of their state constitutional rights, and the ones that do may only permit recovery for specific types of injuries or for particularly flagrant violations. Many state laws also include broad immunities that prevent police officers from being held accountable for their misconduct, with standards for qualified immunity from state constitutional challenges resembling the federal “clearly established law” standard.¹⁹

Municipalities Can Expand Accountability for Police Through Local Ordinances and Laws

Due to inaction at the federal level and growing apathy in state legislatures to pass qualified immunity bills,²⁰ ²¹ it is up to municipalities to take action to hold police


¹⁷ Recommendations to Transform Policing, Law Enforcement Action Partnership (June 3, 2020), <https://lawenforcementactionpartnership.org/national-policing-recommendations/>.

¹⁸ End the War on Black Communities, Movement for Black Lives, <https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/end-the-war-on-black-communities/>.

¹⁹ See Gary S. Gildin, *Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured by State Constitutions Outside the Shadow of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Remedies Jurisprudence*, 115 Penn St. L. Rev. 877, 903–04 (2011).

²⁰ Although bills limiting or ending qualified immunity have been introduced in many states, sometimes over multiple sessions, they often die in committee, get withdrawn, or become so watered down that they no longer resemble their original form. See Kimberly Kindy, *Dozens of states have tried to end qualified immunity. Police officers and unions helped beat nearly every bill.*, The Washington Post (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/qualified-immunity-police-lobbying-state-legislatures/2021/10/06/60e546bc-0cdf-11ec-aea1-42a8138f132a_story.html (noting “[a]t least 35 state qualified-immunity bills [] died” from April 2020 to October 2021).

²¹ In recent years, some states have enacted legislation to prohibit the defense of qualified immunity. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. § 41-4A-4 (In April 2021, New Mexico created a new right of action allowing government employers to be sued for damages and barred government employees from using qualified immunity as a defense in state court); C.R.S. § 13-21-131 (In June 2020, Colorado created a civil right of action for individuals whose constitutional rights have been infringed by a police officer that prohibits qualified immunity as a defense); see also *Expanding Pathways to Accountability: State Legislative Options to Remove the Barrier of Qualified Immunity*, National Police



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accountable and end qualified immunity through local ordinances and laws. While the local municipal strategy will vary depending on the state's existing laws and political landscape, municipalities have various options for expanding the ability of plaintiffs to vindicate their state constitutional rights and reducing or eliminating the defense of qualified immunity that shields police from accountability.

Municipalities can pass ordinances and local laws that: (1) create a local right of action for individuals whose state constitutional rights are violated by the police and remove qualified immunity as a defense; (2) condition legal representation provided by the municipality on officers foregoing qualified immunity as a defense; (3) deny or limit municipal indemnification when officers invoke qualified immunity as a legal defense; or (4) eliminate or limit municipal funding for private counsel for officers who do not agree to forego the qualified immunity defense.

Create Local Right of Action Barring Qualified Immunity Defense

Municipalities can create a local right of action under their municipal codes that not only allows individuals whose state constitutional rights have been violated to bring civil cases against officers and their employers in state court but prevent qualified immunity from being used as a defense. New York City serves as one model for ending qualified immunity at the municipal level.

On March 25, 2021, the New York City Council passed City Council Int. No. 2220-A, a local law that gives residents the right to bring a civil action against police officers for unreasonable search and seizure and the use of excessive force. 2220-A allows plaintiffs to recover money damages and file additional claims under federal and state law, under which other relief may be sought, and permits courts to award attorney's fees. The law also removes qualified immunity as a defense. Additionally, the New York Police Department (NYPD) is required to publicly report certain information about civil actions brought under the law. 2220-A does not, however, bar qualified immunity as a defense for violations of other constitutional rights, such as free speech, and only applies to NYPD, meaning other law enforcement officers, such as correctional officers, are excluded.

The local law is already changing the way NYPD officers are instructed to interact with the public. For instance, shortly after 2220-A's passage, attorneys for the largest police union in the world, the Police Benevolent Association, "strongly cautioned" its members "against engaging in any stop & frisk..., search of a car, residence, or person unless [they were] certain that [they were] clearly and

Accountability Project, available at <https://www.nlg-npap.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Qualified-Immunity-White-Paper-Final.pdf>.



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unequivocally within the bounds of the law.”²² Officers were further notified that “each time [they] conduct a search or use force...[their] actions may subject [them]...to civil liability and monetary damages.”²³ Not only does 2220-A ensure that plaintiffs with valid constitutional claims get their day in court, but its mere existence deters misconduct, reducing the number of cases that need to be brought under the law.

Seek Waiver of Qualified Immunity Defense as Policy and Decline Its Use as Practice

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that defendants must invoke.²⁴ A judge will not (or should not) otherwise apply qualified immunity on their behalf.²⁵ Government lawyers (i.e., city attorneys and county attorneys) and private counsel retained by municipalities and police departments to defend against police misconduct cases typically choose to raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense in litigation. The legal departments within municipalities and the attorneys they contract with to provide legal services can make it their policy to decline representing clients who insist on raising qualified immunity as a defense. When an officer is named as a defendant in a police misconduct case, the municipality can inform that officer that they will only provide or pay for legal representation if the officer agrees to forego qualified immunity as a defense. Depending on language in relevant municipal ordinances, the municipality’s collective bargaining agreement with the union representing the officer, and departmental policies, a municipality may even seek to make waiving qualified immunity a condition of employment and inform the officer of this condition at the time of hiring.

Waiving the defense of qualified immunity or declining not to use it in litigation does not mean municipalities will be conceding liability.²⁶ On the contrary, a government lawyer who declines to invoke qualified immunity can still argue that an officer’s actions were constitutional. Not invoking qualified immunity simply

²² Sergeants Benevolent Association (@SBANYPD_Archive), Twitter (Apr. 16, 2021, 5:21 PM), https://twitter.com/SBANYPD_Archive/status/1383168759997870085 (posting legal guidance on 2220-A addressed to members of Police Benevolent Association, Sergeants Benevolent Association, and Captains Endowment Association).

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ See *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (“Qualified or ‘good faith’ immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official.”); *Gomez v. Toledo*, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (“Since qualified immunity is a defense, the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) which states a defendant “must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense”).

²⁵ See Michael E. Beyda, *Affirmative Immunity: A Litigation-Based Approach to Curb Appellate Courts’ Raising Qualified Immunity Sua Sponte*, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 2693, 2705 (2021).

²⁶ Alex Reinert, *We Can End Qualified Immunity Tomorrow*, Boston Review (June 23, 2020), <https://bostonreview.net/articles/alex-reinert-we-can-end-qualified-immunity-tomorrow/>.



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allows courts to reach the question of whether an officer's conduct violated the constitution. By declining to use the defense, government lawyers can act in the public's interest—by refusing to aid in unfairly and unjustly barring residents from vindicating their constitutional rights—while still zealously defending their client—by arguing that their client's conduct fell within the bounds of the constitution. Further, by waiving the defense or declining to use it, government lawyers will be supporting the development of new civil rights case law²⁷ and promoting court efficiency, since courts will be able to rule on the constitutionality of an officer's conduct, which future parties can rely upon, and cases will not be slowed down by interlocutory appeals.

Deny or Limit Municipal Indemnification of Damages

In the event officers decide to invoke qualified immunity as a legal defense, creating a conflict for the government attorney and requiring private counsel to raise the defense, municipalities can choose to deny or limit their indemnification of the officers. In most police misconduct cases, municipalities agree to pay damages suffered by a plaintiff due to the officer's actions if the officer was acting within the scope of their employment. As a result, officers are often shielded from personal liability for all monetary damages. In fact, research has shown that 99.98% of all dollars recovered by plaintiffs in cases alleging civil rights violations by law enforcement have been paid by governments, not individual officers.²⁸ Even in cases where indemnification is prohibited by policy, or officers are disciplined, terminated, or criminally prosecuted for their misconduct, governments often satisfy settlements and judgments on behalf of their officers.²⁹

Indemnification policies vary widely across municipalities. Although some municipalities require that officers be indemnified for all lawsuits arising from their employment, it is not uncommon for others to place conditions on indemnification or limit its application.³⁰ For instance, municipalities may require the full cooperation of a police officer in order to indemnify them,³¹ or they may limit indemnification to certain damages while excluding others.³² Municipalities may even refuse to

²⁷ *Id.* (“[I]n some jurisdictions, rights would no longer be trapped in the amber of prior ‘clearly established’ law, allowing constitutional law to develop and become established for future cases.”).

²⁸ Joanna Schwartz, *Police Indemnification*, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 855, 890 (2014).

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ *Id.* at 918.

³¹ N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 18(5)(ii); *Banks v. Yokemick*, 214 F. Supp. 2d 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (defendant officer's failure to cooperate shown by refusal to meet with city attorney, invocation of Fifth Amendment at deposition, not appearing at trial, and not responding to discovery requests); see also Cal. Gov't Code § 825.2(b).

³² N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-j(6)(a) (permitting, but not requiring, municipalities to indemnify police officers for punitive damages arising out of a negligent act).



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indemnify officers for certain conduct, such as when the officer engaged in intentional wrongdoing or recklessness³³ or actual fraud, corruption, or actual malice.³⁴ Some jurisdictions can prohibit indemnification under any circumstances.³⁵

Municipalities that already have restrictive indemnification policies should enforce provisions that would enable them to avoid paying settlements and judgments in full on behalf of their officers when the qualified immunity defense is raised. Municipalities with less restrictive policies that have the discretion to strengthen those policies should make agreeing to not use the qualified immunity defense a condition of indemnification and follow through on not paying damages and expenses if the defense is raised. To strike a balance between holding individual officers accountable by making them pay some portion of the damages and costs and ensuring that plaintiffs can recover damages for constitutional violations, municipalities can—depending on the size of the award—refuse to pay the full amount and cap the amount the officer must contribute. Following Colorado’s lead at the state level, municipalities could take the interim step of limiting indemnification under certain circumstances, such as when the officer did not act in good faith and did not have a reasonable belief that the action was lawful.³⁶ Again, it would be in the public interest to not indemnify officers who raise the qualified immunity defense because the unfair and unjust defense prevents residents from vindicating their constitutional rights and creates uncertainty in constitutional law.

Eliminate or Reduce Municipal Funding for Private Counsel

In the event officers must use private counsel because they have decided to invoke qualified immunity as a legal defense, creating a conflict with the government attorneys, municipalities can eliminate or limit their funding of the officer’s private counsel. When a conflict arises preventing government representation of a police officer, such as when the police department and individual officer have conflicting interests and cannot be represented by the same counsel, municipalities typically cover the litigation expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees for private counsel.³⁷ Research has shown that police officers are “almost always” provided with legal counsel “free of charge” when they are sued, if not by government lawyers then by private attorneys hired by the municipality or union representatives.³⁸

³³ See, e.g., § 18, *supra* n. 31 at (4)(b).

³⁴ See, e.g., § 825.2(b), *supra* n. 31.

³⁵ Schwartz, *supra* n. 28 at 918.

³⁶ See Colo. S.B. 20-217 § 3.

³⁷ See, e.g., § 18, *supra* n. 31.

³⁸ Schwartz, *supra* n. 28 at 915-16.



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When officers refuse to waive the qualified immunity defense, requiring private counsel, municipalities can reduce the amount of expenses and fees they will cover during the litigation or require officers to contribute a certain amount. In states where municipalities have discretion to cover the costs of a police officer's private counsel, municipalities can construct their own rules about what to do if a conflict is created by the officer's refusal to waive the qualified immunity defense, which may include capping the amount of costs it will cover or requiring individual officers to contribute up to a certain amount. It would be in the public interest to not cover the full costs of litigation for officers who refuse to waive the qualified immunity defense for the reasons outlined above.

Addressing Misconceptions about Qualified Immunity Reform³⁹

The prospect of eliminating qualified immunity is typically met with three general objections: (1) it will be prohibitively costly; (2) it will expose law enforcement officers to liability for reasonable, good faith performance of their duties; and (3) law enforcement officers will be apathetic or afraid to effectively do their jobs for fear of being sued.

Any Increased Costs Would Be Reasonable and Manageable

Although eliminating qualified immunity will enable more victims of police misconduct to successfully litigate their claims and recover compensation, it will not increase the cost of litigation or lead to an explosion of expensive verdicts. For instance, following the ban on qualified immunity as a defense in Colorado, civil rights attorneys found that there was not a “rash of frivolous lawsuits brought” despite proponents of qualified immunity claiming otherwise.⁴⁰ Barring lawsuits through the qualified immunity defense serves only to shift costs from police officers and their employers to victims of police misconduct, who may have to pay for medical care, miss work, or suffer other financial burdens as a result of the misconduct. Further, qualified immunity does not save municipalities litigation costs since cases continue while a decision on qualified immunity is being made; it may even *increase* costs if there are multiple interlocutory appeals. Lastly, an increased risk of liability will ultimately help save municipalities money in the long run by deterring future constitutional violations, reducing the number of lawsuits filed and related litigation costs and damages awards.

³⁹ For a more comprehensive analysis of common misconceptions about qualified immunity reform, see *Expanding Pathways to Accountability: State Legislative Options to Remove the Barrier of Qualified Immunity*, *supra* n. 21.

⁴⁰ Newsy Staff, *An Inside Look at Colorado's Year-Old Qualified Immunity Ban*, KXLF (July 22, 2021), <https://www.kxlf.com/news/national/an-inside-look-at-colorados-year-old-qualified-immunity-ban>.



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Officers' Reasonable, Good Faith Conduct is Protected by Constitutional Jurisprudence

Police officers are given a great deal of deference under the constitution and analogous state constitutional provisions. For instance, to determine whether a violation occurred in a use of force case under the Fourth Amendment, courts evaluate whether an officer acted reasonably, acknowledging that officers can make reasonable mistakes when engaging in “split-second judgments” under “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances.⁴¹ Even without contending with the defense of qualified immunity, plaintiffs in police misconduct cases have a high burden to prove their constitutional claims.⁴² As such, qualified immunity is unnecessary to protect officers acting reasonably and in good faith.

Officers Will Continue Performing Lawful Policing Functions

Contrary to claims by proponents of qualified immunity, eliminating the defense will not result in police officers failing to carry out their duties. Officers who make reasonable, good faith decisions, follow their training and department policies, and do their job “by the book” do not need qualified immunity. Further, there is no evidence that officers will be afraid to do their jobs if qualified immunity is eliminated. Research has shown that the threat of being sued does not meaningfully impact individuals’ decisions to apply to become police officers or officers’ decisions while on duty.⁴³ Officers, like doctors, should be able to do their high-pressured job even though they face potential financial liability for misconduct and mistakes.


Addressing Potential Challenges to Municipal-Level Reform

Municipalities trying to enact reforms may receive pushback and the following questions from proponents of qualified immunity: (1) Will asking attorneys representing officers to decline qualified immunity cause ethical and professional responsibility issues? (2) Will attorneys have difficulty obtaining express consent

⁴¹ *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).

⁴² *See, e.g., Nieves v. Bartlett*, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019) (requiring a plaintiff to prove an officer lacked probable cause or present evidence that other similarly situated individuals not engaged in protected activity were not arrested in order to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim); *Turner v. Safley*, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (establishing standard for prisoner First Amendment claims which permit the prison to impose restrictions so long as they are reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest and not an exaggerated response); *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (holding a plaintiff must prove the government intended to discriminate on the basis of race in order to prevail in an Equal Protection challenge even if a policy or law has demonstrable discriminatory impacts).

⁴³ Joanna Schwartz, *The Case Against Qualified Immunity*, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1797, 1804 (2018).



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from officers to waive the qualified immunity defense? (3) Can officers who forego the qualified immunity defense argue that conditioning their legal representation on waiver is a violation of their contractual or constitutional rights?

Ethical and Professional Responsibilities

To comply with professional responsibility obligations, government lawyers may need to explain their reasoning for not using the qualified immunity defense and obtain informed consent from their police officer client.⁴⁴ If an officer refuses to consent and claims a right to the defense, it may trigger the lawyer's professional responsibility obligations to use it.⁴⁵ In some states, government attorneys may be granted authority over certain legal matters that would ordinarily fall on a client in a private client-lawyer relationship, which may afford some municipalities flexibility in placing certain conditions on their representation,⁴⁶ such as conditioning representation on officers foregoing qualified immunity as a defense.

Obtaining Consent for Waiver

Although there may be officers who insist on using qualified immunity as a defense in their individual cases, some police groups have recognized the harm caused by qualified immunity and acknowledged that there are adequate protections for officers facing civil rights lawsuits, such as the reasonableness standard under the Fourth Amendment. For instance, the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), Law Enforcement Action Partnership, and the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives have released statements acknowledging, in some form, that qualified immunity has shielded officers who commit unconstitutional acts from accountability.⁴⁷ The support from police groups for ending qualified immunity, along with a shift in public support,⁴⁸ signals that some police departments may be willing to discuss making waiver of the defense a condition of

⁴⁴ For instance, states may have an analogous rule to Rule 1.2(c) of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which permits lawyers to limit their representation if they inform a client of the limitation and the client gives their informed consent.

⁴⁵ Reinert, *supra* n. 26.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., N.Y. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Preamble, Paragraph [10] (2021).

⁴⁷ James Craven, Jay Schweikert, and Clark Neily, *How Qualified Immunity Hurts Law Enforcement*, Cato Institute (Feb. 15, 2022), <https://www.cato.org/study/how-qualified-immunity-hurts-law-enforcement>.

⁴⁸ Pew Research Center, *Majority of Public Favors Giving Civilians the Power to Sue Police Officers for Misconduct*, Pew Research Center (July 9, 2020), <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/07/09/majority-of-public-favors-giving-civilians-the-power-to-sue-police-officers-for-misconduct/> (finding 66% of Americans said "civilians need to have the power to sue police officers to hold them accountable for misconduct and excessive use of force, even if that makes the officers' jobs more difficult").



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employment, legal representation, or indemnification. Municipalities with general decision-making authority over the policies and practices of all public employees, including those working for local law enforcement agencies, may be able to make waiver of the qualified immunity defense a policy for all public employees.

Implication of Officers' Contractual and Constitutional Rights

Defendant officers who are denied indemnification for damages following the resolution of a civil rights case may claim that the municipality's refusal to indemnify them is a violation of the municipality's contractual agreement for representation. Whether or not such a claim is successful will depend on the state's statutory scheme concerning government employers' defense and indemnification of employees and the language in agreements between the officer, their agency, and the municipality. For instance, in *Chang v. County of Los Angeles*,⁴⁹ three officers claimed they were denied indemnification for declining to testify at trial, in violation of the terms of their defense and representation agreement with the county.⁵⁰ However, the appellate court ruled that under California's relevant statutes and the agreement signed by the officers outlining the conditions of the county's representation and indemnification, the county was not obligated to indemnify the officers because it was found they had acted with actual malice.⁵¹

No constitutional right is violated when an officer who refuses to waive qualified immunity as a defense is made to retain and pay a portion of the costs of a private attorney or pay a portion of a judgment or settlement out of pocket when a municipality limits or denies indemnification. However, there may be valid claims based on state statutes, municipal ordinances, union contracts, or departmental policies that govern the conditions municipalities can place on representation and indemnification. Before enacting any new ordinances or local laws regarding indemnification, municipalities should review relevant statutes, ordinances, contracts, and policies to ensure compliance.

CONCLUSION

The qualified immunity defense has enabled officers who engage in misconduct and their employers to avoid accountability. The stalling of reforms at the federal level and slow progress among state legislatures has left municipalities ready for reform questioning what can be done to ensure their residents can vindicate their constitutional rights. Municipalities do not have to wait to act. They can and should

⁴⁹ *Chang v. Cty. of L.A.*, No. BC479858 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 13, 2013).

⁵⁰ *Chang v. Cty. of L.A.*, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 302 (2016).

⁵¹ *Id.*



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provide their residents with a local cause of action to sue police officers who violate their constitutional rights and remove qualified immunity as a defense. Municipal legal departments can and should enact a policy and practice of not using qualified immunity as a defense and government attorneys should obtain waiver of the defense from their officer clients. Municipalities and police departments should condition legal representation, indemnification, and even employment, if possible, on an officer's agreement to waive qualified immunity as a defense. In the event an officer refuses to waive the defense, government attorneys should decline legal representation and municipalities should decline indemnifying officers for the cost of litigation and attorney's fees.

We urge every municipality whose representatives acknowledged the need to improve police accountability in the wake of George Floyd's murder to follow through on their statements and take action to eliminate qualified immunity as a defense for state constitutional claims. NPAP is eager to assist with these efforts. Please do not hesitate to contact us at legal.npap@nlg.org if you are interested in NPAP's support pursuing qualified immunity reform in your municipality.

Empower Victims to Seek Justice.

END QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

For too long, qualified immunity has **prevented victims of police brutality and misconduct from pursuing justice in civil court.** Under this legal doctrine, officers are shielded from being held liable unless the officer's action has already been "clearly established" as a constitutional violation by a prior case with identical facts in that court's jurisdiction, even in cases of intentional, malicious misconduct, injury, or death.

CONSIDER THIS CASE

In **Jessop v. City of Fresno**, a Fresno police officer stole more than \$225,000 in cash and rare coins while executing a search warrant. The Ninth Circuit ruled that while the theft may be "morally wrong," the officer could not be sued because the Ninth Circuit had never specifically decided "whether the theft of property covered by the terms of a search warrant, and seized pursuant to that warrant" constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

**63% OF
AMERICANS
SUPPORT
ENDING QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY**

Cato Institute 2020

WE NEED A BILL THAT WILL...

Empower victims of police abuse

to sue for violations of their state and federal constitutional rights

End qualified immunity

as blanket protection for all government officials

Provide coverage for attorney's fees

so all victims can afford to obtain counsel.

The Truth About

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

MYTH

Ending QI will expose police to personal liability and financial destruction.

FACT

Police officers are almost always indemnified for alleged misconduct. In the largest study of its kind, Professor Joanna Schwartz showed that 99.98% of all dollars paid to plaintiffs alleging civil rights violations by law enforcement came out of the government's pocket, not from individual officers.

MYTH

Ending QI will expose police agencies to financial destruction.

FACT

While qualified immunity reform will make it possible for additional victims of police misconduct to recover compensation, that does not mean there will be a significant net rise in costs. **Qualified immunity does not save costs.** It shifts them to the victims of police misconduct. An increased risk of liability will help save government entities money in the long run through deterrence.

MYTH

QI protects police from being penalized for making rapid life-or-death decisions.

FACT

Qualified immunity only authorizes lawsuits when an officer violates someone's constitutional rights. **Our legal standards** for evaluating if a constitutional rights violation has occurred **are already highly deferential to police discretion** to make split-second decisions. Under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard an officer can mistakenly determine that force is necessary without facing constitutional liability so long as their mistake is reasonable.

MYTH

Ending QI will negatively impact officer retention and recruitment.

FACT

There is no evidence that qualified immunity alone will negatively impact retention and recruitment of police officers. Moreover, the police officers we want to recruit and retain are not individuals who are drawn to a job by the promise of no accountability to the people they nominally serve and protect.

MYTH

Ending QI will paralyze police officers, making them too afraid to do their jobs.

FACT

Qualified immunity is currently not protecting police officers who are making reasonable, good faith decisions in carrying out their duties. **Officers who follow their training and department policies, and who are doing their job “by the book,” do not need qualified immunity**—Fourth Amendment law provides that safeguard.

Statistical Report on Colorado's Qualified Immunity Reform and Crime Rates

By Andrew Qin and the National Police Accountability Project

Abstract: We wished to determine if Colorado's police accountability reform (SB 217) could have caused a significant increase in violent and property crime rates in Colorado's most populous jurisdictions. We compiled a database of 88 comparable jurisdictions and ran synthetic control models for Denver, Colorado Springs, and Aurora to determine if the jurisdictions' crime rates were greater than expected. We then checked if the difference between the synthetic controls and the jurisdictions were statistically significant through placebo testing. We ended up finding that 1) Colorado's three most populous jurisdictions did not experience significantly higher violent crime rates in 2020 and 2021 (post-treatment) compared to their controls after placebo testing, and 2) The Denver-Aurora MSA did experience significantly higher property crime rates in 2020 and 2021 compared to their controls, but Colorado Springs did not experience a significant increase in property crime rates. We concluded that the data does not provide evidence to indicate that the statewide police accountability reform caused a property crime or violent crime increase.

Introduction and Background

Qualified immunity is a court-established doctrine that shields government officials from personal liability for constitutional violations unless the officials violated clearly established laws. After the killing of George Floyd sparked movements against police violence around the country, many activists directed their attention towards qualified immunity as a subject of reform. Activists argue that qualified immunity prevents police officers from being held accountable for misconduct in civil litigation. Supporters of qualified immunity argue that efforts to limit the doctrine would prevent police officers from effectively performing their jobs for fear of frivolous lawsuits. They suggest that eliminating qualified immunity will therefore indirectly lead to a rise in crime. In this statistical report, we aim to provide preliminary data-driven insights on the effects of recently passed qualified immunity legislation on violent and property crime rates in major urban jurisdictions.

On June 19, 2020, Colorado became the first state to implement qualified immunity reform as part of the omnibus Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act (Senate Bill 20-217). The Act prevented officers from using qualified immunity as a defense against civil liability for violations of constitutional rights. The Act also included several other measures, including a ban on chokeholds, harsher penalties for illegal use of force, mandatory internal reporting, narrower use of force guidelines, and new guidelines on acceptable responses to protests. Most reforms took effect immediately (including the qualified immunity provisions) or on September 1, 2020. Other reforms, including data collection and body camera requirements, will take effect in 2022 and 2023. Three other major jurisdictions have passed measures to limit or reform qualified immunity. In August of 2020, Connecticut passed a measure that limited qualified immunity but only took effect in July of 2021. New Mexico and New York City passed measures to limit qualified immunity in 2021.

Because Colorado was the first jurisdiction to implement qualified immunity reform, we analyzed Colorado data to determine the plausible effects of reform on crime rates. We asked the following question: Was the passage of qualified immunity reform in Colorado in June 2020 correlated with significant increases in violent and property crime rates compared to increases in control jurisdictions? We further narrowed the scope of our analysis to Denver, Colorado Springs, and Aurora—the three largest jurisdictions within Colorado – due to missing 2021 statewide data on crime rates.

We should note, however, that although we wished to determine the effects of qualified immunity reform on crime rates, we could not disentangle the effects of the other reforms in the police accountability bill. As we discussed above, SB 217 was an omnibus police reform bill, with several measures enhancing police accountability. If we observed any statewide causal effect, our analysis could not differentiate between which measure resulted in the effect. We believe there is some possibility that the effects of other elements of the police accountability law could have been partly controlled for by coincidence. The reforms in SB 217 outside of qualified immunity and civil liability reform are shared with several other jurisdictions; 17 states passed similar bans on chokeholds, and 30 states passed some form of police accountability law. Additionally, we only excluded the jurisdictions that passed qualified immunity reform from our control set. Jurisdictions that passed police accountability laws matching Colorado's in every way except for qualified immunity reform were included in the analysis. Nonetheless, because

we could not fully control for the other reforms passed in the law, we will only discuss our conclusions in the context of the police accountability law more broadly.

Although we attempt to establish some level of causation in this study by using a synthetic control method, we lack the volume of observational data needed to successfully conduct causal inference. In particular, we lack observations on key lurking variables, including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on poverty rates in each jurisdiction, 2020 and 2021 census data, and shifting community attitudes towards policing.¹ Much of this data will only be released a few years from now, limiting the contours of the present analysis. However, due to the prescience of the qualified immunity question, we decided to produce this preliminary report to at least illustrate the plausible effects of SB 217 on crime rates in Colorado. None of the findings in this report should be interpreted as demonstrating a conclusive causal relationship between qualified immunity reform and crime.

Overview of Available Data

Many of our Methodology choices can only be understood in the context of the available data and policy context at our disposal. We obtained three different types of data from three sources, almost entirely official (with the exception of land area data, which was obtained from a website reporting census data).

First, we received socioeconomic indicator data from the 2011-2019 American Community Survey Five-Year estimates as found through the census data website. The predictor data we utilized was organized “by Place,” meaning the data was largely aggregated in terms of local unit boundaries (towns, cities, census-designated places (“CDPs”), etc.). This data was collected with the intention of serving as crime predictor data. Unfortunately, at the time of the creation of this report, neither 2020 nor 2021 census data had been publicly released.

Second, we collected crime rate data by state and city through the Uniform Crime Reports (“UCR”) released by the FBI. This data was complete from 2011-2020, and the first three quarters of both 2020 and 2021 had been released in the Quarterly UCR from roughly 155 large agencies (limited by the number of agencies that reported their crime rates). This data included statistics on jurisdiction population, violent crime numbers, property crime numbers, and numbers for individual crimes (such as forcible rape, nonnegligent homicide/murder, larceny, etc.). The quarterly data was not disaggregated by quarter.

Third, we received incident level crime data by downloading the data from various agency websites and submitting FOIA requests for agencies that had not released their data publicly (such as Champaign Police Department). Several times, these FOIA requests returned data unfeasible to work with (such as PDF reports of individual crimes), were deemed too costly (totaling greater than \$100 for smaller agencies), or were flatly denied on the basis that data was not kept or that state FOIA laws only permitted in-state residents to make FOIA requests (in the case of Clarksville). As a result, the usefulness of FOIA requested data was limited; however, we incorporated the data that we could obtain using this method into Methodology B analysis.

¹ By “community attitudes towards policing,” we refer to the possibility that increasing distrust of police officers may have changed citizens’ perspectives on crime and cooperation with police, both recognized by the FBI as variables affecting crime.

In sum, the data that we could obtain was limited in scope, largely due to the combination of limited fiscal/temporal resources, difficulty in obtaining data from police departments, and late releases of census and UCR data. The data limitations then harmed the soundness of the analysis. Nonetheless, we managed to obtain enough data to derive meaningful insights on crime rates in treated and control jurisdictions.

Methodology

In this study, we employed two different methodologies, one to incorporate crime rates from all jurisdictions for 2020-2021 (“Methodology A”) and the other to increase the accuracy of the treatment date (“Methodology B”). We have primarily incorporated findings from Methodology A, but findings from Methodology B (performed months before Methodology A was performed) are included in the appendices of this report.

In both methodologies, we employed, to varying extents, a synthetic control methodology as described by Alberto Abadie in his article “Using Synthetic Controls: Feasibility, Data Requirements, and Methodological Aspects.” In a synthetic control method, researchers create a weighted average of jurisdictions and data points with the goal of minimizing the distance between the weighted average and the true jurisdiction’s pre-treatment predictor and response values. The synthetic control method has the advantage of systematically creating control jurisdictions based on average predictor numbers over time, removing the effects of researcher bias from the analysis.

Sampling Methodology

Using data provided by the UCR, we created a dataset of 93 urban jurisdictions and tracked their violent and property crime numbers from 2011 to the first three quarters of 2021. Jurisdictions were chosen on the basis of two criteria: First, the jurisdictions’ violent and property crime numbers must have been published every year (from 2011 to 2021) by the UCR. Because the UCR’s 2021 quarterly crime report only published figures from large self-reporting jurisdictions, the sample of jurisdictions is influenced by self-selection sampling bias; those jurisdictions that chose not to report figures for one of the years are automatically excluded. Second, jurisdictions must have been greater than 85,000 in population according to UCR estimates for every year from 2011 to 2020 (no population data for 2021). This measure is meant to exclude excessively small jurisdictions at the beginning time period that experienced extreme population growth. The number 85,000 was chosen, in part, as a value for a jurisdiction that could experience average population growth from 2011 to reach at least 100,000 by 2020. The second criterion only excludes four small jurisdictions from the analysis, each of which likely did not match the dynamics of larger urban jurisdictions like Colorado Springs and Denver.

After creating the database of crime numbers, we then compiled a set of yearly socioeconomic indicators from each jurisdiction to serve as predictor values for the ‘Synth’ package to average when creating a synthetic control. We chose indicators on the basis of sociological evidence that such indicators could serve as moderately strong predictors of metropolitan violent or property crime rates. Based on the results found in Wells and Weishelt’s “Explaining Crime in Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan Counties,” we chose to record jurisdictions’ high school education percentage, residential stability (or percent of people living at the same property that they lived at one year ago), percentage of population over 18, percentage of population who is

white, percentage of population who is self-employed, unemployment rate, median income, child poverty rate, and population density (population divided by land area). Certain variables recorded in the Wells and Weishelt study were excluded from our analysis because they were either found to be largely non-significant for metropolitan counties in the study (such as South vs. non-South or owner-occupied housing), had missing data for some years (such as single female-led household percentage), or were difficult to collect (such as percentage of population that voted in the last election). These indicators were collected by jurisdiction for 2011 to 2019 from the census tables. If a jurisdiction was missing data from any of those years on any of the collected variables, the jurisdiction was excluded from the analysis.

Certain errors occurred when combining census data with UCR data, particularly around the naming schemes of the cities. While the UCR names cities by their given names, the census data often adds addendum names such as “CDP,” “city,” “town,” and others. We attempted to correct for these errors by erasing addendum words from census names (for instance, removing " City" from names as in the case of “Boise City, Idaho” or “Houston City, Texas”). For large jurisdictions (usually above 100,000 in population), we further went back and individually corrected names to match. We believe we caught most of these errors, but some errors inevitably slipped through the cracks, leading to randomly lost data. Regardless, we find it unlikely that these random errors significantly hindered our analysis.

Because we lacked predictor data for 2020 and 2021, we extrapolated predictor data from 2019 to 2020 and 2021. In other words, 2020 and 2021 predictor data (outside of population and population density) were equivalent to 2019 data. Additionally, 2021 population and population density were extrapolated from 2020 population figures. We do not argue that this extrapolation is a fair representation of reality; of course, with the COVID-19 pandemic and the George Floyd protests of 2020, socioeconomic indicators in 2020 will be different from those in 2019. Extrapolating skewed our pre-treatment predictor averages to some extent, but we do not think it invalidates our results. We further discuss the implications of this choice in the “Methodology A” section.

In the end, we had a dataset of 93 jurisdictions, with crime data from 2011 to 2021 and predictor data from 2011 to 2019. In total, our dataset had 1023 observations and 24 variables. In Table 1, we display the first 20 rows of our dataset.

Table 1: First 20 Rows of Dataset (split into 3 pages)

NAME	population	violent_crime	property_crime	year	violent_crime_rate	property_crime_rate
Alexandria, VA	141638	252	3181	2011	177.918	2245.866
Alexandria, VA	145892	243	2990	2012	166.562	2049.461
Alexandria, VA	148519	258	2967	2013	173.715	1997.724
Alexandria, VA	151065	276	2960	2014	182.703	1959.421
Alexandria, VA	152710	312	2854	2015	204.309	1868.902
Alexandria, VA	155319	286	2798	2016	184.137	1801.454
Alexandria, VA	158256	262	2482	2017	165.555	1568.345
Alexandria, VA	162588	260	2482	2018	159.913	1526.558
Alexandria, VA	162258	288	2517	2019	177.495	1551.233
Alexandria, VA	161525	295	2793	2020	182.634	1729.144
Alexandria, VA	161525	235	1783	2021	145.488	1103.854
Ann Arbor, MI	113848	261	2549	2011	229.253	2238.950

Ann Arbor, MI	115008	227	2726	2012	197.378	2370.270
Ann Arbor, MI	116799	247	2525	2013	211.474	2161.834
Ann Arbor, MI	117768	194	2200	2014	164.731	1868.080
Ann Arbor, MI	118730	228	2364	2015	192.032	1991.072
Ann Arbor, MI	117688	213	2051	2016	180.987	1742.744
Ann Arbor, MI	121930	259	2108	2017	212.417	1728.861
Ann Arbor, MI	122571	270	1932	2018	220.280	1576.229
Ann Arbor, MI	122893	309	2124	2019	251.438	1728.333

NAME	female_household ²	hs	res_stability	over_18	white_percent	self_employed	unemployment	income
Alexandria, VA	8.6	91.0	78.0	83.0	54.3	4.5	4.5	82899
Alexandria, VA	8.6	91.7	78.2	82.9	53.6	4.5	5.1	83996
Alexandria, VA	7.9	91.2	78.3	82.7	53.1	4.4	5.0	85706
Alexandria, VA	8.1	91.3	78.2	82.5	52.7	4.7	4.7	87319
Alexandria, VA	8.6	91.5	77.2	82.3	52.4	4.7	4.5	89134
Alexandria, VA	8.6	91.4	77.4	82.0	52.0	4.7	4.0	89200
Alexandria, VA	8.3	91.4	78.0	81.9	51.8	4.9	3.9	93370
Alexandria, VA	8.7	92.5	78.3	81.7	51.8	4.9	3.3	96733
Alexandria, VA	3.9	93.0	79.0	81.8	51.9	4.8	3.0	100939
Alexandria, VA	3.9	93.0	79.0	81.8	51.9	4.8	3.0	100939
Alexandria, VA	3.9	93.0	79.0	81.8	51.9	4.8	3.0	100939
Ann Arbor, MI	6.8	96.5	64.1	85.4	69.9	4.7	7.3	53377
Ann Arbor, MI	6.8	96.5	64.4	85.8	69.8	4.7	7.2	53814
Ann Arbor, MI	6.7	96.5	65.2	85.5	69.8	4.3	7.6	55003
Ann Arbor, MI	6.6	96.4	64.6	85.6	69.1	4.3	7.1	56835
Ann Arbor, MI	6.6	96.4	64.0	86.0	68.9	4.3	6.5	55990
Ann Arbor, MI	6.4	96.8	64.1	86.1	68.7	4.2	5.6	57697
Ann Arbor, MI	6.0	96.8	64.5	86.6	68.6	4.2	5.3	61247
Ann Arbor, MI	6.0	97.1	64.6	86.9	67.4	4.3	4.6	63956
Ann Arbor, MI	2.6	97.3	66.1	87.2	67.5	4.1	3.9	65745

NAME	received_snap ³	child_poverty	owner_occupied	land_area	pop_density	obs_num	id
Alexandria, VA	3.4	12.4	45.0	15	9442.533	43	1
Alexandria, VA	4.2	13.0	43.9	15	9726.133	44	1
Alexandria, VA	4.6	13.8	43.3	15	9901.267	45	1
Alexandria, VA	4.8	13.7	42.7	15	10071.000	46	1
Alexandria, VA	4.6	12.8	42.5	15	10180.667	47	1
Alexandria, VA	5.0	15.2	42.2	15	10354.600	48	1
Alexandria, VA	4.6	17.7	43.1	15	10550.400	49	1
Alexandria, VA	4.4	18.6	42.9	15	10839.200	50	1

² Originally, we tracked single female-led household percentage, but we soon found out that the 2019 ACS did not record the figures that we needed. While 2011-2018 had data on percentage of *family households* that were led by single females, 2019 data only had data on total households led by single females and total households led by single females with children. We chose the latter, and as the reader can tell, the 2019 percentages are much lower than the 2011-2018. We decided that incorporating such pre-treatment data would skew the synthetic control pretreatment averages too much and decided to cut that data.

³ We tracked percentage of the population who received SNAP benefits, but we did not use that data for any purpose. That variable was also not used by the Wells and Weishelt study.

Alexandria, VA	4.2	18.8	43.3	15	10817.200	51	1
Alexandria, VA	4.2	18.8	43.3	15	10768.333	52	1
Alexandria, VA	4.2	18.8	43.3	15	10768.333	53	1
Ann Arbor, MI	6.3	12.0	46.4	28	4066.000	108	2
Ann Arbor, MI	6.8	13.5	45.5	28	4107.429	109	2
Ann Arbor, MI	7.6	13.2	45.7	28	4171.393	110	2
Ann Arbor, MI	7.6	14.3	45.7	28	4206.000	111	2
Ann Arbor, MI	7.4	13.6	44.8	28	4240.357	112	2
Ann Arbor, MI	6.4	13.3	45.0	28	4203.143	113	2
Ann Arbor, MI	5.9	10.8	45.9	28	4354.643	114	2
Ann Arbor, MI	5.2	11.3	44.8	28	4377.536	115	2
Ann Arbor, MI	4.9	9.8	45.2	28	4389.036	116	2

We decided to split our analysis into violent and property crime analysis for similar reasons as Wells and Weishelt did in their study. There is no evidence that violent and property crime trends are parallel, and ordinarily, property crime numbers would constitute 90% of the total crime rate. Additionally, because the UCR primarily reports property and violent crime numbers, property and violent crime numbers were already standardized before we began analyzing the data.

Methodology A: Approximating the Ideal Synthetic Control Methodology

In our first methodology, we analyzed 3 treated jurisdictions (Denver, Colorado Springs, and Aurora) and included 88 control jurisdictions. The treated jurisdictions were chosen on the basis that they were the 3 largest cities within Colorado. We excluded cities in Connecticut, as they passed their own version of qualified immunity reform. We did not need to further exclude New Mexico and New York City, since such jurisdictions were missing data and did not appear in our final dataset.

Using the Synth package, we created synthetic controls of each of the three treated jurisdictions for both violent and property crime rates. We tested a series of synthetic controls to determine the helpfulness of particular predictor variables in the analysis, but we ended up keeping all predictor variables that we mentioned earlier to preserve methodological standardization.

When creating synthetic controls, we included all pre-treatment time periods but optimized over 2012 to 2019, allowing the “Synth” function to automatically calculate the pre-treatment mean squared prediction error (“MSPE”) over those eight years. We specified the pre-treatment time period to be 2011 to 2020. Although 2020 was the year that the qualified immunity law was passed in Colorado, the function we used to calculate MSPE ratios was the “generate.placebos” function from the SCtools package, which included the final pre-treatment year and the post-treatment years in calculating the post-treatment MSPE. Thus, although the pre-treatment time period was specified to be 2011 to 2020, for functional purposes, 2012 to 2019 were the years relevant to the pre-treatment MSPE calculation, and 2020-2021 were the years relevant to the post-treatment MSPE calculation. Additionally, we specified for the function to employ every available optimization method and choose the best-performing method.⁴ We ended by creating

⁴ Methodologically, it may have been stronger to stick to one optimization method to standardize calculations and reduce computing times. However, when running the Synth function, we sometimes received errors (“Error in svd(c): Infinite or missing values in ‘x’”) which resulted from optimization methods sometimes producing matrices with 0s. To stop producing these errors,

six different synthetic controls, two for each Colorado jurisdiction, and within each jurisdiction, one for violent crime rates and one for property crime rates.

To determine the significance of our findings, we calculated the MSPE ratio for each of the synthetic controls.⁵ In other words, we averaged the squared amount that the synthetic violent or property crime rates differed from the observed violent or property crime rates over the optimized pretreatment time period, given by the Synth function as the *loss.v* value. We then averaged the squared amount that the synthetic violent or property crime rates differed from the observed violent or property crime rates over the post-treatment time period. To control for jurisdictions where the synthetic model was not a great fit, we divided the post-treatment MSPE by the pre-treatment MSPE, creating an MSPE ratio. Theoretically, if the intervention had a significant effect on the property or violent crime rates in the treated jurisdictions, we should see significant increases in crime rates in 2020 and 2021 exceeding those of the synthetic control, and thus, the MSPE ratio of those jurisdictions should be high. However, because there is no objective metric for what a “high enough” MSPE ratio is, we created placebo synthetic controls for every control jurisdiction in the dataset and calculated MSPE ratios for each placebo synthetic control. If the MSPE ratio of the treated jurisdiction was greater than 95% of placebo MSPE ratios, we concluded that the MSPE ratio of the treated jurisdiction was high enough to be statistically significant. The interpretations of such a conclusion are further discussed in the “Discussion” section.

We test for two primary hypotheses:

1. The passage of SB-217 coincided with statistically significant gaps in violent crime rates between all three treated jurisdictions and their controls when standardized for pre-treatment fit. Statistical significance is quantified using placebo MSPE ratios. Further, the treated jurisdictions’ violent crime rates are *greater than* their synthetic controls.
2. The passage of SB-217 coincided with statistically significant gaps in property crime rates between all three treated jurisdictions and their controls when standardized for pre-treatment fit. Statistical significance is quantified using placebo MSPE ratios. Further, the treated jurisdictions’ property crime rates are *greater than* their synthetic controls.

If the evidence proves either hypothesis true, the data would provide some evidence (though not conclusive) for a plausible causal chain between SB-217 and higher crime rates. Because we are testing if a statewide causal factor (SB-217) explained the increase, the hypotheses are only proven true if *all three* treated jurisdictions have significant MSPE ratios. Denver and Aurora, alone, do not provide enough evidence because they belong to the same metropolitan statistical

we were forced to run all optimization methods, even if such a method increased computing times significantly when generating placebos.

⁵ “MSPE” refers to mean squared prediction error, a measure of how well a model matches the observed outcome variable. A higher MSPE generally indicates more “error,” meaning the model’s predictions significantly deviate from reality. Generally, in a synthetic control methodology, we wish to minimize pre-treatment MSPE (or the MSPE before the date of the policy intervention) to obtain a better fit. However, high post-treatment MSPE may indicate that the policy intervention had an observable effect on the outcome variable in the jurisdiction, as the jurisdiction’s true values differed substantially from those expected by the control. We use MSPE ratio, or the post-treatment MSPE divided by pre-treatment MSPE, to express how much the observed values differ from what we expect based on the model, controlled for how well the model fit prior to treatment.

area and are expected to have similar trends. If Colorado Springs does not experience a significant increase and Denver and Aurora experience a significant increase, the data would only provide evidence for a local causal factor driving up crime, not a statewide causal variable.

The synthetic control methodology that we employed has several limitations. First, as noted in the “Sampling Methodology” section, we extrapolated predictor values from 2019 to 2020 and 2021. This biased the averages used when constructing the synthetic control. Since 2020 was included in the pre-treatment time section, we functionally doubled the role of 2019 in calculating predictor averages for the treated jurisdiction for the synthetic jurisdiction to emulate. We do not believe this should, alone, invalidate our analysis. Since the 2020 predictors data is only used in calculating an overall average of the predictors that the synthetic jurisdiction should approximate - and not to serve as predictors that should be held constant from year to year to isolate the effects of the intervention - the extrapolated 2020 data would only cause the synthetic control methodology to create weighted averages that matched treated jurisdictions’ 2019 data above other earlier years. For example, if researchers attempted to control the 2020 and 2021 MSPE for the predictor variables using the 2019 data, such an effort would clearly be invalid, as 2019 unemployment and child poverty rates cannot be used to adjust for 2020 and 2021 data. However, because we do not calculate MSPEs differently based on predictor values, we do not suffer from such limitations. The methodology merely averages the predictor values of the treated jurisdiction over the pre-treatment time period for the synthetic control to match but does not attempt to hold such predictors constant from year to year or control for yearly shifts in those predictors. Thus, any skew created by such a flaw is minimal.

Second, the time of the treatment is not effectively accounted for by the synthetic control methodology. The passage of the police accountability bill in Colorado occurred in the middle of 2020; however, we do not have quarterly data by which we could isolate the two quarters of 2020 prior to treatment from the two quarters post-treatment. Instead, we simply sort 2020 and 2021 as broadly falling under the post-treatment time frame, operating on the assumption that if the police accountability legislation affected violent and property crime rates in the Colorado jurisdictions, the increase in violent and property crime rates for the whole of 2020 would be greater than those of treated jurisdictions. Unfortunately, such an assumption is not necessarily true, as 2020 introduced a series of different factors, ranging from the COVID-19 pandemic to the George Floyd protests, each of which influenced jurisdictions’ crime rates in unknown ways. As a result, we are hesitant to derive a causal conclusion from any of our analysis. We attempt to solve this problem in Methodology B at the cost of other significant methodological limitations.

Third, in an ideal synthetic control, we would have a wealth of years both before and after the treatment to evaluate. Unfortunately, due to the recency of the legislation and the inability to divide years into quarterly data, we only had a total of 2 post-treatment time periods to evaluate. This may limit our insights, as a single year of increased property or violent crime rates in one of the treated jurisdictions would skew the mean post-treatment MSPE substantially, even if such a year occurred merely from chance. Placebo testing should diminish the influence of chance in the analysis, but having more post-treatment time periods to calculate the MSPE would allow the analysis to be more reliable.

Methodology B: Synthetic Control as Comparative Case Study Selection

Our second methodology was employed before the release of 2020 and 2021 data by the UCR and was meant to serve as a workaround to normal synthetic analysis. As a result, the second methodology suffers from severe limitations, many of which could invalidate the analysis entirely. We include the results from Methodology B in the appendices in case they are found to be useful in their treatment date precision and high jurisdiction inclusion that Methodology A lacks.

In our second methodology, we examined violent and property crime rates in Denver only.⁶ In selecting possible control jurisdictions, we waived the requirements for 2020 and 2021 crime data, as such data was not relevant for the analysis. We additionally only filtered for jurisdictions greater than 50000 in population, as we only had access to a small number of time periods but an enormous sample of jurisdictions within the donor pool. We removed population density from the analysis and relied on population alone to serve as the “population” level statistic. This led to many nonsimilar jurisdictions being included in the analysis, significantly increasing the potential for bias. In total, we had roughly 530 jurisdictions in the donor pool when constructing the synthetic control.

To account for the lack of 2020 and 2021 data and to increase the precision of the treatment dates, we used the synthetic control methodology to identify jurisdictions similar to Denver and to provide weights for some of those jurisdictions. We optimized the synthetic controls for 2016 to 2019 to obtain a synthetic control that could follow the most recent trends in Denver. We then identified the top five jurisdictions with the highest weights and reran the synthetic control model with only those jurisdictions to recalculate the weights, relying on the premise that the synthetic of the top four or five jurisdictions that comprise a majority weight in the full synthetic control would be similar enough to the treated jurisdictions to analyze. With those identified control jurisdictions, we submitted requests for incident-level crime data to those departments for 2019-2021. When those requests were either unanswered or denied (as in the case of Ann Arbor Police Department), we removed the city from the synthetic control model and reran the model until we obtained at least four police departments with accessible incident level crime data.

We subdivided all 2019-2021 incident-level crime data into property and violent crimes based on UCR definitions. In particular, murder and nonnegligent homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, and forcible rape (including sexual assault with an object, fondling, and forcible sodomy) were identified as violent crimes. We categorized larceny, burglary, damage/destruction of property, arson, shoplifting, pocket-picking, and motor vehicle theft charges as property crimes. We calculated the daily numbers of violent and property offenses for June 2019 to June 2020 (before qualified immunity reform) and June 2020 to June 2021 (after qualified immunity reform) in control and treated jurisdictions. We then subtracted the daily numbers of violent and property offenses in the 2019-20 time period from the 2020-21 time period and divided by the total number of violent or property offenses in the 2019-20 time period to make the daily numbers of violent and property crimes proportionate to each jurisdiction’s respective crime numbers. Finally, we created a bootstrapped null distribution assuming no true difference between the

⁶ We also attempted to analyze Colorado Springs using this methodology, but we had trouble requisitioning the needed data in a useable form from police agencies.

daily increases of the synthetic jurisdiction compared to Denver and calculated a p-value based on the probability of observing the real difference or greater between Denver and the synthetic control difference based on the null distribution.

This methodology had a few critical limitations. First, because we did not have access to UCR data for 2020 and 2021, we had to use 2011-2019 weights in 2020 and 2021 calculations, which extrapolate beyond the capabilities of the synthetic control. Second, because of several denied requests (in particular, Ann Arbor and Clarksville Police Departments), we were forced to rely partially on convenience sampling in order to successfully carry out the study. Third, because we needed to determine if the increases between the 2019-20 time period and 2020-21 time period were significantly greater than increases in control jurisdictions, we were forced to employ a test where we subtracted daily crimes in one time period from daily crimes in another time period. This method is statistically invalid because it assumes some contiguous relationship between corresponding days on different years, where increases from one day to the corresponding day on the next year would have meaning. However, such an assumption is clearly incorrect, as crime numbers on June 14, 2020 are wholly unrelated to crime numbers on June 14, 2021. As a result, this method substantially exaggerated the standard deviation of violent and property crimes, since daily fluctuations in crime do not remain constant over the course of a year. The test may have been more successful on a monthly level, but we did not have enough monthly difference data to successfully arrive at statistical conclusions through simulation.

Fourth, because we had to standardize the daily crime numbers by dividing crime numbers from some relative figure for each jurisdiction (in this case, the total number of offenses in the 2019-20 time period), smaller jurisdictions disproportionately influenced the variance of the synthetic control, since daily fluctuations of 1-2 offenses were much greater when standardized compared to larger jurisdictions. Fifth, the methodology misuses the synthetic control methodology to identify 4-5 jurisdictions that comprise the majority weight of the main jurisdiction, but the synthetic control methodology is only intended to weight jurisdictions in a manner that creates an average jurisdiction matching the treated one, not to identify jurisdictions that are most similar to the treated jurisdiction. As a result, the jurisdictions we chose based on the synthetic control were often dramatically different from the treated jurisdiction (such as Champaign, IL and Fort Smith, AR, both of which were incredibly small jurisdictions). Finally, because we included both excessively small and excessively large jurisdictions, we did not filter the dataset beforehand to only include jurisdictions that were somewhat similar to Denver, skewing the synthetic averages towards the extremes.

The results of this methodology, in their entirety, are described in Appendix 2.

Exploratory Data Analysis

In this section, we lay out crime numbers from our data and compare them with crime numbers generated by synthetic controls derived from Methodology B to give readers an idea of what conclusions we expected prior to running the analysis. We did not include Aurora graphs in the Exploratory Data Analysis, since we did not have access to incident-level Aurora data. We expect, however, that Aurora's crime numbers parallel Denver's.

As we noted before, if the statewide police accountability law led to systematic increases in crime rates, we would expect to see roughly parallel increases across both Denver and Colorado

Springs. One city experiencing upticks in crime that the other city does not experience only provides evidence of a local causal mechanism, not a statewide causal factor.




Fig. 1: Monthly Violent and Property Crime Numbers in Denver 2016-2021: Each bar represents the number of reported incidents in a single month. Red bars represent the months following the passage of the police accountability legislation on June 19, 2020. Data from June 20-30 is included in the month immediately preceding the red bars (June 2020). The black dotted line represents 10 reported violent incidents or 50 reported property incidents above the previous maximum number of offenses in a single month in the four years prior to legislation.

After the passage of the police accountability law on June 19, 2020, Denver experienced some increase in violent crimes. Both July and August 2020 had more violent crimes in a single month than the previous four years' record for violent crimes in a single month. Denver's violent crimes then decreased over the fall and winter before increasing again the following summer, reaching similar crime numbers as the previous summer. We could interpret Denver's violent crime increase as part of Denver's steady yearly increases in violent crime since 2016.

On the other hand, Denver's property crime incidents increased far more dramatically than its violent crimes did. In **every month** following the passage of the police accountability legislation, Denver experienced more property crimes than the city had in any single month in the previous 4-5 years. Denver's property crimes also did not decrease to normal levels as Denver's violent crimes did. Importantly, however, Denver's property crime increase seems to have begun around March or April 2020, not in June, possibly implying that other factors (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) may have fueled the rise in property crime.




Fig. 2: Monthly Violent and Property Crime Numbers in Colorado Springs 2016-2021

Similarly to Denver, Colorado Springs also experienced some increase in violent crime following the passage of the police accountability legislation. In the summer of 2020, Colorado Springs experienced moderately high violent crime, roughly matching the heights of the previous summer. Additionally, in the summer of 2021, Colorado Springs’ violent crime numbers increased significantly, with one month far exceeding the single-month record for number of violent crimes from the past 4 years.

Colorado Springs also appears to have experienced some rise in property crime in the summer of 2021, although the increase is not nearly as pronounced as the increase that Denver experienced. The summer of 2020 did not appear to have unusually high property crime numbers. The graph does not present clear evidence that Colorado Springs’ property crimes substantially increased following the passage of the police accountability legislation. As we noted earlier, if the rise in property crime in both jurisdictions was caused by the police accountability legislation, we would expect to see roughly parallel trends in both jurisdictions instead of the outcome lag and much smaller magnitude increase in Colorado Springs.

To give a control standard for reference, we included the following graphs from Methodology B comparing the monthly weighted averages of 4-5 jurisdictions with Denver’s monthly violent crime and property crime rates. This is not data used in our main analysis.




Fig. 3: Monthly Violent and Property Crime Numbers in Denver Compared to Control 2019-2021: The red dashed line represents the passage of the police accountability legislation in June 19, 2020. Although the control

continues to mostly track Denver violent crimes even after the passage of the police accountability law, Denver property crimes far surpass the control after April of 2020.

The violent crime control closely tracks Denver's monthly numbers both before and after the passage of the police accountability law. Although Denver experienced some increases in the summer immediately following the passage of the police accountability bill that were not fully matched by the synthetic control, Denver's numbers soon fell comfortably into the control model's range.

On the other hand, Denver's increase in property crime numbers was significantly greater than increases in other jurisdictions. From roughly February 2020 to July 2020, Denver property crimes steadily increased, while synthetic control numbers remained stagnant. Denver property crimes also remained high even after the summer, maintaining its much higher position compared to the synthetic control even as late as June of 2021.

In conclusion, the above graphs imply the following possible results. First, Colorado jurisdictions experienced *some* increase in violent crime rates following the passage of police accountability legislation, but those increases may not be large enough in magnitude for chance to be ruled out as a plausible explanation. Second, Denver experienced an extreme increase in property crime rates in the summer of 2020 that never decreased to normal levels, implying a high likelihood that Denver's property crime increase is *sustained* and *due to systematic factors other than chance*. On the other hand, while Colorado Springs experienced some increase in property crime rates, its significance is questionable due to its much lower magnitude.

Testing and Results

In this section, we discuss the synthetic control diagnostics and MSPE test results for each of the six synthetic controls.

Synthetic Controls for Violent Crime

Denver

We began with Denver, the largest jurisdiction in Colorado. Below, we included the graph comparing the violent crime rates of the synthetic jurisdiction and Denver itself. We also included a table comparing observed and synthetic predictor values to evaluate model fit.




Fig. 4: Denver vs Synthetic Control Violent Crime Rates 2011-2021: The model fit exceptionally well from 2011-2017 before some declining fit in 2018 and 2019. 2020 was the recorded year of treatment.

Table 2: Observed vs Synthetic Denver Predictor Values

	Treated	Synthetic	Sample Mean
Population	682917.900	682732.925	312485.499
Population Density	4463.516	4463.030	3832.261
Median Income (USD)	56967.300	56952.416	55733.756
HS Education or Above %	86.310	86.312	86.464
Residential Stability %	78.240	78.244	80.522
Over 18 %	79.270	77.703	76.249
White %	53.200	53.181	53.491
Self-Employed Rate	5.640	5.640	5.282
Unemployment Rate	6.120	6.135	7.560
Owner-Occupied Housing %	50.030	50.023	53.687
Child Poverty Rate	24.340	24.338	23.744

The synthetic control is relatively strong. The synthetic control matches observed Denver's predictor values exceptionally well, and the pre-treatment MSPE is relatively low at approximately 2288.114 (as computed by the Synth package).

Based on the graph, we can conclude that Denver's violent crime rates were greater than control jurisdictions in the post-treatment period. However, it is difficult to tell whether Denver's increase in violent crime rates in 2020 is due to systematic causal factors in Denver (like the

treatment) or simply due to declining fit in the more recent years. While synthetic Denver roughly follows the trends of Denver up until about 2017, synthetic Denver begins diverging from observed Denver as early as 2018. The pre-treatment gap between the predicted and observed values only increases in 2019 before Denver’s large increase in 2020.

We include the following table to be transparent about how the synthetic control ended up assigning the largest weights.

Table 3: Weights of the Top 20 Highly Weighted Jurisdictions

Weights	Unit Names
0.279	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
0.158	Houston, Texas
0.114	Alexandria, Virginia
0.067	Cambridge, Massachusetts
0.061	Springfield, Missouri
0.040	Madison, Wisconsin
0.035	Austin, Texas
0.014	Columbia, Missouri
0.014	Fargo, North Dakota
0.008	Dallas, Texas
0.008	Laredo, Texas
0.008	Waco, Texas
0.008	Wichita Falls, Texas
0.007	Ann Arbor, Michigan
0.007	College Station, Texas
0.006	Lexington, Kentucky
0.005	Evansville, Indiana
0.005	Manchester, NH
0.005	Odessa, Texas
0.005	Salt Lake City, Utah

In the weights, we can see that the majority of synthetic Denver is comprised of Oklahoma City, Houston, and Alexandria, although several cities possess nonzero weights. In this way, our synthetic control is distinct from the synthetic control used within Abadie et. al.’s research on the Basque region, as their synthetic control only weighted 2 regions and assigned zero weights to the rest of the regions.

Results of Placebo Testing: After calculating 88 different placebo synthetic controls, we found that Denver’s MSPE ratio was nonsignificant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level. When excluding jurisdictions with pre-treatment MSPEs more than 5x greater than the pre-treatment MSPE of Denver, more than 11% of the placebo synthetic controls had MSPE ratios greater than that of Denver. However, Denver’s data is still relatively extreme; if we instead chose to run a one-sided

test or excluded outliers from the placebos, it is very plausible that Denver’s violent crime rates would be significant. Nonetheless, based on our assigned thresholds, the data does not provide sufficient evidence to rule out chance as an explanation for the differences in violent crime rates between Denver and the synthetic control in 2020 and 2021.

Colorado Springs




Fig. 5: Colorado Springs vs Synthetic Control Violent Crime Rates 2011-2021: The model fits relatively well until 2018, where the gap between violent crime rates increases significantly just prior to treatment.

Table 4: Observed vs Synthetic Colorado Springs Predictor Values

	Treated	Synthetic	Sample Mean
Population	456236.000	450584.230	312485.499
Population Density	2339.672	2367.789	3832.261
Median Income (USD)	59.040	55.666	53.687
HS Education or Above %	93.160	90.760	86.464
Residential Stability %	76.380	76.489	80.522
Over 18 %	75.880	75.874	76.249
White %	69.540	58.711	53.491
Self-Employed Rate	5.550	5.404	5.282
Unemployment Rate	7.790	7.685	7.560
Owner-Occupied Housing %	57594.800	57654.295	55733.756
Child Poverty Rate	17.520	19.241	23.744

The synthetic control for Colorado Springs is very strong. The pre-treatment MSPE value is approximately 1477.022, lower than that of Denver. Per Table 4, Colorado Springs’ predictor values match relatively well with those of the synthetic jurisdiction, with the exceptions of racial homogeneity (about 10% off), child poverty (about 1.8% off), and owner-occupied housing (about 3% off). Nevertheless, given that the synthetic control tracks Colorado Springs relatively thoroughly, we find it appropriate to proceed with the given model.

Based on the graph, Colorado Springs did have slightly higher violent crime rate values than the synthetic control in both 2020 and 2021. However, we are relatively certain that such a gap is explainable by declining fit in the later years. The largest violent crime gap is in 2019, where Colorado Springs experienced an increase in violent crime rate while the synthetic control experienced a decrease. The gap decreases in both 2020 and 2021, implying that the only reason violent crime rates are “higher than expected” is because they were already higher pre-treatment.

Table 5: Weights of the Top 20 Highly Weighted Jurisdictions

	Weights	Unit Names
17	0.403	Clarksville, Tennessee
70	0.183	Peoria, Arizona
2	0.170	Ann Arbor, Michigan
39	0.138	Houston, Texas
13	0.047	Carlsbad, California
34	0.015	Frisco, Texas
8	0.004	Boise, Idaho
38	0.004	Henderson, Nevada
25	0.002	Detroit, Michigan
49	0.002	Las Vegas, Nevada
60	0.002	Mesa, Arizona
77	0.002	San Antonio, Texas
21	0.001	Corpus Christi, Texas
23	0.001	Dayton, Ohio
33	0.001	Fort Wayne, Indiana
35	0.001	Garland, Texas
47	0.001	Lansing, Michigan
50	0.001	League City, Texas
51	0.001	Lee’s Summit, Missouri
57	0.001	McAllen, Texas

Per Table 5, roughly 90% of the synthetic control weight is centered around 4 jurisdictions: Clarksville, Peoria, Ann Arbor, and Houston. The rest of the jurisdictions have weights just above 0, similar to the weights we expected from Abadie et. al.’s analysis.

Results of Placebo Testing: Using the same placebos generated for Denver, we found that Colorado Springs’ MSPE ratio of 1.066 was smaller than 70% of placebo jurisdictions after removing placebo jurisdictions with pre-treatment MSPEs five times greater than that of Colorado Springs. The data does not provide sufficient evidence to indicate that Colorado Springs’ violent crime rates in 2020 and 2021 were significantly different from those of control jurisdictions.

Aurora

We expect to see roughly the same crime trends in both Aurora and Denver. Below, we depict a plot comparing the observed/synthetic violent crime rates as well as a plot depicting the gaps in greater detail to visualize the weak model fit more easily.




Fig. 6: Aurora vs Synthetic Control Violent Crime Rates 2011-2021: The path plot on the left follows the violent crime rate numbers in the observed and synthetic jurisdictions. The gaps plot subtracts the synthetic (expected) violent crime rates from the observed violent crime rates to show the numerical gaps between the jurisdictions over time. Unlike the first two synthetic controls, the model fit is extremely weak.

Table 6: Observed vs Synthetic Aurora Predictor Values

	Treated	Synthetic	Sample Mean
Population	359600.00	357346.825	312485.499
Population Density	2320.00	2348.947	3832.261
Median Income (USD)	58.64	58.015	53.687
HS Education or Above %	86.62	86.663	86.464
Residential Stability %	79.03	79.127	80.522
Over 18 %	73.61	73.626	76.249
White %	46.09	49.700	53.491
Self-Employed Rate	5.00	5.034	5.282
Unemployment Rate	7.56	7.551	7.560

Owner-Occupied Housing %	56417.60	56446.994	55733.756
Child Poverty Rate	20.51	20.886	23.744

Even though Aurora’s synthetic control matches its predictor values extremely well, the graph shows that the model is a weak fit for the data. While Aurora experiences a large increase in violent crime in 2016 and 2017, the synthetic control experiences no such increase. Aurora’s pre-treatment MSPE is also high with a value of approximately 13362.431, almost 10 times that of Colorado Springs. We found it unlikely that insights derived from this synthetic control would be helpful, but we ran the significance test regardless.

As in the other two jurisdictions, Aurora’s violent crime rate post-treatment is greater than the synthetic control. However, as the gaps plot demonstrates, the gap between Aurora and the synthetic control had been steadily increasing for some time before increasing dramatically post-treatment. It is plausible that the increase resulted from the police accountability law, but more likely, the increased gap in 2020 and 2021 was simply a symptom of the already weak model fit and preexisting violent crime trends in Aurora.

Table 7: Weights of the Top 20 Highly Weighted Jurisdictions

Weights	Unit Names
0.254	Clarksville, Tennessee
0.163	Chesapeake, Virginia
0.138	San Antonio, Texas
0.092	Odessa, Texas
0.082	Pasadena, Texas
0.061	Round Rock, Texas
0.035	College Station, Texas
0.024	Kenosha, Wisconsin
0.011	Frisco, Texas
0.008	Olathe, Kansas
0.006	Columbia, Missouri
0.005	Grand Prairie, Texas
0.005	Waco, Texas
0.004	Fort Wayne, Indiana
0.004	Green Bay, Wisconsin
0.003	El Paso, Texas
0.003	Fargo, North Dakota
0.003	Irving, Texas
0.003	Las Vegas, Nevada
0.003	League City, Texas

Results of Placebo Testing: We found that Aurora’s MSPE ratio is not significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level. When excluding placebos with pre-treatment MSPEs over five times greater than that of Aurora, about 11.9% of the placebo synthetic controls have MSPE ratios greater than that of Aurora. It is plausible that if we distinguished placebo MSPE ratios with higher than expected violent crime rates from placebo MSPE ratios with lower than expected violent crime rates (functionally turning the test into a one-sided test), Aurora’s increase may become significant. However, given that Aurora’s synthetic control is already so weak, we do not feel it would be valuable to conduct such an analysis.

Placebos for Violent Crimes

As we noted earlier, we generated 88 different placebo synthetic controls with the same settings as the original synthetic control and compiled all the MSPE ratios from each placebo synthetic control into a single dataset for significance testing. We would like to take a moment to comment on these placebos.

Below, we visualized these placebos’ MSPE ratios and noted their summary statistics.

Table 8: Summary Statistics of Violent Crime Placebos (with Outliers)

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
8.043	25.021	1.641




Fig. 7: Placebo MSPE Ratios for Violent Crime Rates: Here, we displayed a histogram of all MSPE ratios calculated by the “generate.placebos” command. The black line represents Denver’s MSPE ratio, the red line represents Aurora’s MSPE ratio, and the blue line represents Colorado Springs’ MSPE ratio. We calculate p-values by dividing the number of “more extreme” MSPE ratios (to the right of the lines) by the total number of MSPE ratios.

As the histogram displays, most placebo MSPE ratios are centered at 0-10 with the exception of two placebo MSPE ratios above 80 and a series of other outliers in the 20-50 range. Those extreme outlier MSPE ratios represent Evansville and Manchester and likely occurred from an

exceptionally good fit with the data in pretreatment years with some declining fit in 2020. The outliers are further discussed in Appendix 2. The summary statistics in Table 8 further demonstrate how much the outliers differ from the rest of the dataset; while the median is centered on an MSPE ratio of around 1, the standard deviation is 25 and the mean is 8.

Re-visualizing without outliers and reducing the binwidth to further detail the smaller MSPE ratios in the spectrum, we arrive at the second graph and table below.

Table 9: Summary Statistics of Violent Crime Placebos (without Outliers)

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
4.73	8.649	1.609




Fig. 8: Placebo MSPE Ratios for Violent Crime Rates without Outliers: The black line represents Denver’s MSPE ratio, the red line represents Aurora’s MSPE ratio, and the blue line represents Colorado Springs’ MSPE ratio. We calculate p-values by dividing the number of “more extreme” MSPE ratios (to the right of the lines) by the total number of MSPE ratios.

As we can see, Colorado Springs is squarely within the center of the distribution. On the other hand, Aurora and Denver’s MSPE ratios are larger than most of the MSPE ratios within the dataset, but the ratios are still smaller than enough placebos to not constitute statistically significant evidence.

We display these placebos to give the reader an idea of what synthetic controls we ended up creating, any outliers or flaws within the synthetic controls, as well as where the treated jurisdictions lie on the distribution.

Overall Results for Violent Crime

We reject the first hypothesis. After generating 88 placebo MSPE ratios, we found that the MSPE ratios of Denver, Colorado Springs, and Aurora were not large enough to constitute statistically significant evidence that violent crime rates in those areas were significantly different from violent crime rates in control jurisdictions post-treatment. The data does not provide sufficient evidence that SB-217 coincided with statistically significant increases in violent crime rates compared to control jurisdictions.

Property Crime

Our property crime results varied significantly from our violent crime results in terms of the significance of our findings. Just like in the case of violent crime, we created three synthetic controls, one for each of the three treated jurisdictions. Model fit varied significantly based on the treated jurisdiction.

Denver

Because of weaker fit, we included both the gaps plot and the path plot for the data.




Fig. 9: Denver vs Synthetic Control Property Crime Rates 2011-2021: The path plot on the left follows the property crime rate numbers in the observed and synthetic jurisdictions. The gaps plot subtracts the synthetic (expected) violent crime rates from the observed violent crime rates to show the numerical gaps between the jurisdictions over time.

Table 10: Observed vs Synthetic Denver Predictor Values

	Treated	Synthetic	Sample Mean
Population	682917.900	682770.807	312485.499
Population Density	4463.516	4470.970	3832.261
Median Income (USD)	56967.300	56835.758	55733.756
HS Education or Above %	86.310	86.341	86.464
Residential Stability %	78.240	78.248	80.522

Over 18 %	79.270	79.006	76.249
White %	53.200	53.070	53.491
Self-Employed Rate	5.640	5.638	5.282
Unemployment Rate	6.120	7.620	7.560
Owner-Occupied Housing %	50.030	50.027	53.687
Child Poverty Rate	24.340	24.338	23.744

In terms of predictors, Table 10 displays that the synthetic control does a good job of creating a synthetic jurisdiction with predictors that match observed Denver well. However, Figure 9 displays that the synthetic control is not a strong fit for the Denver data. While the synthetic control’s property crime rate steadily decreases, Denver’s property crime rate has the opposite trend from 2014. Notably, the gaps between Denver’s property crime rates and the synthetic control steadily increase from 2014, although the gaps are not particularly large until the spike in property crimes in 2020.

As the Exploratory Data Analysis led us to expect, Denver’s property crime rate is far above the synthetic control’s property crime rate post-treatment. There is some declining fit over time, but Figure 9 displays a clear spike in property crime that implies the existence of a systematic causal factor.

Table 11: Weights of Top 20 Highly Weighted Jurisdictions

Weights	Unit Names
0.149	Houston, Texas
0.121	Seattle, Washington
0.103	Ann Arbor, Michigan
0.096	Dayton, Ohio
0.087	San Diego, California
0.064	Sterling Heights, Michigan
0.024	Cambridge, Massachusetts
0.019	Bellevue, Washington
0.016	Dallas, Texas
0.015	Springfield, Missouri
0.013	Manchester, New Hampshire
0.012	Brownsville, Texas
0.011	Escondido, California
0.011	Knoxville, Tennessee
0.009	Alexandria, Virginia
0.009	Austin, Texas
0.008	Lexington, Kentucky
0.008	Waco, Texas

0.008	Wichita Falls, Texas
0.007	Oceanside, California

Results of Placebo Testing: We found the MSPE ratio of Denver to be statistically significant. After excluding jurisdictions with pre-treatment MSPEs greater than five times that of Denver, we found that Denver’s MSPE ratio of 23.999 was extremely high, only exceeded by Madison, WI and McAllen, TX. Although not significant at the 1% level, such a finding is significant at the 5% and 10% levels. The data does provide sufficient evidence to indicate that Denver’s property crime rate gaps in 2020 and 2021 is significantly greater than those of placebo jurisdictions and makes it unlikely that Denver’s heightened property crime rate merely resulted from chance.

Colorado Springs




Fig. 10: Colorado Springs vs Synthetic Control Property Crime Rates 2011-2021: The model fits relatively well with a few marginal errors in 2017 and 2019.

Table 12: Observed vs Synthetic Colorado Springs Predictor Values

	Treated	Synthetic	Sample Mean
Population	456236.000	449950.969	312485.499
Population Density	2339.672	2356.828	3832.261
Median Income (USD)	57594.800	55871.890	55733.756
HS Education or Above %	93.160	90.469	86.464
Residential Stability %	76.380	76.568	80.522
Over 18 %	75.880	75.931	76.249

White %	69.540	63.213	53.491
Self-Employed Rate	5.550	5.567	5.282
Unemployment Rate	7.790	7.717	7.560
Owner-Occupied Housing %	59.040	53.574	53.687
Child Poverty Rate	17.520	21.671	23.744

Colorado Springs’ synthetic control is a strong fit to the data. With a pretreatment MSPE of only 54693.661 (note that because we are using property crime rates, numbers are expected to be much higher than in the case of violent crime rates), the synthetic control follows Colorado Springs’ trend well until about 2019. From 2019-2021, Colorado Springs had a slightly higher property crime rate than its synthetic control. On the level of predictors, synthetic Colorado Springs deviates from Colorado Springs’ predictor values in owner-occupied housing, child poverty, and racial homogeneity. This likely limits the extent to which the synthetic control can track Colorado Springs’ crime trends effectively, but given the pretreatment fit, a statistical significance analysis would still be meaningful. The weights table in Table 12 are also roughly what we expect, with mostly nonzero weights given and a few jurisdictions comprising the majority of the synthetic control.

Based on Figure 10, Colorado Springs’ property crime rate is higher than the synthetic control post-treatment. However, the gap is not very large and likely resulted from the already-present gap in 2019.

Table 12: Weights of Top 20 Highly Weighted Jurisdictions

Weights	Unit Names
0.375	Clarksville, Tennessee
0.172	Springfield, Missouri
0.111	San Diego, California
0.089	Frisco, Texas
0.074	Boise, Idaho
0.069	Lexington, Kentucky
0.064	Houston, Texas
0.028	Ann Arbor, Michigan
0.004	Spokane, Washington
0.003	Las Vegas, Nevada
0.002	Henderson, Nevada
0.001	Columbia, Missouri
0.001	Lee’s Summit, Missouri
0.001	Madison, Wisconsin
0.000	Alexandria, Virginia
0.000	Arlington, Texas
0.000	Austin, Texas

0.000	Beaumont, Texas
0.000	Bellevue, Washington
0.000	Brownsville, Texas

Results of Placebo Testing: After removing jurisdictions with pre-treatment MSPEs more than five times greater than that of Colorado Springs, Colorado Springs’ MSPE ratio of about 7.7 was not statistically significant at any of the three levels. Roughly 45% of placebo jurisdictions had MSPE ratios greater than the one in Colorado Springs. Thus, the data does not provide sufficient evidence to indicate that Colorado Springs’ property crime rate gaps could not have resulted simply from chance.

Aurora

Although the model fit is not weak, we incorporate both the gaps plot and the path plot to display the plausible opposite trends in the data.




Fig. 11: Aurora vs Synthetic Control Property Crime Rates 2011-2021: The path plot on the left follows the property crime rate numbers in the observed and synthetic jurisdictions. The gaps plot subtracts the synthetic (expected) violent crime rates from the observed violent crime rates to show the numerical gaps between the jurisdictions over time.

Table 13: Observed vs Synthetic Colorado Springs Predictor Values

	Treated	Synthetic	Sample Mean
Population	359600.00	338611.472	312485.499
Population Density	2320.00	2328.506	3832.261
Median Income (USD)	56417.60	56373.063	55733.756
HS Education or Above %	86.62	86.675	86.464
Residential Stability %	79.03	79.047	80.522
Over 18 %	73.61	73.618	76.249

White %	46.09	46.175	53.491
Self-Employed Rate	5.00	5.017	5.282
Unemployment Rate	7.56	7.536	7.560
Owner-Occupied Housing %	58.64	53.943	53.687
Child Poverty Rate	20.51	21.374	23.744

Unlike in the case of the Aurora violent crime synthetic control, the Aurora property crime synthetic control is a moderate fit to the data. Per figure 11, the gaps between Aurora’s property crime rate and synthetic Aurora’s property crime rates are less than 500 until the treatment year. Similar to Denver’s property crime synthetic control, Aurora’s property crime synthetic control suffers from opposite trends; while the synthetic control’s property crime rates are steadily decreasing every year from 2011, Aurora’s property crime rates remain steady until its increase in 2020. However, Aurora’s predictors are well-matched by the synthetic control, and Aurora’s pretreatment MSPE of 36839.829 is substantially lower than Denver’s property crime pretreatment MSPE. Overall, the fit with the data is strong enough to derive meaningful insights.

As we expected, Aurora’s property crime trends in 2020 and 2021 roughly follow that of Denver. Aurora similarly had a spike in property crimes that was not matched by the synthetic control. Aurora’s property crime rates post-treatment are far above the synthetic control. Some of the gap may be explained by the presence of opposite trends, but the magnitude of the gap makes it plausible that some systematic causal factor is at play.

Table 14: Weights of Top 20 Highly Weighted Jurisdictions

Weights	Unit Names
0.303	Clarksville, Tennessee
0.241	Irving, Texas
0.191	Chesapeake, Virginia
0.085	San Antonio, Texas
0.018	Grand Prairie, Texas
0.011	Round Rock, Texas
0.009	Pasadena, Texas
0.008	Detroit, Michigan
0.008	Houston, Texas
0.007	Odessa, Texas
0.004	Columbia, Missouri
0.003	Frisco, Texas
0.003	Laredo, Texas
0.003	League City, Texas
0.003	Memphis, Tennessee
0.003	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
0.003	Virginia Beach, VA

0.003	Waco, Texas
0.002	Ann Arbor, Michigan
0.002	Arlington, Texas

Results of Placebo Analysis: After removing jurisdictions with pre-treatment MSPEs more than five times greater than that of Aurora, the MSPE ratio of Aurora is statistically significant at both the 10% and 5% levels. Similar to Denver, Aurora’s MSPE ratio of 32.703 is surpassed by only Madison, WI and McAllen, TX. The data provides sufficient evidence to indicate that Aurora’s 2020 and 2021 property crime rates were significantly greater than those of similar jurisdictions. The significance of the data makes it unlikely that chance alone can explain the increase in property crime rates.

Visualizing the Placebos for Property Crime

Below, we created a histogram to visualize the placebos for property crime and displayed summary statistics.

Table 15: Summary Statistics of Property Crime Placebos

Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
3.918	6.743	1.138




Fig. 12: Placebo MSPE Ratios for Property Crime Rates: The black line represents Denver’s MSPE ratio, the red line represents Aurora’s MSPE ratio, and the blue line represents Colorado Springs’ MSPE ratio. We calculate p-values by dividing the number of “more extreme” MSPE ratios (to the right of the lines) by the total number of MSPE ratios.

Unlike the violent crime MSPE ratios, we did not have any extreme outliers. The standard deviation of the MSPE ratios for the placebos is much lower than the standard deviation of the MSPE ratios for the violent crime placebos even when removing outliers. This implies that the

placebo MSPE ratios for property crimes may be more reliable, since there were not many outlier placebo jurisdictions with excessively strong pretreatment fits coupled with significant errors post-treatment.

As we can see on the histogram, both Denver and Aurora’s MSPE ratios are extreme compared to the placebo synthetic controls, implying that the property crime increases in both jurisdictions likely did not result purely from chance. On the other hand, Colorado Springs’ MSPE ratio is not extreme, existing roughly at the center of the distribution. The implications of this on the hypothesis that Colorado’s police accountability law substantially increased property crime rates are mixed at best.

Sensitivity Testing: Displacing by Time

Another method to determine the significance of our results is to change the time of treatment. If changing the inputted treatment time also results in significant results when placebo testing, such a result may indicate that shifts in crime rate from the causal factor at play in 2020 were not significantly larger than shifts in crime rate from past causal factors. In other words, if we can *recreate* the unusually high MSPE ratios of Denver and Aurora in a placebo treatment year, then the shifts created by the real treatment wouldn’t be particularly unusual.

We tested the robustness of our model by moving the treatment date to 2017. The post-treatment period was then designated as 2017-2019, and the pretreatment period was designated as 2011-2016. We generated 89 placebos and 3 treatment synthetic controls and calculated MSPE ratios to determine extremity for all 3 jurisdictions. If the model is robust in its result that an unusual 2020 systematic causal factor is at play in Colorado, we would expect generally nonsignificant results in all 3 jurisdictions.

We visualized the placebo distributions below.




Fig. 13: Placebo MSPE Ratios for Property Crime Rates with Treatment Year 2017: The black line represents Denver’s MSPE ratio, the red line represents Aurora’s MSPE ratio, and the blue line represents Colorado Springs’ MSPE ratio. We calculate p-values by dividing the number of “more extreme” MSPE ratios (to the right of the lines) by the total number of MSPE ratios.

As the histogram demonstrates, the distribution of placebos is affected by a series of outliers above MSPE ratios of 20. This likely results from the fact that we have fewer pretreatment units which skews the pre-treatment MSPE towards lower numbers, creating the possibility for inflated MSPE ratios. This partially explains why Colorado Springs’ MSPE ratio appears somewhat extreme; Colorado Springs had an exceptionally strong fit pretreatment in this model before experiencing some deviation in both directions after the placebo treatment time of 2017.

Regardless of its flaws, the histogram demonstrates the robustness of our significant results. None of the three jurisdictions had unusually high MSPE ratios when undergoing a placebo treatment. The exceptionally large post-treatment gaps that we saw in Denver and Aurora were unique to 2020; we could not recreate the effects through placebo treatment years.

**Table 16: Comparing Treatment Results with Placebo Treatment
(T = treatment year)**

	Pre-Treatment MSPE	MSPE Ratio	P-value
T (2020)			
Denver	153872.327	23.9991	0.0253**
Colorado Springs	54693.661	2.0095	0.4521
Aurora	36839.829	32.7034	0.0294**
T – 3 (2017)			
Denver	94999.554	4.9523	0.3289
Colorado Springs	5529.759	27.6425	0.1176
Aurora	41598.403	6.1348	0.2899

* Significant at 10% level

** Significant at 5% level

*** Significant at 1% level

Overall Property Crime Results

We reject our second hypothesis. After constructing 88 different placebos and three synthetic controls for each of the treated jurisdictions, we found that Denver and Aurora both experienced property crime increases significantly greater than those of similar jurisdictions and that such increases likely did not result purely from chance. On the other hand, we found that Colorado Springs’ MSPE ratio was not extreme. Therefore, the data provides evidence of a local causal factor in the Denver-Aurora-Lakewood MSA but does *not* provide evidence of a statewide causal factor. We discuss this further in the “Discussion” section.

Summary Table

Table 17: Overall Summary Table

	Pre-Treatment MSPE	MSPE Ratio	P-value
Violent Crime			
Denver	2288.114	14.0741	0.1111
Colorado Springs	1477.022	1.0659	0.6957
Aurora	13362.431	10.0482	0.1190
Property Crime			
Denver	153872.327	23.9991	0.0253**
Colorado Springs	54693.661	2.0095	0.4521
Aurora	36839.829	32.7034	0.0294**

* Significant at 10% level

** Significant at 5% level

*** Significant at 1% level

Discussion

We found no statistically significant evidence in favor of the conclusion that Denver, Colorado Springs, or Aurora experienced unusually high violent crime rates after the passage of the police accountability bill in 2020 compared to control jurisdictions. Although all three jurisdictions did have higher violent crime rates than synthetic controls (to varying degrees), the jurisdictions' MSPE ratios were not extreme when compared with placebos. We do not have enough evidence to say that these jurisdictions' violent crime rates could not have resulted from chance or factors unrelated to the police accountability reform.

On the other hand, we did find statistically significant evidence in favor of the conclusion that Denver and Aurora experienced unusually high property crime rates in 2020 and 2021 compared to control jurisdictions. In particular, Denver and Aurora's property crime rates increased in 2020 and 2021 to be far above the synthetic control, and their calculated MSPE ratios were unusual even in the context of placebos, decreasing the likelihood that chance was the explanation for the property crime increase. We now detail the implications of this result.

Several factors may cast doubt on the property crime findings. First, because both the Denver and Aurora synthetic controls were trending the opposite direction from the observed property crime rates, such synthetic controls are only expected to continue decreasing in 2020 and 2021. The fact that Denver and Aurora experienced large MSPE ratios may simply represent a flaw in the synthetic control itself, not a representation that Denver and Aurora possessed higher property crime rates than expected.

We believe that this concern, although valid, should not invalidate our Denver and Aurora findings. While synthetic Denver and Aurora did trend opposite from the observed cities, they still matched the predictors for both cities extremely well. Standardizing MSPE ratios by

dividing by pre-treatment MSPE to account for models that are not well-fit should be able to compensate for some of the error. Additionally, the gaps between the synthetic jurisdictions and the observed jurisdictions were relatively moderate before 2020 at least in the case of Aurora and only expanded dramatically after 2020 and 2021. The synthetic controls, although not fully parallel to observed trends, still imply that some unique causal factor is driving up property crime rates in Aurora and Denver that is not influencing other jurisdictions (or at least not to the same extent).

Second, the predictors we utilized were imperfect. When constructing linear models relating the predictors with the response variables, the predictors for violent crime only had an R-squared value of approximately 0.56, while the predictors for property crime only had an R-squared value of 0.449. In other words, the predictors we chose could only explain roughly 56% of the variation in violent crime rates between jurisdictions and 44.9% of the variation in property crime rates. Because these predictors could not explain significant proportions of the variation in crime rates, synthetic jurisdictions created based on these predictors were imperfect as well. Once again, this concern is valid but should not be enough to discredit the analysis. Especially for phenomenon that is as variable as crime rates, we must accept significant imperfection in choosing the predictors to explain jurisdictional and yearly variations. Although data on certain predictors may improve the analysis (such as data on trust in police), the predictors that we have ensure that the synthetic controls will mimic the real jurisdictions in enough key socioeconomic indicators for the two to possess at least marginally similar crime dynamics.

We are confident in our ability to generate valid, albeit flawed, insights from the methodology that we used. However, we do not believe definitive causal conclusions can be generated from our report.

The data does suggest that some causal factor is uniquely affecting the Denver-Aurora metropolitan statistical area in a way that other control jurisdictions are not experiencing. The data also suggests that such a causal factor likely became prominent in 2020. However, because of the limitations of our synthetic control methodology, we cannot pinpoint the causal factors that explain such an increase. The problem is especially exacerbated given the random variations and unknowns of 2020, ranging from COVID-19 to the George Floyd protests. For instance, it is plausible that Denver and Aurora's policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic were weaker than surrounding jurisdictions, leading to higher unemployment and more property crimes. It is also plausible that the metropolitan area simply experienced more property destruction during the protests compared to other jurisdictions, leading to more reported property crimes.

Even if we eventually gather the data needed to remove these "unknown" lurking variables, other confounding variables hinder our ability to make an effective causal judgment. It is fully possible that the factors leading to the passage of the police accountability measure also led to increased property crime rates. For instance, citizen distrust of police officers could lead to increased crime rates through decreased cooperation between communities and police. At the same time, citizen distrust could have also generated the political momentum to pass the police accountability reform in the first place. With the presence of all these different plausible causal chains, using these insights to create a definitive claim on what causal factor caused increased property crime in the Denver MSA would be both improper and invalid. For causal inference to be valid, we need more than just statistics; we require all plausible explanatory factors to be controlled for and social scientific evidence that a causal chain is plausible. That is beyond the scope of this

report, which only provides the statistics and is unable to control for plausible 2020-2021 explanatory factors.

With these limitations in mind, what are our insights useful for? We believe that our insights can inform the public debate on qualified immunity and police accountability in two ways:

First, although the debate on police accountability usually centers on the effects of such bills on violent crime rates (such as murders and aggravated assaults), our report indicates that there is no significant evidence in favor of the idea that the qualified immunity legislation in Colorado coincided with a greater-than-expected increase in violent crime. In fact, especially in the case of Colorado Springs, the jurisdiction experienced changes in violent crime that were relatively middle of the road compared to placebos. Although the lack of significance does *not* entail that there truly is no relationship between the two variables, we find it unlikely that the Colorado police accountability measure substantially increased violent crime rates in large jurisdictions given that all three jurisdictions did not experience statistically significant increases. In terms of police accountability, our insights suggest that the true evidentiary debate should center on property crime rates.

Second, we can conclude that some unique causal factor increased property crime rates in Denver and Aurora. Our analysis rules out the idea that there is no surge in property crime rate in the MSA; it also rules out chance as the explanation behind the increase. However, the fact that Colorado Springs did not experience a similar level of property crime increase decreases the likelihood that a statewide causal factor, like qualified immunity reform, is the explanation behind such a property crime increase. As we explained in the “Methodology” section, if a statewide causal factor explains the property crime increase, we should see parallel increases across jurisdictions in Colorado, not just in the Denver-Aurora MSA. Colorado Springs did not experience comparable increases to the Denver-Aurora MSA, implying that causal factors unique to the Denver-Aurora MSA caused the increase in property crimes. Nonetheless, at least in those two cities, we believe that our analysis reveals future directions for statistical and social scientific research in determining why those cities experienced such increases.

In sum, we find no statistically significant evidence that qualified immunity reform caused violent crime increases in any of the three jurisdictions we studied. Although we did find evidence of a systematic property increase in Denver and Aurora, the fact that we did not find comparable evidence in Colorado Springs makes it unlikely that a statewide causal factor, such as the police accountability reform, caused the increase. Our report does not *rule out* qualified immunity reform as a causal factor in crime increases or decreases, but we believe our report contributes important evidence as to the plausible effects of police accountability reform on crime rates.

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Appendix 1: Methodology B Results

Methodology B has the advantage of being precise about the treatment dates, allowing us to possibly isolate the qualified immunity bill as a factor, instead of other lurking variables such as the COVID-19 pandemic. However, we do not include the results in our main analysis due to critical methodological limitations that likely invalidate our results. Before we begin the discussion, please note that methodology B was mostly performed in the early stages of the report and has not been revised since. Thus, synthetic control results and inclusion of jurisdictions were much different in methodology B compared to Methodology A.

Violent Crime Synthetic Controls

Synthetic controls were different in several key ways: First, we included all jurisdictions above 50,000 in population with data from all 9 years (2011-2019). Second, we incorporated single female-led household percentage as a predictor and simply used single female-led household percentage with children for 2019. Third, we did not include population density as a predictor. In total, we had around 500 jurisdictions in our synthetic control. Fourth, due to random errors in the optimization functions of the synthetic controls, we varied the pre-treatment time periods to be 2011-2018 and 2011-2019, experimenting with both until one of the functions worked. Such a condition should be largely unimportant, as we do not use the synthetic control to directly match the crime rates, only to determine the series of jurisdictions that, when combined, comprise the majority weight of the synthetic control. Additionally, we optimized over 2014-2019. Below, we display the results for our violent crime synthetic controls.




Fig. 14: Path Plot Comparing Denver and Synthetic Denver Violent Crime Rates: The fit is relatively strong throughout all years.

Table 18: Weights of Top 10 Jurisdictions

Weights	Unit Names
0.217	Seattle, Washington
0.206	Houston, Texas
0.199	Fort Smith, Arkansas
0.139	Champaign, Illinois
0.045	Ann Arbor, Michigan
0.033	Des Plaines, Illinois
0.032	Dearborn, Michigan
0.032	Redmond, Washington
0.031	Miami Beach, Florida
0.019	Milpitas, California

The synthetic control fits relatively well for the optimization time period with a pre-treatment MSPE of 1344.333. Using the given weights, we took the five cities with the greatest weights and submitted FOIA requests to obtain access to their incident-level data (if the data was not already public) from 2019-2021. Our request to Ann Arbor was denied, leaving us with a total of four jurisdictions with data. We reran the synthetic control with just those four jurisdictions to determine the jurisdictions' weights for manual calculation of daily violent crime increases. The weights are displayed in the next section.

Property Crime Synthetic Controls

We performed the same method for property crime, except we changed the optimization to 2016-2019 to account for errors when we attempted to run 2014-2019. Because we are not calculating MSPE ratios, it is appropriate to decrease the pre-treatment range to minimize MSPE values over, as an excessively small pre-treatment MSPE does not have disparate impacts on MSPE ratios as they would in a placebo analysis.




Fig. 15: Path Plot Comparing Denver and Synthetic Denver Property Crime Rates: The fit is extremely weak prior to 2017, where the synthetic control dips to match Denver’s rates. This may imply that the control is not very reliable.

Table 19: Weights of Top 10 Jurisdictions

Weights	Unit Names
0.225	Seattle, Washington
0.197	Champaign, Illinois
0.189	Houston, Texas
0.163	Fort Smith, Arkansas
0.042	Austin, Texas
0.028	Cathedral City, California
0.028	Dearborn, Michigan
0.027	Des Plaines, Illinois
0.017	Santa Ana, California
0.015	Milpitas, California

As the path plot demonstrates, synthetic Denver does not follow observed Denver’s trends very well, particularly before 2017. Although the pre-treatment MSPE value of 28879.851 appears low, it is important to note that the pre-treatment MSPE is only calculated over the short optimization time period (2016-2019), where the model performs exceptionally well. Nonetheless, we proceeded with the analysis. We once again took the five cities with the highest weights and recalculated the synthetic control. We were able to obtain data from all five jurisdictions.

Statistical Bootstrapping Simulations

After collecting data from each of the four to five jurisdictions identified in each test as well as Denver and Colorado Springs, we calculated the daily differences in violent and property crime between the June 19, 2019 to June 18, 2020 time period compared to the June 19, 2020 to June 19, 2021 time period (the first time period also had an extra day from the leap year). In particular, we corresponded the dates so that the number of violent crimes on June 19, 2019 was subtracted from the number of violent crimes on June 19, 2020 and created a dataset of these differences in violent and property crime numbers. These differences were then divided by the total number of violent or property crimes in the first period of time. We divided by the total number of crimes in the previous period as opposed to the population in order to account for jurisdictions which began from already-high crime rates and the proportionately smaller increase in crime rate that the same absolute increase in crime would entail.

To calculate the synthetic control differences for comparison, we used the weights in the previous section and multiplied them by the proportional daily differences in crime between the two periods. We then summed up the proportional daily differences and joined the two datasets together. We used bootstrapping to create a null distribution of 10,000 differences in mean centered at 0 and determined if the probability of observing the difference between the mean proportional average daily increase in Denver or Colorado Springs with the mean proportional average daily increase in the synthetic control or greater was low enough to justify concluding that Denver or Colorado Springs' increase in violent crime was significantly greater than control jurisdictions.

Denver Violent Crime Tests

A table of the synthetic control jurisdictions for Denver violent crimes with weights is shown below:

Table 20: Synthetic Control Weights for Denver Violent Crimes

Name	Weight
Seattle, Washington	0.496466442
Fort Smith, Arkansas	0.487715311
Champaign, Illinois	0.011537542
Houston, Texas	0.004280705

We generated the following two hypotheses:

$H_0: \mu_{Denver} = \mu_{Synthetic}$. The true mean daily proportional difference in number of violent offenses between the June 2020 to June 2021 time period compared to the June 2019 to June 2020 time period in Denver, CO is equal to the true mean daily proportional difference in number of violent offenses between the two time periods in the synthetic control.

$H_A: \mu_{Denver} > \mu_{Synthetic}$. The true mean daily proportional difference in number of violent offenses between the June 2020 to June 2021 time period compared to the June 2019 to June 2020 time period in Denver, CO is greater than the true mean daily proportional difference in number of violent offenses between the two time periods in the synthetic control.

$\alpha = 0.05$

Although we had population-level data, we utilized a bootstrapped simulation and hypothesis testing to determine if the difference between the Denver increases and the synthetic control increases could have resulted purely from chance. We bootstrapped 10,000 differences in mean assuming no true difference in mean between Denver increases and synthetic control increases and graphically depicted the null distribution below.




Fig. 16: Null Distribution of Denver Violent Crime Differences in Mean with Control: Each observation in the histogram represents a single simulated difference in mean between Denver and the synthetic control. The red dotted line refers to the observed difference in mean. We took all observations at the observed value or greater and divided by the total number of simulated values to arrive at the p-value.

Because the p-value of 0.0592 is greater than a reasonable alpha level of 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. The data does not provide sufficient evidence at the 1% or 5% level that Denver’s average daily increase in violent crimes from the 2019-20 time period to the 2020-21 time period is significantly greater than the synthetic control’s average daily increase in violent crimes. However, the data does provide sufficient evidence at the 10% level that Denver’s average daily increase in violent crime after the passage of the police accountability bill is greater than the synthetic control’s average daily increase in violent crime.

We also conducted a monthly difference-in-difference test using the synthetic control model as the “control” jurisdiction, since the graph modeling the trends of the synthetic control graph with true Denver trends indicated the possibility of parallel yearly violent crime trends between the synthetic control model and Denver, although the levels of the two models did not exactly match. By utilizing monthly data and linear modeling for 2019-2021, we decreased the influence of daily crime fluctuations on the results while simultaneously retaining sufficient data points to draw some statistical conclusions.

We created the dummy variables of “time” and “treated” for this end. “Time” takes the value of 1 after June 19, 2020 in both the synthetic control and Denver (with June 20-30 falling under the June 1 value due to monthly numbers), representing the passage of the police accountability legislation. “Treated” takes the value of 1 for Denver and 0 for the synthetic control, representing the jurisdiction designations. The linear model is shown below:

Table 21: Difference in Difference Test for Denver Violent Crimes

Term	Estimate	Std. Error	Statistic	P-value
(Intercept)	390.732	13.913	28.084	0.000

time1	18.503	21.998	0.841	0.404
treated1	-15.177	19.676	-0.771	0.444
time1:treated1	37.942	31.110	1.220	0.228

The interaction variable for variables “time” and “treated” reflects the difference-in-difference estimate. Because the p-value of 0.228 far exceeds a reasonable alpha level of 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. The data does not provide sufficient evidence on the monthly level that the passage of qualified immunity reform on June 19, 2020 in Denver corresponded to an increase in violent crime that outpaced other control jurisdictions.

Denver Property Crime Tests

The following jurisdictions and weights were utilized to construct the synthetic control for Denver property crimes:

Table 22: Synthetic Control Weights for Denver Property Crimes

NAME	weight
Austin, Texas	0.6935988
Champaign, Illinois	0.2188792
Seattle, Washington	0.0874752
Fort Smith, Arkansas	0.0000465
Houston, Texas	0.0000002

Since Houston had a negligible weight, we decided to exclude Houston from the analysis and run the bootstrapping with data from the other four jurisdictions.

$H_0: \mu_{Denver} = \mu_{Synthetic}$. The true mean daily proportional difference in number of property offenses between the June 2020 to June 2021 time period compared to the June 2019 to June 2020 time period in Denver, CO is equal to the true mean daily proportional difference in number of violent offenses between the two time periods in the synthetic control model.

$H_A: \mu_{Denver} > \mu_{Synthetic}$. The true mean daily proportional difference in number of property offenses between the June 2020 to June 2021 time period compared to the June 2019 to June 2020 time period in Denver, CO is greater than the true mean daily proportional difference in number of violent offenses between the two time periods in the synthetic control model.

$$\alpha = 0.05$$

Once again, we bootstrapped 10000 differences in mean, assuming that the null hypothesis is true. We graphically depicted the null distribution below:




Fig. 17: Null Distribution of Denver Property Crime Differences in Mean with Control: Each observation in the histogram represents a single simulated difference in mean between Denver and the synthetic control. The red dotted line refers to the observed difference in mean. We took all observations at the observed value or greater and divided by the total number of simulated values to arrive at the p-value. This time, the observed value far surpasses any of the values of the null distribution.

Because the p-value of 0 is far less than a reasonable alpha level of 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis. The data provides sufficient evidence to indicate that Denver’s average daily proportional increase in property crime after the passage of qualified immunity was significantly greater than control cities’ increase in property crime over the same time period.

We did not employ a monthly difference-in-difference test because the parallel trends assumption is clearly violated. The graph comparing the synthetic control trends with the true Denver trends is not parallel, especially from 2016-2017 (see Figure 14).

Summary of Results

This methodology concludes similarly to the previous methodology we used. The data does not provide evidence at the 1% or 5% significance levels to indicate that Denver’s increase in violent crime after the passage of police accountability legislation significantly exceeded the violent crime increase in control cities. However, the data does suggest that Denver’s increase in property crime did exceed the property crime increase in similar cities without qualified immunity reform. Because of the critical limitations in our data and Methodology, these results do not meet the standard of statistical rigor needed to present this as definitive evidence that property crime rates truly did increase in Denver beyond what was expected. For instance, substantial problems existed in the way that we simulated to obtain results. By using daily differences between two different time periods, the standard deviation of such differences were exaggerated, as crimes can randomly increase or decrease day by day without reference to broader legislation. If there happened to be 20 violent crime incidents on June 19, 2020 and 0 violent crime incidents on June 19, 2019, the methodology would flag that day as a highly significant violent crime increase, even though the two days are not interconnected in any way. Additionally, our method of standardization gave smaller jurisdictions disproportionately more weight, as tiny variations in violent crime incidents were far more significant. The graph below displays this phenomenon visually.




Fig. 18: Density Plot of Synthetic Control Standardized Differences in Violent Crime: Each of the numbers on the x-axis represents the difference between the number of violent crimes on a 2020-21 day and a 2019-20 day divided by the total number of violent crimes in the 2019-20 period. Noticeably, the spreads of each jurisdiction are correlated with their respective populations.

Nonetheless, we include the methodology here to demonstrate possible conclusions of an analysis that accurately referenced the treatment date and to provide additional corroboration of the main findings of our report.

Appendix 2: Investigating Outliers

As noted in the “Results” section, the placebo synthetic controls for violent crime were significantly skewed by a series of high-MSPE ratio outliers, including two extreme outliers with MSPE ratios greater than 80. We investigate these outliers now.

Manchester, NH




Fig. 19: Path Plot Comparing Manchester and Control Violent Crime: While the synthetic control follows observed Manchester exceptionally well until 2019, Manchester experiences a decrease in violent crime rate that is not followed by the control in 2020 and 2021.

Manchester, NH had an MSPE ratio of over 200, more than 40 times greater than the mean MSPE ratio without Manchester or Evansville. The path plot provides some insight into the mathematical reasons behind this occurrence. The synthetic control tracks the violent crime trends in Manchester exceptionally well until 2020; in 2020, the synthetic control experiences an increase in violent crime that is not matched by Manchester itself. Additionally, Manchester’s violent crime rate in the first 3 quarters of 2021 is far lower than expected by the synthetic control. Thus, Manchester had an extremely low pre-treatment MSPE coupled with a large post-treatment MSPE. Although this is an outlier, further investigation does not reveal any clear data errors or differing circumstances that would warrant removing the Manchester data from the dataset. Likely, this resulted from the weakness of our predictors coupled with our inability to track unknowns in 2020 and 2021; plausibly, Manchester had a stronger response to the COVID-19 pandemic or less police distrust that allowed it to avoid the violent crime increases that the rest of the country faced.




Fig. 20: Path Plot Comparing Evansville and Control Violent Crime: While the synthetic control follows observed Evansville exceptionally well until 2019, Evansville experiences an increase in violent crime rate that is not followed by the control in 2020 and 2021.

Similarly, in Evansville, the synthetic control tracks the violent crime trends well until the treatment period begins, where Evansville experiences a sharp increase in violent crimes that is not followed by the synthetic control. Based on these graphs, we can make 2 plausible conclusions:

First, the synthetic control method appears to have trouble tracking abrupt shifts in violent crime rates, which may be attributable to the randomness by which violent crime rates increase or decrease. In Aurora's violent crime synthetic control, Aurora's abrupt increase in violent crime rates in 2016 was not well-tracked either, implying that although the synthetic control is effective at following trends over time, outlier years cannot be accurately followed with the predictors that we have. Similarly, in Evansville and Manchester, sharp increases and decreases in violent crime rates even without treatment could not be successfully tracked by the synthetic control.

Second, it is plausible that, even without treatment, there could be large increases in violent crime rates that simply happen to fall on the post-treatment years. This highlights the difficulty of making a causal claim; because there are many lurking variables, and violent crime rates are often very random phenomena, we cannot attribute large increases in crime rates purely to treatments. We can, however, use significance testing to diminish the likelihood that the years are explainable purely by chance, as we do in the analysis.

Whether these conclusions apply to property crime analysis is less certain, as the property crime placebos did not have many significant outliers.

**SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DOCKET NO. 085028 (A-000059-20)**

HAMID HARRIS,
Plaintiff-Respondent

v.

CITY OF NEWARK; NEWARK POLICE
DEPARTMENT; DETECTIVE DONALD
STABILE; POLICE OFFICER ANGEL
ROMERO; JOHN DOES 1-10 et.
al.,

Defendants-Petitioners.

CIVIL ACTION

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
FROM:

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY:
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-59-20

SAT BELOW:

Before the Hon. Heidi W. Currier,
J.A.D.

**BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This brief is submitted on behalf of *amicus curiae*, the National Police Accountability Project ("NPAP"), to address an issue that will significantly impact the enforcement of civil rights protections in New Jersey courts: whether this Court should create a new right permitting defendants to pursue interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity orders when doing so would provide little or no cost savings to the government but would undermine plaintiffs' cases, disrupt trial court proceedings, and burden appellate court resources. An examination of the role that qualified immunity interlocutory appeals have played in federal civil rights litigation reveals that they do not conserve government resources but succeed in inflicting profound delay and harm on plaintiffs and courts. This net negative for litigants and courts counsels against creation of a new right.

Federal courts are also instructive as to the locus of the right to pursue interlocutory appeals on qualified immunity matters. The United States Supreme Court rejected the assertion that interlocutory appeals were essential to preserving the protections of the qualified immunity doctrine. The ability to pursue an interlocutory appeal of a qualified immunity order is a procedural right grounded in 28 U.S.C. §1291 and not a substantive

one related to 42 U.S.C. §1983 ("Section 1983"). Accordingly, nothing in Section 1983 or substantive civil rights law supports the creation of a new right to pursue interlocutory appeals in New Jersey state courts.

Finally, although not squarely within the scope of the question presented in this case, *Amicus* also respectfully requests the Court to apply a critical analysis to the purported policy justifications and public interest impacts for maintaining the qualified immunity doctrine. The same infirmities that plague policy justifications for qualified immunity interlocutory appeals, apply to the doctrine of qualified immunity as a whole. The marginal benefits government actors inure from qualified immunity are far outweighed by the doctrine's severe harm to New Jerseyans who are victims of government abuse.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

The National Police Accountability Project (NPAP) was founded in 1999 by members of the National Lawyers Guild to address allegations of misconduct by law enforcement officers through coordinating and assisting civil rights lawyers representing their victims. NPAP has approximately six hundred attorney members practicing in every region of the United States and over one dozen members in New Jersey. Every year, NPAP

members litigate thousands of egregious cases of law enforcement abuse that do not make news headlines as well as the high-profile cases that capture national attention. NPAP provides training and support for these attorneys and other legal workers, public education and information on issues related to law enforcement misconduct and accountability, and resources for non-profit organizations and community groups that assist victims of such misconduct. NPAP also supports legislative efforts aimed at increasing accountability for law enforcement and detention facilities and appears regularly as *amicus curiae* in cases such as this one presenting issues of particular importance for its member lawyers and their clients.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Amicus adopts the statement of facts and procedural history contained in Plaintiff's briefs.

ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONERS' POLICY RATIONALES DO NOT SUPPORT THE CREATION OF A RIGHT TO PURSUE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ORDERS.

Interlocutory appeals are a rare exception to the general rule requiring a final judgment to seek appellate review because of the significant burdens they impose on both litigants and courts. *Johnson v. Jones*, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995) ("appeals

before the end of district court proceedings--are the exception, not the rule"); *In re Pa. R.R. Co.*, 20 N.J. 398, 408, 120 A.2d 94 (1956); 19 George C. Pratt, *Moore's Federal Practice* §201.10[1] (3d Ed. 2009) ("The purposes of the final judgment rule are to avoid piecemeal litigation, to promote judicial efficiency, and to defer to the decisions of the trial court.").

While federal courts permit defendants to pursue appeals on qualified immunity orders in a limited subset of cases, the practice cannot be justified on public policy grounds. An examination of the impact of qualified immunity appeals in federal court shows they do very little to conserve government resources, can stall and diminish the strength of a plaintiff's case, and are inefficient for courts.

A. Qualified Immunity Interlocutory Appeals Rarely Have the Effect of Conserving Government Resources.

Petitioners argue that this Court should create a right to pursue interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity orders in New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJ CRA") cases to conserve government resources. However, interlocutory appeals have not served this goal in federal civil rights cases. Interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity orders are successful in a relatively small number of cases and the rare appeal that succeeds often disposes of the case when the most burdensome stages of litigation have been completed.

Most interlocutory appeals resolve in affirmance of the lower court orders. *Kurowski v. Krajewski*, 848 F.2d 767, 772-73 (7th Cir. 1988). Qualified immunity appeals are no different. In Professor Joanna Schwartz's multi-district, two-year study of over 1000 federal civil rights cases, lower court orders denying qualified immunity were reversed in their entirety in only 12.2% of cases. Joanna C. Schwartz, *How Qualified Immunity Fails*, 127 YALE L. J. 2, 40-41 (2017). Defendants obtained partial reversal in 7.3% of reviewed cases, allowing the litigation to proceed on other claims. *Id.* This empirical study reveals a strikingly low rate of success for defendants who pursue qualified immunity interlocutory appeals. Therefore, in vast majority of cases where the trial court denies a qualified immunity motion, interlocutory appeals are not sparing the government defendant from any cost or burden.

In fact, the average interlocutory appeal makes a civil rights case more expensive and disruptive for government defendants to litigate when additional costs created by the appeal process are factored in. See *Wheatt v. City of E. Cleveland*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200758 at * 9 (N.D. Ohio 2017). An unsuccessful interlocutory appeal "adds another round of substantive briefing for both parties, potentially oral argument before an appellate panel, only for the case to proceed to trial." *Id.* Because overwhelming majority of interlocutory appeals are unsuccessful, they result in

an additional burden to government officials, not a reduced one. *Id.* (“In a typical case, allowing interlocutory appeals actually increases the burden and expense of litigation both for government officers and for plaintiffs”); see also Karen Blum, *Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message*, 93 *Notre Dame L. Rev.* 1887, 1907 (2018) (noting interlocutory appeals “have resulted in expensive, burdensome, and often needless delays in the litigation of civil rights claims.”); Alan K. Chen, *The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgement and the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law*, 47 *Am. U.L. Rev.* 1, 100 (1997) (noting the costs associated with interlocutory appeals had the potential to make immunity litigation “more costly for all involved”).

Even in the unusual case where an interlocutory appeal is successful, the burden from which the government official is saved is minimal in comparison to the overall cost and time involved in defending a civil rights case. Courts have acknowledged the fact-intensive nature of qualified immunity inquiries “makes it impossible to resolve a qualified immunity claim” at the beginning of a case. *Newland v. Rehorst*, 328 F. App’x 788, 781 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2009) (“it is generally unwise to venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record in the vast majority of cases.”); *Turner v. Weikal*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90463 at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Jun. 23, 2013) (collecting cases).

Because at least some factual development is usually needed to determine qualified immunity, it is generally not raised as grounds for dismissal until summary judgment. Schwartz, *supra.*, at 29-30 (finding qualified immunity defense was not raised until summary judgment in 62.2 % of cases). Accordingly, qualified immunity interlocutory appeals typically involve summary judgment orders and "at that point, an interlocutory appeal saves only the distraction and expense associated with trial." *Wheatt*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200758 at *9 (N.D. Ohio 2017).

From a financial perspective, the bulk of litigation expenses have already been paid to cover the costs of discovery by summary judgment. See Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, *Limiting Evasive Discovery; A Proposal for Three Cost Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules*, 87 Denv. U. L. Rev. 473 (2010) (noting "discovery accounts for the majority of the cost of civil litigation as much as ninety percent in complex cases, according to some estimates."). Many of the most time-consuming tasks of a civil rights case are also completed before summary judgment, particularly when it comes to the demands on the government official being sued.¹ See *Eg.* 5 California Trial Guide § 100.01 (noting that discovery is the

¹ A defendant in a civil rights case participates in discovery and devotes significant time to locating documents, providing and reviewing interrogatory responses, and preparing and sitting for their deposition. While trial and trial preparation also require participation from the defendant, they have already devoted many hours to the case prior to summary judgment.

longest, most time-consuming phase of litigation). Thus, even in the unlikely event a government official prevails on their qualified immunity appeal, few financial or human resources are conserved.

The net impact of qualified immunity interlocutory appeals on defendants is not conservation. Instead, government defendants in federal civil rights cases usually incur unnecessary costs when they pursue an interlocutory appeal. Creating a new right to pursue interlocutory appeals in New Jersey courts will not further public policy aims of conserving government resources, it is more likely have the opposite effect.

B. Any Benefit Qualified Immunity Interlocutory Appeals Would Provide to Government Officials is Far Outweighed by the Harm It Would Inflict on Civil Rights Plaintiffs.

While interlocutory appeals make litigation more expensive for both parties, delays caused by appeals have a uniquely prejudicial impact on plaintiffs. *Mitchell v. Forsyth*, 472 U.S. 511, 544-45 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part “I fear that today’s decision will give government officials a potent weapon to use against plaintiffs, delaying litigation endlessly . . . result in denial of full and speedy justice to those plaintiffs with strong claims on the merits.”); Blum, *supra.* at 1890 n. 23 (“concerning the expense and

delay caused by interlocutory appeal . . . [d]elay, of course, works to the defendant's advantage.").

First, delays attendant to interlocutory appeals often have the effect of weakening a plaintiff's case as evidence becomes stale and witnesses fall out of contact. See *Eg.* Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, *Making a Buck While Making a Difference*, 21 Mich. J. Race & L. 251, 264 (2016) ("interlocutory appeals cause witnesses' memories to fade or disappear and delay resolution to a plaintiff who is stressed because of a the violation and the litigation"); Alexander A. Reinert, *Does Qualified Immunity Matter?*, 8 U. St. Thomas L.J., 477, 493-494 (2011) (quoting a surveyed plaintiff's attorney that explained "while an appeal is being resolved evidence may become stale, witnesses may disappear, and a client may lose hope").

Additionally, interlocutory appeals also significantly extend the time during which plaintiff must bear the costs of their injury. Many civil rights plaintiffs, particularly victims of police brutality, have tangible injuries in the form of medical expenses, lost wages, and diminished earning capacity. An interlocutory appeal of a qualified immunity order delays trial by an average of 441 days, extending the time a plaintiff must wait to be made whole. Joanna Schwartz, *Qualified Immunity's Selection Effects*, 114 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1101, 1122 (2020). The daunting additional year plus wait that a plaintiff must endure before trial

may incentivize individuals with limited financial resources to accept inadequate settlement offers. Blum, *supra.* at 1890 n. 23 (“The threat of appeal and delay also works to leverage a settlement with the plaintiff.”); David G. Maxted, *The Qualified Immunity Litigation Machine: Eviscerating the Anti-Racist Heart of §1983, Weaponizing Interlocutory Appeals & The Routine of Police Violence Against Black Lives*, 98 Denv. L. Rev. 621, 673-74 (2021) (noting that “simply filing the interlocutory appeal wins at least a battle for the defense by forcing a delay and imposing costs on the other side” and that even if the appeal is dismissed that “a couple more years may have passed. The plaintiff may fatigue and feel coerced into accepting a meager settlement.”).

Defendants are aware of the unequal pressure that interlocutory appeals impose on plaintiffs and frequently pursue them even where the court lacks jurisdiction. See *Apostol v. Gallion*, 870 F.2d 1335, 1338-9 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining “defendants may take appeals for tactical as well as strategic reasons: disappointed by the denial of a continuance they may help themselves to a postponement by lodging a notice of appeal”); Michael Avery et. al., *Police Misconduct Law and Litigation*, 3d Edition 3:23, 504 (2021); Blum, *supra.*, 1907 (2018) (noting the frequency with which interlocutory appeals are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Qualified immunity interlocutory appeals would not spare government resources but rather would provide defendants

with a procedural device through which they can delay accountability and prejudice plaintiffs who have legitimate claims.

The cost, disruption, and delay caused by interlocutory appeals not only undermine individual cases but threaten future civil rights enforcement actions and the private attorney general function they serve.² Some plaintiffs' attorneys have acknowledged that the costs and time demands required to challenge interlocutory qualified immunity appeals have made them reticent to take on civil rights cases even when they appear strong on the merits. Reinert, *supra.* at 492-494 (detailing interviews with civil rights attorneys who had been dissuaded from accepting civil right cases because the costs and delays associated with litigating qualified immunity have made the cases too burdensome to pursue; Schwartz, *supra.* at 1143 (recounting interview with a civil rights attorney who considered expense and time of interlocutory appeals in case selection determinations). The role interlocutory appeals would have in deterring future suits will allow misconduct to go unchecked and fuel cultures of police impunity.

² See *Eg. Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Carteret*, 115 N.J. 536, 543, 559 A.2d 1369, 1372 (N.J. 1989) (acknowledging that plaintiffs in civil rights cases act not only on their own behalf but "also as private attorney general vindicating the rights of the public.")

The availability of qualified immunity interlocutory appeals often thwart civil rights cases in federal court before they can even be filed. Any abstract policy justification for creating a right to pursue interlocutory appeals is eclipsed by the severe, demonstrable harm these appeals have had on plaintiffs and the broader societal goals of private civil rights enforcement in federal court. See *Chen, supra.*, at 101 (“the Court may be exacerbating the social costs of immunity litigation by widening the availability of interlocutory appeals.”).

C. Qualified Immunity Interlocutory Appeals Disrupt the Efficient Administration of Justice.

The public interest in conservation of court resources and the efficient administration of justice weigh against the creation of a right to pursue interlocutory appeals on qualified immunity orders. Courts have consistently detailed the disruption and burden interlocutory appeals have on both trial and appellate courts. *Johnson*, 515 U.S. at 319; *Flanagan v. U.S.*, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984) (noting the importance of limiting interlocutory appeals because “it reduces the ability of litigants to harass opponents and to clog the courts through a succession of costly and time-consuming appeals”); *City of New York v. Beretta USA Corp.*, 224 FRD 46, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that interlocutory appeals “significantly delay and disrupt the course of the litigation, imperiling both the rights of the plaintiff and the interest in

judicial economy generally served by application of the final judgment rule”); *In re Lozrepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig.*, 289 F.3d 98, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[I]nterlocutory appeals are generally disfavored as ‘disruptive, time-consuming, and expensive’ for both the parties and the courts.”)

Interlocutory appeals undermine a trial court’s ability to manage a case, often a few weeks or months before trial is set to begin. *Johnson*, 515 U.S. at 319 (“rules that permit too many interlocutory appeals can cause harm . . . an interlocutory appeal can make it more difficult for trial judges to do their basic job—supervising trial proceedings. It can threaten those proceedings with delay, adding costs and diminishing coherence.”); *Apostol*, 870 F.2d at 1338 (noting that delays from interlocutory appeals “may injure the legitimate interests of other litigants and the judicial system...judges’ schedules become more chaotic (to the detriment of litigants in other cases)”). Interlocutory appeals only assist lower courts where they materially advance the resolution of claims. Given the high affirmance rates of qualified immunity denials, see *Supra*. §I(A), interlocutory appeals needlessly interrupt trial court proceedings and complicate district court schedules.

Interlocutory appeals also deplete the scarce resources of appellate courts forcing them to review: (1) the same legal question multiple times; or (2) a question that will eventually

be moot after trial. *Johnson*, 515 U.S. at 319 (interlocutory appeals “risks additional, and unnecessary, appellate court work either when it presents appellate courts with less developed records or when it brings them appeals that, had the trial simply proceeded, would have turned out to be unnecessary”); Bryan Lammon, *Sanctioning Qualified Immunity Appeals*, 2021 U. Ill. L. Rev. Online 130, 133 (2021) (“immediate appellate review thus risks duplicative, overlapping appeals of similar issues—once in the qualified-immunity appeal and again in an appeal after trial.”).

In addition to increasing the volume of their dockets, interlocutory appeals often force appellate courts to analyze underdeveloped records and engage in factual rather than legal analysis which they are better suited to perform. *Johnson*, 515 U.S. at 319 (quoting *Pierce v. Underwood*, 487 U.S. 552, 560–561 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the “special expertise and experience of appellate courts” lies in “assessing the relative force of . . . applications of legal norms”) ; See also, Michael E. Solimine, *Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals Lawful*, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. Online 169, 175 (2019) (noting the additional burden imposed on appellate courts when they must consider an underdeveloped record).

Even assuming the right to pursue an interlocutory appeal of a qualified immunity order conserved resources for government officials, a proposition disproven by empirical studies, they would still ultimately undermine public policy goals of fairness and efficiency. Courts, like plaintiffs, are severely burdened by interlocutory appeals, and stand to lose much more than defendants purportedly gain by creating a new right to pursue qualified immunity interlocutory appeals.

II. DEFENDANTS IN FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS CASES ARE UNABLE TO PURSUE A QUALIFIED IMMUNITY INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL THAT DERIVES FROM 28 U.S.C. § 1291 AND IS NOT A SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION INTEGRAL TO THE DOCTRINE.

New Jersey courts have looked to Section 1983 to inform their interpretations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. *Tumpson v. Farina*, 218 N.J. 450, 474 (N.J. 2014) (“The interpretation given to parallel provisions of Section 1983 may provide guidance in construing our [NJCR]”). This practice extends to Section 1983’s qualified immunity doctrine as New Jersey courts apply the same two prong test to determine whether officials are immune from suit under the NJCR. *Brown v. State*, 230 N.J. 84, 99 (2015). Accordingly, Petitioners insist that interlocutory appeals must be available to NJCR defendants because New Jersey’s qualified immunity doctrine “confers the same benefits” as the federal standard. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 7-8. However, interlocutory appeals are not integral to the federal

qualified immunity doctrine and the benefits of qualified immunity are "fully protected" without the right to pursue an interlocutory appeal. *Johnson v. Fankell*, 520 U.S. 911, 921 (1997).

Federal courts have made clear that the right to pursue an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal is tied to federal procedural rules rather than a substantive protection. *Mitchell v. Forsyth*, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985 (finding appeals of qualified immunity orders permissible only where they meet collateral order doctrine criteria); *Johnson*, 520 U.S. at 921 ("locus of the right to interlocutory appeal in §1291 rather than in §1983 itself"). When Idaho officials who had been sued in state court under Section 1983 claimed that the state procedural limits on interlocutory appeals deprived them of the full benefits of qualified immunity, the United Supreme Court squarely rejected the argument, holding the "right to have the trial court rule on the merits of a qualified immunity defense presumably has its source in §1983, but the right to immediate appellate review of that ruling in a federal case has its source in §1291... a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a nonfederal forum." *Id.* The Court went on to find that the Idaho officials' qualified immunity protections were fully preserved in state court notwithstanding the fact that interlocutory appeals were unavailable. *Id.*

Defendants enjoy the full benefits and protections of

the federal doctrine of qualified immunity when they cannot seek immediate appeal. Therefore, Petitioners cannot cite federal precedent to support their position that interlocutory appeals are essential to preserving qualified immunity. Indeed, this Court will break from federal precedent if it finds New Jersey's qualified immunity doctrine contains a substantive right to pursue immediate appeals.

III. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER ELIMINATING THE FLAWED DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

The doctrine of qualified immunity is impossible to justify on either common law or historical precedent. Nor can it be justified on account of its advancement of the public interest. This Court should critically consider eliminating the doctrine.

A. The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity Lacks A Common Law or Historical Basis.

"[Q]ualified immunity jurisprudence stands on shaky ground."³ Accordingly, members of the United States Supreme Court, have acknowledged the *judicial* doctrine should be reconsidered. *Id.* (emphasis added). To the extent New Jersey courts have imported the federal qualified immunity standard and the rationales behind its creation, the state doctrine must be reconsidered as well.

³ *Hoggard v. Rhodes et al.*, 2021 U.S. Lexis 3587, ____ S. Ct. ____ 2021, 2021 WL 2742809 No. 20-1066, Decided July 2, 2021 (Justice Thomas on denial of certiorari).

The Civil Rights Act of 1871, or Section 1983, established causes of action for plaintiffs to seek money damages from Government officers who violated federal law. Following the passage of Section 1983, courts continued to hold public officials liable for unconstitutional conduct without any regard to a good-faith defense. See, e.g., *Miller v. Horton*, 26 N.E. 100, 100-101 (Mass. 1891) (Holmes, J.) (holding town board members liable for mistakenly killing an animal when ordered by the government commissioners).⁴ It was not until nearly a decade after Section 1983 was enacted that the defense of good faith was incorporated into federal civil rights jurisprudence. See *Pierson v. Ray*, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).

The recognition of immunity for good faith actions could not be traced to the text of Section 1983 or any common law immunity that existed when the law was enacted. "Statutory interpretations . . . begins with the text." *Ross v. Blake*, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016). Importantly, "the statute on its face does not provide for any immunities." *Malley v. Briggs*, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986). The key language simply states that any person acting under the color

⁴ See also Max P. Rapacz, *Protection of Officers Who Act Under Unconstitutional Statutes*, 11 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1927) ("prior to 1880 there seems to have been absolute uniformity in holding officers liable for injuries resulting from the enforcement of unconstitutional acts.")

of state law shall be held liable for violating a protected right of a citizen.

Notwithstanding the fact that qualified immunity is not incorporated in the text of Section 1983, immunity can be available under the statute if it was "historically accorded the relevant official" in an analogous situation "at common law," *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976), unless the statute provides some reason to think that Congress did not preserve the defense. See *Tower v. Glover*, 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984). Here, those immunities were not available at common law, particularly not to police officers. *Wyatt v. Cole*, 504 U.S. 158, 173 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); *Tenney v. Brandhove*, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). In short, the text of 42 U.S.C. 1983 ("Section 1983") does not mention immunity and the common law of 1871 did not include any free-standing defenses for all public officials.

Despite this background, the "judicial" doctrine of qualified immunity operates currently as an across-the board defense based on the incomprehensible principles of "clearly established law" standard that was unheard of prior to until these past several decades. Simply put, this judicially enacted doctrine has become what the Court sought to avoid to wit: "a freewheeling policy choice," at odds with Congressional intent in enacting Section 1983. *Malley*, 475 U.S. at 342.

Qualified immunity's departure from any common law or historical foundation has not gone unnoticed by the United States Supreme Court in recent years. *Ziglar v. Abbasi*, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("In further elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity ... we have diverged from the historical inquiry mandated by the statute.") *Crawford el v. Britton*, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur treatment of qualified immunity under [Section 1983] has not purported to be faithful to the common-law immunities that existed when [section] 1983 was enacted and that the statute presumably intended to subsume, *Wyatt*, 504 U.S., at 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In the context of qualified immunity . . . we have diverged to a substantial degree from the historical standards.")).

Qualified immunity lacks a foundation in the text or history of Section 1983. Its continued application in NJCRA cases cannot be justified.

B. The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity Provides Little Benefit to Government Defendants While Promoting Police Impunity and Depriving Victims of Government Abuse of Needed Remedies.

Just as no government interest in pursuing qualified immunity interlocutory appeals can justify the harm they cause to plaintiffs, the doctrine, as a whole, undermines the principles of fairness and deterrence on which the American civil justice system

is founded. See discussion *supra*. § I. Petitioner suggests that qualified immunity is essential to prevent government disruption because it shields government officials from the burdens of defending litigation. See Petitioner's Brief at 8. However, qualified immunity rarely disposes of a case prior to the completion of the most burdensome and costly phases of litigation. See Schwartz, *supra*, at 9 (finding qualified immunity only raised as a defense prior to the initiation of discovery in 13.9% of cases reviewed and only lead to dismissal in 9% of the cases). Empirical evidence shows the doctrine fails to achieve its principal goal.

While qualified immunity only minimally advances the goals of protecting the government from the costs and disruptions of litigation, it has contributed to a culture of police impunity and blocked victims of constitutional violations from recovering for meritorious claims.

Courts have increasingly noted that qualified immunity has essentially provided law enforcement officers with a *carte blanche* to engage in misconduct. *Kisela v. Hughes*, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (2018) ("qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent of the Fourth Amendment"); *Jamison v. McClendon*, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 404-5 (S.D. Miss. 2020) ("Once, qualified immunity protected officers who acted in good faith. The doctrine now protects all officer no matter how egregious their

conduct"); *Zadeh v. Robinson*, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willet, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining qualified immunity created a system where "[w]rongs are not righted, and wrongdoers are not reproached.") As Justice Sotomayor explained in her dissenting opinion in *Kisela*, the shield created by qualified immunity "sends an alarming signal to law enforcement officers and the public. It tells officers they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished." 138 S.Ct. at 1162. The lack of accountability for law enforcement officers through civil rights is particularly concerning for law enforcement personnel as they rarely face administrative or criminal consequences for their misconduct. See e.g., Timothy Williams, *Chicago Rarely Penalizes Officers for Complaints, Data Shows*, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015); See Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, *Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted*, WASH. POST. (April 11, 2015) (noting successful criminal prosecutions are few and far between.).

The civil remedy created by Section 1983 exists to make whole citizens whose constitutional rights have been violated and act as accountability process to hold those officials responsible. *Pearson*, 555 U.S. at 231. The New Jersey Civil Rights Act was enacted to advance similar goals in state court. *Tumpson*, 218 N.J. at 474 (citing *S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. No.*

1558, 211th Leg. 1 (May 6, 2004). The doctrine of qualified immunity has made civil rights statutes ineffective in providing financial and other injunctive relief necessary to advance the goals and underlying purposes of these statutes. See *Eg. Zadeh*, 928 F.3d at 479 (Willett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“this current ‘yes harm, no foul’ imbalance leaves victims violated but not vindicated.”).

New Jersey State Courts have long been a pioneer in expanding protections for its citizens. In fact, many states look to New Jersey case law when construing their own laws. The continued adherence to the judicially created doctrine of qualified immunity serves no valid interests and simply prolongs a citizen’s right to seek redress for violation of their constitutional rights.

Some states legislatures, like New Mexico and Colorado have taken the role of abolishing qualified immunity for state constitutional claims. Even though New Jersey may or may not do it statutorily, this Court has the power to refuse to follow a doctrine which is judicial in nature. The powers rests with this Court.

CONCLUSION


For the reasons set forth above, *amicus curiae*, the National Police Accountability Project, respectfully urges that this Court affirm the decision of the Appellate Division,

holding Petitioners do not have a right to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of qualified immunity. *Amicus* further urges this Court to consider eliminating the defense of qualified immunity in NJCRA cases.

Respectfully,

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IMPACT OF THE NEW MEXICO CIVIL RIGHTS ACT ONE YEAR LATER

In July 2022, NPAP polled fifteen members who practice civil rights in New Mexico to tell us how the New Mexico Civil Right Act (NMCRA) has impacted the rights of their clients since going into effect in July 2021. Overall, NPAP attorneys have not filed more cases than usual but they believe NMCRA will help ensure that their clients who suffered constitutional violations will not have their cases dismissed or stalled because of qualified immunity.

- **NM Civil Rights Attorneys Are Not Filing Significantly More Cases.**
 - Most attorneys that had sued under the law responded that they added NMCRA claims to cases they would have otherwise filed as a standard Section 1983 action.
 - Only two members reported filing a case exclusively under NMCRA and not Section 1983.
 - Five members reported having a case in development that they think would be vulnerable to dismissal under qualified immunity if it were filed as a standard Section 1983 case but will survive under NMCRA.
- **NMCRA Will Help Civil Rights Plaintiffs Survive Dispositive Motions.**
 - Most members anticipate that NMCRA will help them survive dispositive motions on qualified immunity.
 - Members are also optimistic that NMCRA will help their cases against institutional defendants since it creates a cause of action against them, as well. In *Hand v. Cty. of Taos, NM*, the District court found the plaintiff had stated a claim against the county board under NMCRA but not Section 1983 because he had not identified an official policy or custom in his complaint. 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115462, at *5-6 (D.N.M. June 29, 2022).
- **NMCRA Is Helping Avoid Delays Associated with Qualified Immunity**
 - One member thinks that the NMCRA will also lower the number of motions to dismiss, interlocutory appeals, and discovery stays caused by qualified immunity. He is basing this on the fact that a defendant he regularly sues did not file a motion to dismiss in a case where he added NMCRA claims.