Outrageous decision by Judge William Pryor; officer did not use excessive force when at conclusion of high-speed chase, suspect crashed into bushes, officer got out of car behind and to the right of suspect’s car, suspect started backing up, officer fired 11 shots through back windshield and side windows as car passed near him, car rolled across the road and came to a stop with engine running, officer then changed magazines and fired another 10 shots at front of car; Quotes that plaintiffs can expect defendants to use: “When an officer is on foot and standing in close proximity to a suspect’s moving vehicle, he need not be directly in the vehicle’s path to fear reasonably for his life.”, ‘A police officer is entitled to continue his use of force until a suspect thought to be armed is fully secured.’ Jean-Baptiste, 627 F.3d at 821 (internal quotation marks omitted). He is “not required to interrupt a volley of bullets until he kn[ows] that [the suspect] ha[s] been disarmed.” Id. at 822; see also Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 777, 134 S.Ct. 2012 (‘[I]f lethal force is justified, officers are taught to keep shooting until the threat is over.’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nor is he required to wait for a car that has just stopped to begin moving again in his direction. See Pace, 283 F.3d at 1278, 1282 (holding that an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he started firing at a car that had been ‘stopped for, at most, a very few seconds’). A reasonable officer who had nearly been struck by a suspect’s moving vehicle could perceive that the vehicle, with its engine still running and its headlights still shining as it faced him, remained a dangerous weapon that continued to pose a threat until the driver was fully secured.”) ( Note dissent by Judge Jill Pryor, concluding: “I want to highlight that the majority opinion is not just incorrect in this case but also has the potential to excuse the unconstitutional use of force by police in the future. The majority opinion justifies Brown’s use of force by pointing to Christian’s high-speed driving during the chase and Brown’s proximity to the Pontiac as it reversed. I fear that the majority opinion sanctions the use of deadly force when after a car chase an officer on foot approaches a vehicle and the driver attempts to flee, even if the officer is not in the vehicle’s path and has no probable cause to believe the driver will use the vehicle as a weapon. Time and again—for good reason—our precedent has rejected the rationale the majority opinion adopts today. I dissent.” (footnote omitted).
Citation
Actionable Conduct Edition